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Abstract 
This thesis purports to make two contributions to understandings of 
biotechnology. First, it presents a novel framework through which to view 
biotechnology as a complex series of fundamentally social and politically 
economic mediations rather than a decontextualised collection of technical 
and scientific phenomena. Second, the thesis presents a method for 
analysing contemporary discourses about biotechnology within this 
framework. The framework presented in the first content chapter of the 
thesis identifies what I see to be the four primary mediating “movements” 
that are central to seeing Biotechnology as Media: Alienation, Translation, 
Recontextualisation, and Absorption. The next chapter explicates these 
movements more fully using a combination of social practice and discourse 
theory. Using these four movements and the mediation framework as a 
guide, I then critically analyse a corpus of seventy two exemplary texts 
(approximately 700,000 words) about contemporary biotechnology.  
Mediation, in the sense I use it here, is not concerned with one particular 
media form or technology. Rather, it focuses on the process of mediation as 
the movement of meanings (Silverstone, 1999). I argue that seeing 
biotechnologies as mediations can provide a deeper and more critical 
understanding of how ways of seeing, being, acting, and describing 
(discourses) associated with contemporary biotechnology are moved from 
micro- and macro-biological and scientific contexts into the everyday lives 
of citizens and ecosystems. In particular, such a view highlights the forces 
and voices that currently determine the path and substance of political-
economic movements in biotechnology and, consequently, how everyday 
perceptions of biotechnology are shaped or silenced in processes of 
mediation.  
A core assumption of the thesis is that processes of mediation are not 
neutral. Rather, they are always inherently interpretive, politically 
economic, and ethically significant. Any mediation involves “filtering” 
processes via which “content” is transformed into a form that is appropriate 
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for a given medium by persons who have control over the medium, and by 
the nature of the medium itself. This applies as much in laboratory and 
scientific contexts as it does in the contexts of mass consumption, whether 
in newspapers, policy papers, movies (such as Gattaca), or consumer goods. 
The same is true in the mediation of biotechnology: there are technological 
and discursive restrictions on what and who can “contribute to” and “come 
out” of biotechnology and also what is construed as being a valuable and 
desirable outcome of biotechnology research and development. 
The three central analysis chapters of the thesis outline firstly how 
biotechnology can function as a time-based medium for the reproduction of 
already powerful discourses on, for example, the role of technology in 
human development and the consumer market as the moral medium between 
generators of new technologies and their “consumers”. I identify exemplars 
of how the history of biotechnology and mediation (movement) is expressed 
in the corpus. This is followed by a more concentrated analysis of the 
ethical and social significance of the key “official” mediations presented in 
the corpus. I focus in particular on how the predominant policy evaluations 
of biotechnological mediations expressed in state, national, and international 
policy documents construct a “virtuous cycle” of product development that 
will ostensibly “deliver the benefits” of biotechnology to all citizens who, in 
the corpus, are framed predominantly as “consumers”. 
The final chapter of the thesis reflects on the significance of biotechnology 
at the macro level of social practices and systems. Apart from its direct 
function as a technical medium for alienating hitherto inalienable aspects of 
life, such as configurations of DNA, and turning them into products for sale, 
I argue that, as a suite of mediating movements, biotechnology has the 
potential to effectively, and for the most part invisibly, mediate our more 
general understandings and experiences of ourselves, of other species, and 
of the world we live in. More specifically, I argue that biotechnological 
mediations actively, and often forcefully, promote a narrowing of the range 
of evaluative resources on offer to the general community, and indeed to 
biotechnologists themselves. Biotechnological mediations can therefore be 
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described as part of a broader movement away from conditions of 
heteroglossia or dialogue (multi language, multi voice) toward conditions of 
monologia (one language, one voice). 
The thesis concludes with an important question: if we can identify these 
narrowing effects or mediations of biotechnology by using techniques such 
as Critical Discourse Analysis and by seeing biotechnology in a mediation 
framework, what can we do to interrupt them and generate movements that 
are more generative of heteroglossic and socially responsive ways of seeing, 
being, and acting? I offer a number of responses to the question in the 
conclusion. 
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Preface 
This thesis is the culmination of many conversations, thoughts, ideas, and 
experiences that extend beyond the thesis period. The biotechnology focus 
to these ruminations began in 1999 when I undertook what seemed to be a 
promising position at the Brisbane Institute as Project Manager of the 
Institute’s twelve month Biofutures Policy and Awareness Strategy. For 
readers who would not have heard of it, The Brisbane Institute refers to 
itself as an ‘independent think tank’ and ‘public ideas forum’ for Brisbane, 
Queensland, and Australia more generally. The Brisbane Institute is funded 
by sponsors: mostly large companies, universities, and the state government. 
The project I worked on, and my salary, was funded by the state government 
Department of State Development. A number of senior members of the 
Institute’s Board were directly involved with local biotechnology firms and 
research institutions. I took on the job of designing a twelve month series of 
conferences and seminars that were intended to promote public awareness 
and policy development surrounding biotechnology research and 
commercialisation. The research component of the position involved a 
comprehensive mapping and analysis of the Queensland biotechnology 
research and industry sector, including a nation wide survey of the 
“bioindustries” labour force and the distribution of all science related public 
funding for 1999-2000. The purpose of that research was to determine 
where Queensland’s ‘strengths’ and ‘weaknesses’ were in terms of a 
biotechnology industry ‘critical mass’. This research had the potential to 
either validate or invalidate Premier Beattie’s claims that Queensland was, 
XVI 
or would soon be, the biotechnology ‘hub’ of Australia (cf. for example, 
Beattie, 1999). This included my conducting 24 interviews with local 
biotechnology scientists, science bureaucrats, consumer representatives, and 
chief executive officers and managing directors of Queensland 
biotechnology firms. Several of the interviewees have since given 
permission for their interview transcripts to be used as a resource in this 
thesis. 
Every person I interviewed for the research identified that they were 
dissatisfied with the level of debate – or lack thereof – over where 
biotechnology was going. Only two interviewees out of the 24 interviewed 
said that they had participated in a forum that they felt was effective in 
exploring and responding to the social aspects of the technology. Consumer 
representatives were particularly concerned with the polarisation of debate 
into ‘for’ and ‘against’ camps. This sense of frustration with the current 
level of discussion and debate around biotechnology research and 
commercialisation is where my thesis essentially began. 
The time I spent at the Brisbane Institute was not, as I had hoped it would 
be, dedicated to promoting critically informed public awareness of 
biotechnology. Rather, my time was primarily taken up in attempting to 
navigate the multiple and varied interests that were launched on the Institute 
in relation to the biotechnology “awareness” program. The pressure to 
pursue a unquestioned industry development agenda, and not to publish 
anything that could be seen to be critical of local developments in 
biotechnology, grew increasingly over the 12 months from both internal and 
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external sources. The result was that I and my colleagues developed a sense 
of being vastly constrained by the politics of the situation, particularly as we 
became personally affected by our interactions with others in the field. Most 
particularly, we were confronted by the sense that commercial developments 
in biotechnology were, apparently, beyond critical discussion and public 
control.  
I and my colleagues in various institutions at the time felt that the social 
space for informed discussion and questioning of developments in 
biotechnology was being controlled by a strong industry-government focus 
on expanding and commercialising biotechnological research. The space for 
ethical and social deliberation, and the voicing of concerns from persons 
who are directly affected by some of the new genetic technologies, was 
severely curtailed in an often threatening and patronizing manner. Since 
leaving the Brisbane Institute, some of my professional activities in 
biotechnology and ethics have been directed toward opening out these 
spaces for critical reflection and discussion in biotechnology, and in 
challenging the dynamics of silence and silencing that I had witnessed in 
many public biotechnology forums. 
A significant proportion of the first year of this PhD was spent collecting 
and analysing the existing public “education” materials available on 
biotechnology. Using the methods and philosophy of Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) in particular, I was interested in identifying the range of 
resources that we (citizens) are offered through a range of sources as we 
attempt to make sense of, and evaluate, the various claims surrounding the 
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potential benefits and costs of biotechnology research and 
commercialisation. In addition to these textual resources, I was also 
interested in the kinds of public consultation mechanisms that were on offer, 
who controls them, and how they portray – or don’t portray – the different 
agents who are directly or indirectly affected by new biotechnologies. What 
I found was that the curtailing of dissent and strict demarcation of 
discussion and debate I had witnessed at the Brisbane Institute was also 
present in the range of biotechnology education materials on offer. So, not 
only was there a limited range of critical works available to the public, there 
was also very little respected or publicly funded socio-political space within 
which to create alternative or contesting resources.  
These initial rounds of analysis eventually transformed into a broader 
theoretical and conceptual examination of how biotechnology as a social 
practice – as opposed to a merely a technical one – influences the range of 
meaning resources we have on offer to us not only in understanding and 
evaluating biotechnology research, but also in understanding and evaluating 
broader societal movements, aims, and trajectories. To understand the social 
impacts of biotechnology more fully, I had to find some way of 
understanding the ways that biotechnologies and the associated ways of 
seeing and acting ‘moved’ beyond the laboratory into new and different 
social and ecological contexts. This is where Biotechnology as Media 
entered the equation.  
Before delving into these discussions any further, I would like to emphasise 
that I have directly experienced and observed, and continue to experience 
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and observe, many of the pressures, movements, discourses, and political 
interactions that are discussed in this thesis. What began as an attempt to 
simply make sense of these experiences, and be a participant in them, has 
evolved into the theoretical-conceptual rendering of biotechnology as media 
that you are about to read. As perhaps is the experience of many doctoral 
candidates, I have come to see at the end of the thesis writing period that my 
work has only just begun. I offer the thesis therefore as an initial ‘map of the 
territory’ with the hope that it will assist others in their attempts to 
comprehend, and respond to, the ever increasing detail of a modern 
biotechnology terrain. 
  1
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Introducing biotechnology 
One of the primary challenges that citizens – and this category includes 
academics, business people, lawyers, politicians, and scientists – encounter 
when attempting to understand and evaluate “biotechnology” is its broad 
nature and the very different range of contexts, practices, discourses, 
techniques, and persons it involves, uses, or affects. Official institutional 
definitions of biotechnology oscillate between framing biotechnology as any 
scientific technique that uses or consumes one aspect of a living organism as 
a tool to do something else (viz bio-technology) and technologies that 
produce a complete living organism or bio-product of a certain type or 
quality. So, for example, biotechnology can include anything from using 
reproductive technologies to select an embryo that does not have the genetic 
traits of, for example, Down’s Syndrome, to using yeast to make bread or 
hops to brew beer.  
Current examples of bio-products include do it yourself DNA screening and 
diagnostic kits for sale via the Internet; genetically engineered vaccines and 
drugs; replacement body parts harvested from genetically engineered 
animals for xenotransplantation1 into humans; compounds produced in, and 
harvested from, genetically engineered or naturally occurring organisms; 
                                                 
1 Xenotransplantation includes ‘any procedure that involves the transplantation, implantation, or 
infusion into a human recipient of human body fluids, cells, tissues, or organs that have had ex vivo 
contact with live nonhuman animal cells, tissues, or organs. The definition includes human embryos 
co-cultured with living nonhuman animal cellular material, such as bovine tubal cells or Vero cells, 
and includes feeder layer cells irradiated to render them nonproliferative’ (Crawford, 2002). 
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human skin for sale; living bacteria that consume and convert pollutants 
such as diesel; reproduction technologies and services for example, donor 
insemination, in vitro fertilisation, and animal cloning; pre natal genetic 
screening for genetic diseases and conditions such as Down’s Syndrome and 
Thalassemia; and animals, plants, and foodstuffs that are genetically 
engineered to display particular traits, such as taste, colour, lower levels of 
body fat, heat or cold resistance, insect resistance, or stress resistance.  
Most of the technologies that we refer to as biotechnologies are different 
from the kinds of technologies of mass production we have known in the 
past: these are not generally the kinds of technologies that require a lot of 
space to be housed or fuel to run. Many of the so called biotechnologies are 
actually technical knowledges and associated laboratory tools and 
computerised techniques that sit in, and in the spaces between, a range of 
scientific and industry minds and computing networks in a range of 
scientific disciplines and industry areas. Areas of scientific inquiry involved 
in biotechnology include, for example, molecular biology; genomics; 
functional genomics; computational biology; microbiology; bioinformatics; 
genetics; animal husbandry; chemistry; pharmacy; biomedicine; agriculture; 
pharming2; and aquaculture. So, although we hear a lot about 
“biotechnology” or “gene technology” as a new area of science, it doesn’t 
really exist in isolation from any of these branches of science, from longer 
term traditions of human biological intervention in physical life forms and 
                                                 
2 Pharming involves genetically engineering and growing animals and plants that produce compounds 
used to produce pharmaceuticals for human and veterinary purposes. 
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systems, from the existing and emerging bio-productive apparatus or, in fact, 
from public policy initiatives, industry, and government priorities upon 
which it is still highly dependent in OECD countries including Australia.  
Further, I observe that the social practice of biotechnology is a purposive, 
and in most countries now, a formal hybrid of these scientific practices with 
industry practices and contexts. I do not assume though that the science-
industry hybrid that characterises contemporary biotechnology is new to 
science. Rather, science has an ongoing history of collaboration and co-
determination with industry that has, at different periods in history, become 
more or less prominent (cf. Ben-Chaim, 2001; Chen, 1992; Gaudillière, 
2001; Leiss, 1994). Ravetz (1971) identifies four different conceptions of the 
relationship between science and industry, including the possibility that 
science should be free of any associations with the state or industry.  
1. The idea of science as a technique important to industry; 
2. The idea of industry as a technique (productive apparatus) 
important to science; 
3. The idea of science as a form of knowledge valuable in itself; 
and 
4. The idea of science as a vehicle of liberation from dogmatic 
attitudes and irrational faith (Ravetz, 1971, in Leiss, 1994, p. 
xi).  
All of these conceptions of science and its relationship or non-relationship 
with industry and capital are present in contemporary discourses and 
definitions of biotechnology yet, obviously, some are more prominent than 
others. While all are present in the discourse, it is notable that contemporary 
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biotechnology policy prescribes that commercial industry intervention in 
biotechnology research and development activities are vital and indisputable 
requirements for deriving benefits from biotechnology.  
The rhetorico-economic enhancement of biotechnology 
A consistent finding in the critical literature that deals with language 
practices surrounding biotechnology is that government and scientific 
institutions have primarily sought to ‘indoctrinate rather than illuminate’ 
(Seedhouse, 2001) the public so that they will accept and value 
biotechnology products and services (cf. for example Hindmarsh, 1996; 
Hindmarsh, Lawrence, and Norton, 1998; Fraser, 2001; Sunderland, 2000). 
The authors cited above analyse public education brochures on genetically 
modified foods, touring CSIRO science education vans, public speeches 
made by influential scientists, politicians, research directors, and information 
booklets and discussion papers circulated by “independent” think tanks, and 
so on.  
My critical discourse analysis of a corpus of policy, education, industry, and 
interview texts, has confirmed these same dynamics of indoctrination across 
a range of textual genres in biotechnology. The highly prophetic 
“biotechnology is our future” discourse in particular is entrenched in the 
policies of all of the countries represented in the thesis corpus. The degree to 
which Politicians have “hedged their bets” on biotechnology is evident in a 
speech presented by the Queensland Premier Peter Beattie to Tokyo business 
leaders in 1999. 
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Like you, I am obsessed with the immense potential biotechnology has 
to improve our quality of life and to create a future for our children. 
Australia is one of the 12 mega-diverse3 countries on earth. And 
Queensland has more than its share of this natural wealth. Some 20 of 
Australia's bioregions are in Queensland. And a further 15 marine 
bioregions occur in Queensland waters. We have five world heritage-
listed sites covering some 40 million hectares, including vast wet tropics 
areas, and Fraser Island - the world's largest sand mass. Our Reefs 
and Rainforests make Queensland not only a magnificent place to work, 
live or holiday - but they also present a unique opportunity to claim a 
future in this great industry. (Beattie, 1999, np) 
This excerpt is indicative of things to come. Here, Premier Beattie not only 
claims biotechnology as his and his audience’s ‘obsession’, but 
simultaneously construes Queensland’s “biodiversity” as something to be 
exploited. This discourse of discovering and exploiting natural resources in 
the form of biodiversity is, arguably, at the base of dominant “official” 
representations of biotechnology research and commercialisation.  
Biotechnology scientists and industrialists refer to the process of looking for 
exploitable “value” in natural world as “bioprospecting”. Bioprospecting is 
very simply ‘biotechnological research that looks for a useful application, 
process, or product in nature’ (United States National Parks Service, 2002, 
np). Beattie’s claims regarding the competitiveness of Australia and 
Queensland rests upon the degree to which economic value can be 
technologically extracted from Queensland’s megadiverse ecosystems. Bio-
                                                 
3 Approximately 12 countries in the world (Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, the United 
States, India, Indonesia, Madagascar, Mexico, Peru and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) 
contain 70% of our planet's biodiversity. These countries are known as being “Megadiverse”.  
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prospecting, as the name suggests, is ideationally consistent with traditional 
land mining practices and views except that it is living organisms (for 
example, corals, marine animals, or snakes) that are being screened and 
mined for things (for example, venoms, novel compounds) that can be 
transformed into a useful/valuable bio technology or product (for example, 
new drugs, anti-venoms, bioremediation organisms). A point to note here is 
that the object of bioprospecting is literally anything that is living that can 
be mined for potential use value. This practice of bioinformatics is central to 
biotechnology’s mediating impact in that it expands the range of contexts 
and organisms that can be subjected to instrumental imperatives of capitalist 
production. 
Bioprospecting – and biotechnology more generally – relies significantly on 
information and communication technologies (ICTs). This interaction with 
ICTs is commonly referred to as “bioinformatics”. Bioinformatics is ‘the 
science of developing computer databases and algorithms for the purpose of 
speeding up and enhancing biological research’ (UF Interdisciplinary 
Bioinformatics Initiative, 2001, p. 1). Bioinformatics has been used most 
noticeably in the Human Genome Project where scientists worked with 
mathematicians, statisticians, and computational specialists to develop 
software programs that could be used to catalogue and analyse human DNA. 
Students in Bioinformatics receive training in molecular biology and in 
computer science, including database design and analytical approaches (UF 
Interdisciplinary Bioinformatics Initiative, 2001, p. 1).  
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Thus, while much focus is on the biological science tools and techniques, 
biotechnology is more accurately described as “converging” biological and 
information technologies (cf. Graham, Isaacs, and Sunderland, 2002, p. 20; 
Thacker, 2000, 2002). Eugene Thacker’s work on “biomedia” is perhaps the 
most specific exploration of this phenomenon of technical and biological 
convergence. Thacker (2002, p. 1) uses the term “biomedia” to describe the 
‘technical recontextualization [sic] of biological components and processes’. 
Extending on Donna Haraway’s (1990) work on cyborgs, Thacker (2002, p. 
1) describes ‘the way in which the body-technology relationship is 
transformed in biotech research, from a relative separation (human-user, 
machine-tool) towards a specific implosion (the biologization of 
technology)’. Indeed, the term bio-technology provides an interesting 
illustration of the convergence of these two spheres of the biological and the 
technical as manifest in language. 
Perhaps most significantly, the use of ICTs in biotechnology is directly 
patterned in the thesis corpus with discourses of speed and acceleration. It is 
also interesting to note that computer screens are frequently featured in 
pictorial representations of all biotechnology contexts in the thesis corpus – 
except “third world” and “developing countries”. The focus on speeding up 
biological research is also indicated in the above definition of 
bioinformatics. The emergence of “high throughput screening”; “high 
throughput analysis”; and “high throughput biology” in local research 
institutes reaffirms the focus of ICT use in biotechnology as being on 
speeding up the research and development process and on being able to 
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process large amounts of ‘data’ (i.e. screening genomes or the materials 
harvested through bioprospecting such as corals, plants, venoms, shells).  
Discourses of speed in biotechnology relate interdiscursively to what 
Armitage and Graham (2001) refer to as “dromo-economic” imperatives for 
speed, efficiency, and productivity in contemporary political economy (see 
also Pace, 2002). Quoting Armitage and Graham (2001, p. 3): ‘Virilio 
believes that the logic of ever-increasing acceleration lies at the heart of the 
political and economic organisation and transformation of the contemporary 
world’. As Virilio puts it:  
To me, this means that speed and riches are totally linked concepts. And 
that the history of the world is not only about the political economy of 
riches, that is, wealth, money, capital, but also about the political 
economy of speed. If time is money, as they say, then speed is power. 
(Virilio, 2000, in Armitage and Graham, 2001, 3-4)  
Speed is also important in contemporary biotechnology due to the increased 
focus on patenting and licensing. As a reviewer of this thesis points out, you 
cannot patent if you are not first to develop or “discover” a particular genetic 
technology. As an example, the following excerpt from the United Nations’ 
Human Development Report for 2001 presents contemporary biotechnology 
practices as being preferable to traditional breeding precisely because they 
can do it faster: 
Traditional cross-breeding takes a long time, typically 8-12 years. Biotechnology 
speeds the process of producing crops with altered traits by using a specific 
genetic trait from any plant and moving it into the genetic code of any other 
plant. More significantly, the modification of plants is no longer restricted by the 
characteristics of that species. (UN Human Development Report, 2001) 
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Of note as well is the fact that the authors of the UN Human Development 
Report also esteem the fact that plants can be engineered and produced using 
the genetic characteristics of other species which was not possible using 
traditional cross breeding techniques.  
Why biotechnology is significant as media  
Biotechnology is significant as media firstly because, as a practice, it 
produces and reproduces certain ways of seeing the world in multiple social 
and ecological contexts. Based on a critical discourse analysis of policy, 
education, industry, and interview texts, I observe that biotechnology 
discourses are shaped by, and in turn perpetuate, a range of historically 
salient discourses in western society. These include, for example, 
foregrounding economic capital and technological determinism in discourses 
of human development; using natural resources and contexts as materials 
and sites of capital production; focusing on speed and acceleration in 
technological and economic progress rather than extended contemplation of 
social and ecological factors; and the artificial demarcation of allegedly 
“rational” and “objective” physical sciences from allegedly “irrational” or 
“emotive” social sciences and practices of ethics, faith, or politics.  
Multiple institutions and practices in Australia have been transformed in the 
same way that biotechnology is being transformed to accord with dominant 
economic imperatives at present (Bainbridge, 1997; Leiss, 1994; Marginson, 
1997; Pusey, 1991; Saul, 1997; Sunderland and Graham, 1998; Yeatman, 
1993, 1998). These include practices as pervasive and potentially influential 
as education, health care, and public service. Viewed in this socio-
  10
ecological, socio-historical context, biotechnology is but one development in 
a more pervasive social trajectory toward economic totality in social and 
biological life. Although it cannot be seen as a completely new phenomenon, 
biotechnology is a notable development in this trajectory because, since the 
advent of genetic technologies in the 1970s, and the ongoing “gold rush” for 
intellectual property rights on previously inalienable DNA, humans can not 
only design, commodify, and homogenise social processes and practices 
such as education, health care, public service delivery, they can also more 
thoroughly or fundamentally redesign, commodify, and homogenise living 
organisms to accord with the dominant productive requirements of the day. 
Hence, the sphere of assumed human control over other humans and species 
is increased. 
Biotechnology is, thus, also significant as media because it increases the 
range and depth of potential sites and contexts within which dominant 
conceptions of progress, the good life, and so on, can operate. Bakhtin 
describes the tendency toward, and associated politics of, particular 
homogenising discourses as a “centripetal” force toward a central point. This 
is opposed to “centrifugal” forces which promote movements away from this 
central point toward heterogeneity. Both the centripetal and centrifugal 
forces, he argues, are played out in language.  
…there are two forces in operation whenever language is used: 
centripetal force and centrifugal force. Centripetal force… tends to push 
things toward a central point; centrifugal force tends to push things 
away from a central point and out in all directions. Bakhtin says that 
monologic language (monologia) operates according to centripetal 
force…The centripetal force of monologia is trying to get rid of 
  11
differences among languages (or rhetorical modes) in order to present 
one unified language. Monologia is a system of norms, of one standard 
language, or an "official" language, a standard language that everyone 
would have to speak (and which would then be enforced by various 
mechanisms, such as Althusser's RSAs and ISAs). (Bakhtin in Klages, 
2001, np) 
I argue that these centripetal and centrifugal movements toward and away 
from heteroglossia are the broadest level of mediation associated with 
biotechnology. In consonance with Bakhtin, I posit that these movements are 
mediated by, and manifest in, language. The concepts of heteroglossia and 
monologia are thus central to the thesis.  
Bakhtin’s heteroglossia rose out of Soviet culture during, and in response to, 
Stalin’s ‘revolution from above’ from 1928-32 (Brandist, 2002, p. 92). 
Bakhtin invokes the concept heteroglossia to argue against the idea that an 
artificially imposed “national language” could possibly represent the intense 
stratification and diversity of language that constitutes a culture. 
The internal stratification of a single national language into social 
dialects, group manners, professional jargons, generic languages, 
languages of generations and age groups, languages of trends, languages 
of authorities, languages of circles and passing fashions, languages of 
socio-political days, even hours (every day has its slogan, its 
vocabulary, its accent) (Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 262-3, in Brandist, 2002, p. 
115)  
Bakhtin emphasises that, at any given moment of its becoming, language is 
stratified not only into linguistic dialects in the strict sense of the word 
(according to formal linguistic markers, especially phonetic), but, also into 
‘socio-ideological languages: languages of social groups, “professional” 
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languages,, “generic” languages, languages of generations’. (Bakhtin, 1981, 
p. 271-2, in Brandist, 2002, p. 113).  
I argue that the rhetorical and discursive strategies involved in suppressing 
heteroglossia in biotechnology are not only political but have an inherent 
ethical significance. The natural heteroglossia that exists in a community or 
society incorporates multiple and varied points of view on the world which 
are in a constant state of becoming (Bakhtin, 1929/1986, in Lemke, 1995, p. 
22). Moreover, heteroglossia ‘creates the conditions for the possibility of a 
free consciousness’ by its representation of the limits of discourse and, 
hence, interpretation (Morris, 1994, p. 16). By contrast, politico-rhetorical 
and discursive strategies that seek to impose and perpetuate monologia (even 
though this could never be wholly successful) not only threaten, but also 
devalue the natural diversity of voices and languages. Despite the rich range 
of contesting and marginalised voices that have responded to developments 
in biotechnology, proponents of biotechnology have promoted, and continue 
to promote, a monologic, positivistic agenda for accelerated 
biotechnological development. This, I argue, is of inherent ethical and 
political significance, a point I explicate further in the chapters that discuss 
critical discourse analysis (chapters 5-7).  
Biotechnology proponents’ attempts to overrun heteroglossic responses to 
biotechnology with an official, positivistic rationale and discourse are 
significant in a number of ways. Biotechnologies – when observed through a 
mediation framework – touch and transform many contexts. Their impact is 
not limited to the contexts in which they are directly produced or consumed. 
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For example, by the time a biotechnology product gets to market it will have 
been transformed on repeated occasions, and in multiple contexts, according 
to the discourses, practices, and processes of, for example, scientific 
research institutions and peer review processes, government policy 
directives, government regulations, government funding priorities, 
intellectual property guidelines and regulations, ethics committees, 
commercialisation, commodification, industrialisation, marketing, and so on. 
The “product” that eventuates is a complex “black box” of all of these social 
and technical processes and interests which perhaps no individual is able to 
account for (Latour, 1987). 
Biotechnology can produce and consume anything from a strand of DNA, a 
single cell bacteria, an ovum, a sperm cell, an embryo, a species of plant, or 
a living person or animal. This fact is obscured in scientific discourse by the 
use of the term “living organism” to describe the objects and outcomes of 
biotechnology. The term “living organism” cannot capture the fact that 
persons can be, and already are, the outcome of these technologies. 
Moreover, there is almost nothing in the official representations of 
biotechnology to indicate that “potential” persons can be, and already are, 
prevented from being born as a result of these technologies when a foetus or 
fertilized egg is “discarded” because it has the genetic characteristics for, for 
example, Down’s Syndrome. A foetus or fertilized egg may also be 
discarded for not displaying the genetic characteristics required for, for 
example, bone marrow transplantation with an older sibling. 
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But just as the bio-products and technologies themselves are repeatedly 
transformed, so too are the contexts – and the people who constitute them – 
that deal with them. To deal with each “new technology” mediating 
practices are required to generate, for instance, new laws; new ethical 
guidelines; new cataloguing techniques; new storage bins that keep GM 
from Non GM grains; and new consultation mechanisms for dealing with the 
public. Further, apart from being “workers” in a constantly adapting chain of 
vocational contexts for bio-product commercialisation development, 
humans, along with non human animals and plants, are also objects and 
“outcomes” of biotechnological research and commercialisation. By this I 
mean that humans are objects of scientific research and technologies used to 
alienate particular body parts or cells and they are also the products of these 
kinds of interventions.  
A human baby can, for instance, be technologically mediated into existence 
through the use of IVF technologies, genetic screening, or genetic selection. 
Although still dependent on the presence of an ovum, sperm, and uterus, the 
resulting human is, within certain limits, a product of biotechnologies. The 
basic biological being of an adult human might also be transformed through 
gene therapy or other medicinal and therapeutic interventions. In a more 
extreme example, genetically engineered animals and plants are literally 
produced – as opposed to organically reproduced – using the techniques, 
technologies, and products of biotechnology: biotechnology is engineered 
and absorbed in the very substance of some animals’ and plants’ biological 
be-ing. In this case, processes and contexts of “animal” reproduction are 
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superseded by “rational” processes of controlled economic production 
(Haraway, 1990, p. 191; Plumwood, 1993). Haraway (1990, p. 191) argues 
that this replacement of the “animal” with the “rational” has already 
permeated much of human and animal life. In her words, ‘we are all 
chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in 
short, we are cyborgs’. Jordan (1999, p. 4) similarly argues that science and 
technology have attained an ‘intimate and penetrating’ presence in our lives 
through surgery, dentistry, electronic devices such as pacemakers, and the 
constant digestion and absorption of pharmaceuticals, vitamins, and body 
enhancing chemicals.  
Biotechnology is also significant as media because it is an inherently 
exclusive medium. In technologising and rationalising reproduction, 
practices such as biotechnology do not allow all humans to exercise 
“authorship” over their own, or others’, being. Rather, biotechnology – like 
any other specialist knowledge and practice – provides an inherently 
exclusive technological medium via which humans with the appropriate 
knowledge and position can produce and reproduce new or altered forms of 
human, and non human, life. As confirmed by the corpus texts, it is a reality 
that elite scientific, technological, and capitalist impulses predominantly 
define not only the official purpose of biotechnology practice, but also the 
official means of achieving that purpose and the nature of practitioners’ 
relationships with other practices, living organisms, and the natural 
environment. I use the term “official” here to emphasise that although there 
are dominant ways of representing biotechnology evident in the thesis 
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corpus, these are not the only representations. Indeed, the interview 
transcripts with research scientists (as opposed to research directors or 
company CEOs) displayed a clear lack of these “official” ways of describing 
the purpose and means of biotechnology.  
Key concepts and methods employed in the thesis 
The methods of analysis employed in this thesis have both shaped, and been 
shaped by, the central conceptual and theoretical components of the thesis 
during all stages of its construction. It should be assumed that all conceptual 
and theoretical components of the thesis will act as “method” in their own 
right, and that the outcomes of progressive analyses have, in turn, 
significantly shaped the conceptual and theoretical framework developed 
throughout the thesis. Literatures relevant to both theory and analysis are 
interwoven throughout the thesis chapters rather than grouped into one 
literature review style chapter. This approach is consistent with the overall 
dialogic nature of the thesis and the research method. The key terms and 
concepts employed in the thesis are introduced below. 
Media 
Media in this thesis does not refer to particular media technologies or 
institutions such as television, radio, or print. I argue, rather, that 
contemporary biotechnology practices depend on processes of mediation: 
processes of shifting and politicising meanings. Seeing biotechnology 
through a “media lens” most importantly requires recognition that the 
process of mediation is fundamentally interpretive, evaluative, 
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transformative, and perhaps most strictly, politically economic (Silverstone, 
1999, p. 4).  
Mediation involves the movement of meaning from one text to another, 
from one discourse to another, from one event to another. It involves the 
constant transformation of meanings, both large scale and small, 
significant and insignificant, as media texts and texts about media 
circulate in writing, in speech and audiovisual forms, and as we, 
individually and collectively, directly and indirectly, contribute to their 
production (1999, p. 13). 
In developing a framework for seeing biotechnology as media, I emphasise 
the various ways that any given social practice is both subject to, and 
initiator of, mediating practices that move both “into” and “out from” the 
permeable discursive “boundaries” of the social practice of biotechnology. 
Using critical discourse analysis (explained below) I have analysed the 
politico-discursive movement of biotechnology into a number of different 
social contexts into which core biotechnological products, ways of seeing, 
being, and acting are being “exported”.  
Based on this analysis, I observe that biotechnology as media has three 
primary aspects and implications: That is, biotechnology is simultaneously a 
technological, social, and historical medium. First, as indicated above, 
biotechnology is a technological medium for the production, alienation, 
technologisation, and commodification of living creatures and plants and 
other “life materials”. That is, while the so called “new genetic 
technologies” can be used to design and produce a complete living creature 
that exhibits particular “desirable” characteristics, these technologies and 
techniques can also be used to alienate (remove from origin), commodify, 
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and technologise (use as a tool for some other purpose) one particular aspect 
of a living creature or thing – such as deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), a 
particular type of cell or enzyme, venom, or a derivative compound. 
Second, biotechnology is a social medium for producing and reproducing 
particular ways of seeing, being, acting and describing over others 
(discourse). In highlighting biotechnology as social media, I want to 
emphasise that official discourses on biotechnology (i.e. those that are 
authorised by governments and other powerful institutions) produce and 
reproduce certain, identifiable evaluative and political orientations regarding 
what is progressive, normal, healthy, dispensable, desirable, undesirable, and 
so on. Throughout the thesis I maintain that governments’ role in promoting 
biotechnology in multiple countries across the world – and in making it a 
basis for economic, industry, health, and science and technology policy –
increases the potential power and influence of biotechnology to function as 
social media in multiple social contexts in and over time.  
Finally, as indicated previously, I argue that biotechnology is an historical 
medium for the reproduction and rejuvenation of a number of historically 
salient discourses not only regarding what constitutes “the good life” but 
also who or what is included or excluded in that good life, and how we as a 
society or species might go about achieving that good life. I argue that, via 
the social practice of biotechnology, these historically powerful discourses 
and trajectories are being successfully reproduced, reinvigorated, and 
conveyed into new or expanded social and biological contexts. When viewed 
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in this way, biotechnology can be seen literally as a medium between the 
past, present, and the future. 
The term “context” is used in this thesis to denote a specific field of activity 
which may include multiple and overlapping social practices and 
geographical sites of activity. I may refer, for example, to “contexts of 
consumption”; “contexts of production”; “the laboratory context”; “the 
market context”; or “the body-context”. I argue that contexts are significant 
because they set both formal and informal standards of discourse and 
interaction: contexts are “genres” of social engagement if you like (Bakhtin, 
1986, in Eggins and Martin, 1997, p. 236; Weiss and Wodak, 2003, pp. 21-
22). The contexts that are featured in the corpus and the broader thesis 
include:  
- Spaces of abstraction prior to biotechnological intervention 
including, for example, ecosystems and the body context;  
- Scientific research and teaching contexts in universities and schools;  
- Laboratories in public and private research units;  
- Computing machines and networks;  
- Commercialisation, product development, and marketing contexts;  
- ‘The market’ of exchange;  
- Officially designated “public” contexts, including the supermarket, 
the street, the hospital, the clinic, and the workplace; 
- Pharmaceutical companies;  
- “The Bioindustries”; 
- The mass Media; 
- Industry-research “clusters”, “networks”, and “hubs”;  
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- “Developing” countries and “The Third World”; 
- “Global science and technology”; 
- Stock markets and finance;  
- Agricultural production contexts; 
- Government policy and regulatory contexts (ethics is usually 
included in regulation); 
- Ecosystems and individual living organisms that have been or will be 
transformed through biotechnological intervention; 
- Economies that will be transformed through the development of 
bioindustries. 
As I explain in Chapter 2 – A Framework for Viewing Biotechnology as 
Media – different contexts require translation and transformation in the 
nature of biotechnological products, but, perhaps more significantly, the 
values that are attributed to them.  
Through iterative phases of analysis and conceptualisation I have identified 
four primary mediating processes involved in moving biotechnology 
discourses in and between the contexts listed above: Alienation, Translation, 
Recontextualisation, and Absorption. I will henceforth refer to these as the 
four primary “movements” of biotechnology as media. The four movements 
describe in a cumulative way the discursive mediating processes via which 
aspects of “life” are technologically alienated from their origin; 
commodified and translated into, and interpreted using, existing technocratic 
discourses; recontextualised from living organisms and ecosystems, to the 
laboratory, to the computer, to markets of exchange, and once again to living 
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organisms through consumption; and then finally absorbed into the everyday 
invisibility of the productive apparatus, the lives of citizens, and ecosystems.  
I argue that these four movements, when combined, can be employed to 
understand the political, social, and ethical affects and transformations of 
biotechnology in a range of social contexts beyond the social practice of 
biotechnology itself. In illuminating the sites and contexts where apparently 
preordained and discursively limiting movements in meaning are 
promulgated and imposed, the biotechnology as media framework also 
highlights where counter movements can be made to open out and contest 
monologia.  
Social practice 
The conceptual framework for positioning biotechnology as media rests on a 
theoretical understanding of biotechnology as a social practice. Following 
Isaacs (1998), I define social practice as a socially constructed, socially 
constituted, and socially embedded4 collection of persons, techniques, 
technologies, discourses, ways of seeing, being, and acting that are bound 
together toward the achievement (in actuality or representation) of a 
common purpose(s). A social practice is not an institution, although social 
practices do entail institutional dimensions of hierarchy and authority as 
indicated above. The term social practice is, rather, intended to signify 
practices that are characterised by shared traditions, ways of seeing, being, 
                                                 
4 Social embedded nature refers to the way in which social practices ‘exist within broader social 
settings and alongside other social practices’ (Isaacs, 1998, p. 7).  
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acting, meaning making, and, particularly in the case of biotechnology in 
current times, designation of common orientation and purpose. 
Diverging from Isaacs’ original model, I argue that discourse and language 
are the primary means by which social practices are produced and 
reproduced over time and via which they shape, and are shaped by, 
surrounding social individuals, practices, and systems. In consonance with 
Bakhtin and Luhmann (1995), I argue, then, that language and discourse are 
the primary means via which social practices function as media. This 
argument depends on the characteristics of social practices as outlined by 
Isaacs:  
i. Social practices are constructed and constituted by persons; 
ii. Social practices are directed toward an overall purpose; 
iii. Social practices are shaped by tradition i.e. of what to do within the 
practice and how to do it; 
iv. Social practices depend on processes of learning and socialisation to 
recreate themselves; 
v. Social practices involve, but are not necessarily delimited by, an 
institutional or organisational dimension including the production and 
reproduction of positions and discourses of authority and power within 
the practice; and 
vi. Social practices exist within wider social and ecological systems. 
(Isaacs, 1998, pp. 3-8) 
I posit that the notion of social practice provides a functional and effective 
framework for comprehending and analysing biotechnology in its social, 
political, historical, and discursive contexts. More generally, it allows me to 
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foreground a socio-political and historical aspect to biotechnology, rather 
than a merely technical or economic aspect as is often the case in official 
biotechnology discourse.  
Comprehending biotechnology as social practice also, and perhaps most 
significantly, allows me to highlight that the “boundaries” surrounding any 
given social practice are discursive and, hence, are permeable. This one 
feature of biotechnology as a social practice is perhaps the key 
understanding of the biotechnology as media framework. Permeable 
boundaries mean that discursive resources may flow both into and out from 
the social practice of biotechnology. Adding critical discourse analysis to the 
mix helps me to identify and critique the nature, content, and politico-ethical 
implications of these mediating interchanges.  
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
Critical discourse analysis is employed in the thesis to emphasise the social 
constitutive, political and rhetorical functions of language (cf. Gee and 
Lankshear, 1995; Weiss and Wodak, 2003). One of the key considerations of 
the thesis is to identify, through close textual and interdiscursive analysis, 
the way that biotechnology promotes particular voices and particular ways 
of seeing, being, and describing while at times actively subverting others. I 
understand that discourse has many meanings in academic and non academic 
circles, however, the term discourse will be used in this thesis to describe a 
specific dialogical relationship between ways of seeing, ways of being, ways 
of acting, and ways of describing. Unless otherwise indicated, the reader can 
assume that when I use the term ‘discourse’ I am also referring to these 
  24
broader dialogic aspects of the term including ways of seeing, being, and 
acting.  
My use of the term discourse is consistent with the CDA literature (cf. 
Fairclough, 2001, p. 1; Lemke, 1995, p. 24; Stillar, 1999, p. 91). As Lemke 
states: 
[Discourse refers to] the persistent habits of speaking and acting, 
characteristic of some social group, through which it constructs its 
worldview: its beliefs, opinions and values. It is through discourse 
formations that we construct the very objects of our reality, from 
electrons to persons, from words to ‘discourse formations’. We 
necessarily do so from some social point of view, with some cultural 
system of beliefs and assumptions, and some system of values, interests 
and biases. We do this not as individuals alone, but as members of 
communities, and however we do it, whatever discourse formations we 
deploy to make sense of the world, our formations always have 
systematic sociological relations to their formations. We speak with the 
voices of our communities, and to the extent that we have individual 
voices, we fashion these out of the social voices already available to us, 
appropriating the words of others to speak a word of our own. (Lemke, 
1995, p. 24) 
In consonance with Stillar, I assume that ‘discoursal and rhetorical acts 
[both] shape and reflect the social practices of groups in particular contexts’ 
(Stillar, 1999, p. 91). Furthermore, I assume that this mutually constitutive 
relationship between discourse and social life is a feature of all social 
processes, relationships, and contexts. As Fairclough states, ‘CDA is based 
upon a view of semiosis as an irreducible element of all material social 
processes’ (Williams, 1977, in Fairclough, 2001, p. 1, italics added) 
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The rationale for using CDA in this thesis is that language acts are 
‘intimately connected to the social conditions out of which texts arise and to 
the social consequences that follow them’ (Stillar, 1998, p. 90). While we 
may tend to see a written “text” as a static or object form of discourse, Stillar 
emphasises that discoursal or rhetorical texts are social and symbolic acts: 
‘A text is an active step in a sequence of related social goings-on. It does 
something in its social context…’ (Stillar, 1998, pp. 1-3). A written code of 
ethics or a policy statement, for example, is obviously still a part of a social 
context(s) and is an active step in ‘social-goings-on’ (Stillar, 1999, pp. 1-3). 
Persons use a code of ethics or a policy document to express, influence, and 
regulate social-goings-on. These texts are officialised means by which 
authoritative actors and institutions, such as governments, articulate 
normative expectations and principles for engagement between persons.  
Hence, a text is also a phenomenological manifestation of a range of 
different contexts, agendas, interests, and imperatives that are translated and 
recontextualised into [usually] written form. Although a text can be seen as 
being symbolic or representative, it does not originate or exist independently 
of the human agents who create and interpret it, their contexts and 
experiences, their intentions, and/or the action that the text initiates. As 
Stillar argues,  
…all symbolic acts articulate their participants’ interests in – their 
orientation toward – what is being represented and who is being 
addressed. A symbolic act is not merely “about” something; it indexes 
our position with regard to that something – whether we think it 
desirable, possible, likely, good or bad, and so on – and with regard to 
that “someone” we are addressing – whether we tell, ask, or command, 
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and whether we construct our addressee as “above” or “below” or 
“equal”. The symbolic act is the material with which we play out our 
motives, our interests, and our stance in relation to others and to 
ourselves. (Stillar, 1998, pp. 4-5) 
Like Stillar, Lemke emphasises that each act of discursive interaction has an 
‘orientational dimension’ (Lemke, 1995, p. 11). But while Stillar emphasises 
that the symbolic act is deliberative to the extent that it is the ‘material with 
which we play out our motives’, Lemke asserts that the orientational-
political function of the symbolic act is in fact unavoidable. We can 
inadvertently through our symbolic acts commit ourselves to a particular 
political stance and social point of view in the eyes of others without, 
perhaps, even being aware that we have done so: 
We orient our meanings toward prospective audiences and we orient 
them within a system of different viewpoints available in the 
community toward our topic. These orientations involve value 
preferences: they commit us to a political stance and a social point of 
view on our subject and toward our audiences. They are inescapable, 
and to the extent that our viewpoint is determined by our social position, 
and by our social and political interests in any conflict between social 
positions, orientations meaning situates us in the realm of textual 
politics. (Lemke, 1995, p. 11-12) 
Whether it is apparent or not, every text included in the thesis corpus makes 
claims on how its reader is to think about, and attribute value to, 
developments in biotechnology. There are many features of a text that can 
function in this way. Static object categories such as ‘the third world’, ‘the 
disadvantaged’, ‘the anti-biotechnology community’, ‘the disabled’, and 
‘living organisms’, for example, have an objectifying function. These kinds 
of categories also have the added meta-function of privileging and 
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promoting stereotypical, universal, and partial ‘sight lines’ of cognition over 
ones that might reveal and appreciate vulnerability, particularity, and/or 
difference (Steiner, 1975, p. 78).  
In this thesis I have adopted Stillar’s (1998) approach of combining critical 
discourse analysis with functional grammar and rhetorical analysis. Close 
textual analysis using functional grammar is important because it highlights 
exactly how lexical and grammatical variation in a text functions to produce 
particular political, evaluative, and rhetorical ends. The everyday rendering 
of active processes (verbs) or persons (subjects/agents) as nouns (things) in 
scientific discourse is but one example of how grammar influences the 
evaluative orientation and epistemological impact of a text. The significance 
of this particular example is that, when a person is rendered as a thing or 
object, the necessity for others to be responsive to the person as a person is 
reduced or removed entirely.  
Rhetorical analysis is important because it brings us to think about the way 
that we are persuaded to think about things in a certain way. Rhetoric in a 
very general sense is the study and practice of persuasion (Aristotle, 1991, 
pp. 1-2). Put very simply, the practice of rhetoric assumes that different and 
contending positions exist and, moreover, that someone needs to have their 
point of view changed. Rhetoric is employed to achieve three main 
functions: 
1. Prosecution and defence (Forensic rhetoric);  
2. Political transformation (Deliberative rhetoric); and  
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3. Aesthetic and artistic value (Epideictic rhetoric) (Aristotle, 1991, p. 
81-2). 
The subtlety of rhetorical and grammatical strategies in biotechnology 
discourse cannot be underestimated. In the pilot analysis for the thesis, for 
example, I compared two public education documents. One was produced by 
an Australian Government Agency Biotechnology Australia (BA), the other 
by the New Zealand Independent Biotechnology Advisory Council (IBAC). 
I chose these two documents to do a comparative analysis because, at first 
glance, they appeared to be very different. The BA brochure “Juggling 
Genes” is intended for a young audience, it is a full colour gloss publication 
and uses colloquial quirky language. The IBAC booklet by comparison is 
intended for adults and is quite a substantial A5 booklet presented with a 
matt cardboard cover in three colours: olive green, dusty red, and white. The 
major headings included in both documents are included in the table below 
to provide an indication of content and the style of language used: 
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Table 1 : Comparison of education documents 
 
Upon analysis, I found the IBAC booklet to use largely the same strategies 
as Biotechnology Australia’s Juggling Genes brochure. In particular, both 
documents used references to new and newness in relation to the benefits of 
biotechnology while referencing constantly to tradition and the familiarity of 
biotechnology development when outlining possible risks associated with 
future developments. Both documents also portrayed future benefits of 
biotechnology in a universal, positivistic and unquestioned way, whereas 
risks were portrayed only as potential considerations that ‘might’ occur in a 
limited number of situations. Analysing these documents ultimately showed 
me that even two documents I initially perceived to be quite different in their 
IBAC  BA  
We want to know what you want to know  Fantastic farming  
What is biotechnology?  Doggie diversity  
Why think about biotechnology?  Getting into genes  
The basics of life  How are genes juggled?  
Classifying new biotechnologies  Gene technology benefits  
Finding out about genes and DNA  Fancy food?  
Moving genes around  Genetically modified food downunder  
- GM bacteria  Is this really going to happen?  
- GM plants  Who regulates gene technology and its safety?  
- GM animals  Freaky, friendly or Frankenstein?  
- GM humans    
Growing new tissue    
- Tissue culture    
- Cloning    
- Cross-species organ transplants    
Who is IBAC?    
- Our philosophy    
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evaluative and rhetorical orientations, because of the different genres and 
presentation formats they were drawing on, were in fact rhetorically, 
grammatically, and ideationally compatible.  
Corpus selection 
Following this pilot analysis, I began to collect a range of texts that 
expressed “official” representations of biotechnology in the public sphere. 
As the reader will be aware, public acceptance of new technologies is 
mediated by a range of texts and rhetorical genres on offer to members of 
the public through the social medium. Resources include texts that are 
specifically designed to influence understanding (such as education 
brochures) and texts that are designed to do something else (for example 
establish a strategic plan for commercialising research) but which employ 
significant rhetorical strategies to justify and officially rationalise those 
plans. As indicated previously, policy and other institutionally authored texts 
are significant because they are official authorised statements of an 
organisation’s orientation toward something: the text is a ‘concrete 
realisation’ of abstract forms of knowledge, orientation, and evaluation 
(Weiss and Wodak, 2003, p. 13).  
The resulting thesis corpus consists of 87 titles and 700,000 words (see 
Appendix for full list of corpus texts) including interview transcripts from 
scientists, science bureaucrats, consumer representatives, and biotechnology 
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company managers in Queensland5; Australian State and Commonwealth 
level policy documents; international policy documents that are publicly 
available; policies and reports from transnational organisations such as the 
United Nations; public ‘education’ documents from a number of countries; 
and a number of corporate reports and media articles dealing with the 
biotechnology industry.  
Criteria for text selection for written texts (other than interview transcripts) 
i. Texts designed to influence public understanding of, and attitudes 
toward, biotechnology research and commercialisation (primarily 
policy, public awareness, and opinion pieces from select industry 
journals); 
ii. Texts that describe the progression of biotechnology in society and 
methods for supporting and enhancing the practice;  
iii. Texts that are designed to communicate an official rationale for, and 
account of, biotechnology for a particular group or institution; 
Authors of the selected texts include:  
- National and state government departments, agencies, and officials in 
Australia, Canada, Finland, Ireland, India, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, the United States, South Africa, and Sweden;  
                                                 
5 As indicated in the Preface, I conducted these interviews while working at the Brisbane Institute. 
Special permission was given from the interviewees to use the transcripts as a comparative resource in 
this thesis. 
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- Supra national policy and regulatory bodies such as the Commission 
for European Communities, the G8 Heads of Government, the OECD 
and the UN;  
- Spokespersons and public relations professionals for a particular 
company or industry such as Abbott Laboratories, Monsanto, and 
Johnson & Johnson;  
- Industry organisations such as Aus Biotech and the US 
Biotechnology Industry Organisation; and  
- Government agencies responsible for promoting public awareness of 
biotechnology such as Biotechnology Australia, The New Zealand 
Independent Biotechnology Advisory Council, and the Canadian 
Council for Biotechnology Information (see www.whybiotech.com).  
The interview transcripts have been used as a resource for comparison with 
other texts. The interviews are valuable because they provide accounts of 
biotechnology’s objectives, means, and outcomes as articulated by its 
practitioners. They are also significant because they are not necessarily 
‘official’ or ‘authorised’ statements regarding biotechnology. The veil of 
anonymity that surrounded the interview process also led to some unique 
statements and portrayals of different parties in the biotechnology “debate”. 
The interviews are also special because they were delivered in the first 
person voice rather than the institutional voice.  
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Heteroglossia  
As indicated above, my examination of the politics of discourse in relation to 
biotechnology as media is based primarily on Bakhtin’s heteroglossia. 
Different aspects of the concept of heteroglossia have been foregrounded by 
different authors (cf. Beetham, 2002; Brandist, 2002; Haraway, 1992; 
Lemke, 1995, p. 24). There are two variations of the term that are significant 
for the thesis. Lemke’s (1995) use of the term heteroglossia is the first 
variation. Lemke emphasises that aspect of heteroglossia that refers to ‘the 
spectrum of interpretive and expressive tools from which a discourse 
community typically chooses in defining its world and the way the discourse 
community relates to heteroglossia in which it is embedded’ (Bakhtin, 
1929/1986, in Lemke, 1995p. 24). Used in this way, heteroglossia can 
highlight the range of intertextual and ‘interdiscursive’ (Fairclough, 2002) 
resources that we typically have access to in making sense of, and 
evaluating, a particular area of social development such as biotechnology.  
Intertextuality refers to the notion that words do not relate to their “object” 
singularly but are located within, and related dialogically to, a range of other 
words that are directed toward the same object (Brandist, 2002, p. 113). 
What this essentially means is that meaning is not derived simply from one 
word or one way of representing something but, rather, is derived via the 
interaction between different words and different discourses pertaining to the 
same thing. For example, biotechnology is variously represented in the 
public sphere as (in rough terms):  
a) A source of future wealth, health and prosperity; 
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b) A source of potential catastrophe and environmental damage; 
c) A means by which to ease human suffering and malnourishment; 
d) A source of social stratification and genetic discrimination; 
e) A natural development for human kind; 
f) An unnatural thing for humans to do. 
In Lemke’s terms, this range of representations (plus the many more that are 
on offer) of biotechnology constitutes an intertextual spectrum of meaning 
resources pertaining to biotechnology. The notion of intertextuality is that 
social agents do not simply derive their understandings of biotechnology 
from one of the representations, rather, they would be exposed to, and more 
or less responsive to, any number of representations of biotechnology in and 
over time.  
Heteroglossia more generally refers to the range of meaning resources we 
have on offer in social systems: the full heterogeneity of voices, languages, 
and perspectives on the world that Bakhtin initially described – not merely 
those that pertain to a specific topic such as biotechnology.  
All the languages of heteroglossia…are specific points of view on the 
world, forms for conceptualising the world in words, specific 
worldviews, each characterized by its own objects, meanings, and 
values. As such they may all be juxtaposed to one another, mutually 
supplement one another, contradict one another, and be interrelated 
dialogically. (Bakhtin, 1935/1981, pp. 291-2, in Lemke, 1995, p. 24) 
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While Lemke emphasises intertextuality in heteroglossia, this is different 
from – but not inconsistent with – Bakhtin’s original emphasis on the 
political aspects of language monologia and heteroglossia. While I will refer 
to intertextuality within the thesis, I posit that it is important to retain 
Bakhtin’s original focus on the political and ethical significance of 
heteroglossia and monologia. Most particularly, the notion of monologia 
reminds us that, although a range of resources may be on offer within the 
social medium, some are foregrounded – or hegemonic – while others are 
marginal. We should neither discount the extensive range of discursive and 
rhetorical strategies that are at work to maintain distinct hierarchies and 
patterns of dominance in the politics of representation.  
There is another aspect of heteroglossia that is not articulated heavily in the 
intertextuality version of the term: voices of the heteroglossia. In addition to 
the languages of the heteroglossia, Bakhtin describes a natural but 
suppressed diversity of voices that exist in any culture or social practice at a 
given point in time. The most notable uptake of/parallel to Bakhtin’s notion 
of the heteroglossia in ethics has been feminist ethics. Haraway (1992, in 
Beetham, 2002, p. 178) argues that we must ‘abandon the dream of a 
common language because it has too often been an imperialist one, in which 
the relatively powerful say they want a dialogue but they want it only on 
their terms and in their tongue’. Gilligan also argues for ‘a different voice’ 
that challenges the ‘masculine’ concern for justice as universal and offers in 
its place an ideal of care that is attentive to differences of need (Gilligan, 
1982, 1995, in Beetham, 2002, p. 178). Like the feminist analysis of the 
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masculine voice, Bakhtin, following Marr, argues that the imposition of a 
unitary national language is an artificial dictatorship over language and 
habitation in social reality: ‘the dictatorship of artificial linguistic and 
literary standards opposes the “natural life of languages”, especially those of 
oppressed socio-economic groups’ (in Brandist, 2002, p. 112).  
Hybridity 
Social practices are always hybrid practices. This is because of a number of 
reasons. First, all of the people who constitute a social practice are 
simultaneously embedded in other practices, contexts, social groupings, and 
interactions. Second, the persons who constitute the social practice of 
biotechnology are “hybrids” of their own (and others’) histories, 
experiences, social roles, and contexts. At the same time, each individual 
member of a social practice is shaped and informed by hybrid traditions that 
are passed on through the practice. Lemke defines hybridity as the notion 
that:  
particular utterances, even though the product of a single speaker, may 
contain within them elements of more than one dialect or discourse 
formation, thus producing new possibilities, which, if taken up by other 
speakers, can lead to linguistic and cultural change. (Lemke, 1995, p. 
25) 
The significant point to note in Lemke’s definition is that hybridity can lead 
to linguistic and social change. But while hybridity is a natural state of 
discourses and social practices, hybridisation is not unfettered. The features 
of hybridisation are, on the contrary, strongly patrolled and controlled by 
both internal and external actors. Indeed, social practices are purposively 
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hybridized to benefit particular purposes, individuals and/or groups (cf. 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough’s notion of “inculcation”, 1999, p. 13).  
Hybridity between science and industry is a matter of public policy at state, 
national, and supranational levels. Although this government led co-optation 
of research and commercial interests is not new (cf. for example Ben-Chaim, 
2001; Gaudillière, 2001), the science-industry merger is notable in 
biotechnology to the extent that Australian Governments’ policy platforms 
for biotechnology actually depend upon this hybridising between science 
and industry. Hybridisation can be forced through public and institutional 
strategic policy and funding priorities. The following excerpt from an 
interview with a Research Scientist is indicative of the extent to which 
funding restrictions have actually precipitated the current convergence of 
biotechnology research science and industry: 
Gone are the days when you can dream up some wild idea and expect the 
department to fund it. You have got to really show that you are addressing real 
industry needs, you are addressing strategic directions set by government and 
those sorts of things. So I think those days are gone. I think most of us accept 
that. We still enjoy the work we are doing, we still get a buzz out of new 
discoveries and recognition for the work we do, so that is what drives us. But to 
do that we realise we have to get funding to do that. (Interview, Research 
Scientist and Team Leader, Government research institute)6 
Apart from the use of particular terminologies and practices, deliberative 
hybridisation in biotechnology in response to public policy initiatives is 
based on creating relationships between people and contexts. These 
                                                 
6 Note: quotes from the thesis corpus will be presented in this arial narrow font throughout the thesis to 
aid the reader in differentiating them from other literature citations. 
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relationships are in turn mediated primarily through language and discourse. 
For example the relationship between a company and its shareholders might 
be fostered and developed while the relationships between a company and 
the public or relationships between humans and animals, nature are not 
acknowledged. What is significant in biotechnology policy is that policy 
makers a) recognise that hybridity occurs through the mixing of people from 
different contexts and practices; and b) they use it as a tool to create further 
hybridity between biotechnology, science, and industry. 
Ethics 
Ethics is frequently mentioned in government documents concerning 
biotechnology but it is a very particular discourse on/way of seeing ethics 
that is inscribed. In the Victorian Strategic Plan for biotechnology, for 
example, every reference to ethics is in collocate with the terms regulation; 
committee; advisory; and/or safety. The sheer consistency with which ethics 
is represented/collocated in this way in policy documents specifically 
relating to biotechnology suggests that is not just a tendency or coincidence 
but that the code/regulatory approach to ethics is in fact a generic feature of 
biotechnology policy and practice more generally. This is confirmed by the 
fact that the code and regulation approach to ethics is consistent across 
government departments dealing with biotechnology research and 
development in Australia and abroad. An example of the way that ethics is 
presented in biotechnology is provided in current debates over research on 
human embryonic stems cells.  
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In traditional orthodox ethics the ‘issue’ of stem cells is interpreted and 
debated within the bounds of standard bioethics concepts such as informed 
consent, moral agency, and utility (cf. American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine, 2002; Daley, 2000; Parker, 2003; Reiss, 2002). While these 
concepts might provide some particular insights that are useful for 
professional and amateur “ethicists” to kick around in relation to this 
particular issue, they simultaneously limit the discussion and debate to some 
strict parameters regarding what can be questioned and how. Moreover, they 
do not provide for broader ruminations on the mediating functions of 
particular technologies outside of the immediate context of the ‘issue’. 
Concepts such as autonomy, rights, and utility create both limited and 
particular sight lines that “ethicists” and others (including any consumer of 
mass media during periods when ‘issues’ such as these are debated) are 
encouraged to see as ‘ethical’ deliberation. Thacker observes, 
One of the primary issues in this [stem cell] debate is whether the future 
of stem cell research will be exclusively medical therapy or extra-
medical enhancement. Much discussion has to do with whether the U.S. 
government should continue funding such research, knowing that one of 
the resources of stem cells is discarded embryos from infertility clinics 
(and thus intersecting issues pertaining to abortion and human 
experimentation into regenerative medicine). However, stem cells (and 
there are many different kinds of stem cells) exist in many different 
kinds of contexts, and it is unlikely that a single set of guidelines will be 
acceptable across all possible uses of stem cells in research. Beneath 
these ideological, ethical, and economic deliberations is a more 
troubling question: that, with developing biotechnologies, the very 
notions of what counts as normative health may be in the process of 
being redefined. (Thacker, 2002, p. 3, italics added) 
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Here, Thacker draws attention to the idea that, apart from standard issues of 
informed consent, moral agency, or utility, what constitutes a normal healthy 
human being is redefined by developments in biotechnology. However these 
issues have been hived off into academic social science disciplines rather 
than being incorporated in the ethics discourse. Obviously, health and 
wellbeing is a central aspect of what constitutes individual and collective 
conceptions of the good life. The redefining of the meaning of health along 
genetic lines is just one example of a mediating force associated with 
biotechnology.  
Like approaches to public consultation in Australia (cf. for example 
Australian Law Reform Commission {ALRC}, 2001, 2002a, 2002b; Fraser, 
2001) ethical “responses” have, under the directives of State and Federal 
Government departments, generally concentrated on one particular area of 
research or a specific issue relating to biotechnology research and 
commercialisation, for example, genetically modified (GM) crops; 
regulating ownership of genetic material; cloning; or stem cell research. 
Public “consultations’’ have largely consisted of debate style interactions 
between an expert elite and a purportedly “lay” audience. As Fraser (2001, 
np) argues, the already dominant tendency in both ethics and public 
consultation is ‘to simplify and reduce the variety and complexity of 
arguments to those that sit comfortably alongside scientific risk analysis’.  
The prevalence of scientific risk analysis as a basis for ethical and 
community standards and procedures is not surprising given the dynamics of 
the practice of ethics more generally. “Ethics” is regularly portrayed in 
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public discourse as an expert practice that seeks to provide solutions to 
particular moral questions, issues, and dilemmas. However, parallel with the 
intentions of CDA as expressed by Weiss and Wodak (2003), some 
contemporary approaches to applied ethics have emerged to devise social 
strategies for ‘channelling or constraining the power of persons so that all 
citizens may flourish, even those who are weak and vulnerable’ (Isaacs, 
2002d, p. 4). Notable areas of development include feminist ethics; narrative 
ethics; environmental ethics; and ethics of “engagement”. Moreover, it 
requires persons – particularly those in positions of responsibility and power 
– to develop critical and interpersonal sensibilities that are not commonly 
promoted in modern consumer societies (cf. Marcuse, 1969/1972; Smythe, 
1981, p. xv). 
The focus of emerging approaches is to promote enduring social 
relationships – rather than one off responses or written guidelines – that 
contribute to the ‘ethical form of life’ (Isaacs and Massey, 1994, p. 2). In 
Isaacs’ and Massey’s words, 
For us, the overall point or purpose of applied ethics is practical and 
involves creating and sustaining relationships which mutually recognise 
the needs, interests and aspirations of all participants (stakeholders) as 
“ends in themselves”. The focus is on the continuing enhancing of the 
other and the self within the human social condition as it is actualised 
within specific situations, roles, practices, institutions and cultures. In 
short, applied ethics seeks to enhance the ethical form of life. (Isaacs 
and Massey, 1994, p. 2, italics added).  
In consonance with Isaacs and Massey, May (1992) argues that the ethical 
way of life is concerned not just with an immediate or isolated response to 
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given problem, issue, or dilemma, but with a general condition of 
responsiveness to others in our day to day relationships.  
An ethic of responsibility calls for people to be sensitive and responsive 
for those whom they have harmed or those whom they could help. The 
call for sensitivity carries with it a call for attention to the details of 
one’s own life and the lives of those with whom one comes in contact. 
Rather than paying attention to what it is that we all share in common, 
for instance our “humanity” an ethic of responsibility calls for us to pay 
attention to what is unique and even peculiar about one another. To 
gain this knowledge, we cannot be armchair theorists; rather, we must 
find out about the world, both the facts of the world that various people 
inhabit and the facts of how individuals respond to that changing world. 
This means that the social facts of how people in a certain situation 
relate to each other and affect each other, as well as how people’s 
attitudes and desire are affected by such interaction, need to be taken 
quite seriously…The concept of responsibility seems especially well 
suited to problems in applied ethics (such as those in professional or 
business ethics) because it has an inherently social dimension, namely, 
that it is responsive to the way individuals relate to each other (as we 
have seen) and to the way individuals relate to groups… (May, 1992, 
pp. 91-2, italics added) 
A point to note is that this type of ethics “in the everyday” broadens not only 
the scope of the practice of ethics as we commonly understand it, but also 
the range of people who are regarded as being responsible for questions of 
ethics, and, moreover, the range of socio-political experiences and 
relationships that are of ethical significance.  
When I refer to “ethics” in this thesis, therefore, I am not referring to ethics 
as a practice of formulating written codes and ethics committees. Rather, I 
am referring to ethics as a practice that is concerned with identifying and 
responding to the deeper issues of privilege, exploitation, and power that 
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play out in biotechnology. My work in applied ethics seeks to identify the 
social, political, and ethical complexity of the social practice of 
biotechnology and, moreover, to subject that practice to critical social and 
ethical inquiry.  
While some self labelled “ethicists” (cf. Caufield, Singer, and Flis, 2003; 
Savulescu, 1998) choose to practice ethics in biotechnology by championing 
a particular area of biotechnological research, the approach to ethics I follow 
is more concerned with identifying and critiquing aspects of the practice of 
biotechnology that may need to be sustained or transformed so as to 
maintain and support the health and flourishing of persons who are rendered 
vulnerable in relation to these new technologies (cf. Isaacs, 2002a). This 
approach has been informed particularly by my professional experiences as a 
coordinator of public discussions surrounding the ethics of biotechnology.  
By using the biotechnology as media framework, I would like to offer 
academics, scientists, policy makers and hopefully many others a way of 
seeing biotechnology that helps them to comprehend biotechnology as 
something more than new technologies and techniques. I would like to 
illustrate that, through the politics and mediation of discourse, a social 
practice such as biotechnology has the capacity to transform and shape 
significant aspects of our lives both as humans embedded in social systems 
and as humans embedded in ecological systems. In this way, I posit that the 
media framework provides important understandings for the applied ethics 
agenda in biotechnology.  
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I argue that biotechnology is ethically significant at a macro societal level 
precisely because its proponents make stringent claims regarding not only 
what constitutes the good life, but how we as citizens, workers, and 
consumers are expected to achieve that good life. Apart from some 
exceptional contributions in the fields of critical anthropology (cf. Escobar, 
1999), disability studies (cf. Clapton, 2002; Goggin and Newell, 2002; 
Newell, 2000), technology and culture studies (cf. Haraway, 1990,1999; 
Thacker, 2000, 2002), and select analyses of public relations and 
communications practices in gene technology (cf. Hindmarsh, 1996; Weaver 
and Motion, 2002), there has been little such in depth critical analysis of 
ethics and biotechnology at this macro level of social practice or social 
systems.  
Thesis structure 
A brief summary of each of the thesis chapters is provided below. 
Chapter Two provides a fuller introduction to the biotechnology as media 
conceptual framework. The four movements of mediation – Alienation, 
Translation, Recontextualisation, and Absorption – in particular are outlined 
in full in this chapter using examples from the thesis corpus. The media 
framework is positioned early in the thesis to provide the reader with a basis 
of understanding for the subsequent theoretical and analysis chapters. As 
indicated previously, in framing biotechnology as media I am seeking to 
explore biotechnology as a process of mediation: a process of shifting and 
politicising meanings rather than a particular media technology such as the 
television or radio.  
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The concepts of mediation, social practice, and discourse are combined in 
this chapter to introduce the notion that a social practice such as 
biotechnology can function as media. Biotechnology, like any media form, 
inherits, creates, or sustains particular channels for the movement of 
meaning. It also has, particularly in its current form, demarcations on the 
officially sanctioned ‘content’ that can be carried on those channels. At 
present, the officially sanctioned content is that which fits within the 
channels and requirements of product development, commercialisation, and 
sale. Following work by Postman (1985) and McLuhan (1964), I also 
emphasise that, apart from its official and readily identifiable content, 
biotechnology, like any media form, also involves processes of filtering, 
transforming, and politicising meaning: media as epistemology. This 
essentially means that unintended or unofficial ‘content’ in the form of 
inscribed ways of seeing, being, and acting, is also ‘transmitted’ along with 
– and within – the official content of biotechnology mediations. The chapter 
also explores in more depth the role of the State as an official mediator of 
new technologies and technological ‘revolution’ and as the generator of 
official discourses on, and rationales for, biotechnology. 
Chapter Three seeks to identify and explain in more detail the links between 
the concepts of discourse, social practice, and mediation. As such, the 
chapter provides a theoretical basis both for the biotechnology as media 
conceptual framework and for understanding the nature of biotechnology as 
a social practice. Discourse is highlighted in this chapter as an essential 
process in the production, reproduction, and mediation of ways of seeing, 
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being, and acting both within and beyond the social practice of 
biotechnology over time. The inherently ethico-political nature of discourse 
is also highlighted. Following work by Isaacs (1998) and Luhmann (1995) I 
posit that the boundaries surrounding any given social practice are discursive 
and hence are permeable. In this way the social practice of biotechnology is 
highlighted as being embedded within history and in relationships with other 
practices. This notion of historical and social embeddedness is a key concept 
in understanding biotechnology’s mediating functions because it situates 
biotechnology as an “open” (but not unfettered) practice that both mediates, 
and is mediated by other practices and particular persons in and over time. 
Chapter Four provides an introduction to a range of methods and concepts 
used in critical discourse analysis for the thesis. This chapter is designed to 
function as a bridge between the introductory chapters and the analysis 
chapters which illustrate more fully the ways that the processes of mediation 
actually play out in official discourses on biotechnology. The methods and 
concepts identified are used as “filters” or “probes” with which to read and 
analyse the corpus as a whole, individual texts, and subsections of them. The 
key analytical filters explained in this chapter include interdiscursivity; the 
discourse-historical method (Wodak, 2001); mediation and context; the 
politics of representation (Mehan, 1993); thematic patterns (Lemke, 1995); 
emic instances (Pike, 1958); and moments of silence (Sheriff, 2000; 
Sunderland, 2002).  
Chapter 5 provides important discourse-historical background to 
biotechnology in preparation for the corpus analysis. The notion of 
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biotechnology as a ‘time medium’ in particular is explored in this chapter. 
The Chapter also explores a number of ways that history is [mis]represented 
in contemporary discourses on biotechnology. A central observation of this 
chapter is that historical discourses on biotechnology provide only limited 
scope for understanding history as a linear positivistic progression toward 
human development. This limited view of history in official biotechnology 
discourse inhibits heteroglossia and, hence, the range of resources on offer to 
citizens in understanding and evaluating contemporary biotechnological 
developments. 
Chapter 6 seeks in the first instance to identify a number of key official 
representations of mediation (movement) in biotechnology policy and 
education texts: what or who moves where and how. Because contemporary 
biotechnology policy is for the most part geared toward moving the 
knowledges, beings, and things associated with biotechnology to 
commercial and consumption contexts, there is much in the thesis corpus 
that reflects the four movements of hybridisation and mediation. There is a 
significant focus on how movements toward hybridity between science and 
industry is produced and reproduced and how links between science and 
industry such as the ‘product development pipeline’ act as channels for 
mediating biological and discursive content into different contexts. The 
chapter concludes by discussing the metaphor of ‘the Virtuous Cycle’ that 
was used in the Australian Health and Medical Research Strategic Review 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1999) to portray the movement of research 
into contexts of commercialisation, product development, and sale to 
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citizens. The metaphor of the Virtuous Cycle draws on significant 
intertextual bases relating to, or more particularly countering, the ‘vicious 
circle’ of poverty, ignorance, and sinfulness (cf. Malthus, 1914; White, 
1896/1960). 
Chapter Seven explores the social and ethical implications of the mediations 
outlined in Chapters Five and Six. In this chapter I draw attention to the fact 
that official discourses on biotechnology portray the meeting point between 
biotechnology research and ‘the community’ as being located within the 
context of the market of commercial exchange. I also identify the significant 
politics of representation that surround given stakeholders in biotechnology 
such as ‘the anti biotechnology community’ and ‘scientists’ and the way that 
context is used to include and exclude persons and from ethical deliberations 
surrounding biotechnology mediations. The chapter features analysis and 
discussion of a number of voices that are missing from official 
biotechnology discourses. 
Chapter Eight is the concluding chapter of the thesis. In this chapter I 
provide a summary of the main points of the thesis as well as some 
suggested points of transformation in ways of seeing biotechnology and in 
public engagements surrounding biotechnology research and 
commercialisation. This chapter marks the re-incorporation of my 
professional experiences in designing and conducting public discussion 
forums for biotechnology and advocates a number of changes in the way we 
see both biotechnology and ethics in relation to these engagements. 
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Conclusion 
Biotechnology is increasingly defined in public policy and organisational 
discourses as a branch of science practice that is primarily concerned with 
commercial, material, and product outcomes. This is despite some scientists’ 
claims that the primary function of the practice is to contribute to the stock 
of human knowledge and understanding, environmental benefit, alleviation 
of hunger, or the provision of new drugs and pharmaceuticals to those who 
suffer. Through convergent technologies of biology and information humans 
can use biotechnology to increase the range of human and non human living 
organisms that fall under the commodity logic of contemporary capitalism. 
In this biotechnology ‘revolution’ a broader range of humans, animals, and 
plants are rendered – in a more thorough way – both materials and sites of 
capital production. 
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Chapter 2 A framework for viewing 
biotechnology as media 
Overview 
Framing biotechnology as media allows us to analyse biotechnology not as a 
set of static, objective techniques or technologies but, rather, as a means of 
producing, reproducing, and shifting meanings. In this chapter I posit that 
the social practice of biotechnology extends outward into society, and in turn 
is shaped by the reverse, via four primary discursive mediating processes: 
Alienation, Translation, Recontextualisation, and Absorption. It is precisely 
because of biotechnology’s potentially wide reaching influence, and relative 
political weighting at present, that we should seek, wherever possible, to 
identify, comprehend, and evaluate its effects in contexts beyond those in 
which it is readily seen to operate or function. 
Media 
Understanding biotechnology as media firstly requires us to step away from 
what we immediately think of as “media” (for example television, radio, 
print). Rather, in framing biotechnology as media I am seeking to explore 
biotechnology as a process of mediation: a process of shifting and 
politicising meanings (Silverstone, 1999). Viewing biotechnology as a social 
practice initially helps to highlight the extent to which biotechnology as 
media processes can and do affect wider social trends and trajectories 
beyond the field of biotechnology itself. This is primarily because social 
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practices are “separated” from their social environment, by discursively7 
constituted boundaries that are produced and reproduced both within and 
beyond the practice itself (cf. Isaacs, 1998; Luhmann, 1995). A discursive 
boundary quite simply is one of meaning. Some people have access to the 
shared meanings, ways of seeing, terminologies, experiences, and so on 
within the practice, while others do not. Any given practice, including its 
shared meanings and boundaries, has a history and a purpose: this includes 
seemingly non significant technologies employed within the practice. As 
such, when we see biotechnology as media, we are talking not only about 
technological media forms or techniques, but also to the social, 
interpersonal, and historical aspects of the practice itself. All of these aspects 
of a practice can in fact mediate or shift meanings. 
The highlighted biotechnology as media movements of Alienation, 
Translation, Recontextualisation, and Absorption work beyond the social 
practice of biotechnology itself. As mentioned above, the boundaries 
between any social practice, other practices, institutions, professions, and 
“society” at large are discursively constituted and hence are permeable. The 
boundaries that separate the social practice of science from ethics or public 
policy, for example, are not made of electric fences. Rather, these 
boundaries are the products of shared and consistently produced/reproduced 
ways of seeing, acting, and being that people share. Furthermore, it is not 
                                                 
7 As noted in the Introduction, I use the terms “discourse” and “discursive” in consonance with Lemke 
(1995) who observes that ‘discourses are the persistent habits of speaking and acting, characteristic of 
some social group [practice or system], through which it constructs its worldview: its [identity], 
beliefs, opinions, and values (p.24). When I refer to discourse in the thesis I am assuming a dialogic 
relationship between ways of describing in language and ways of seeing, being, and acting. 
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only the people within any given practice who create and sustain these 
boundaries. Because the boundaries are discursive and permeable, other 
social practices, institutions, individuals, and so on can also contribute to 
them, and to the practice itself. The influence that biotechnology has on the 
rest of society is not one way. Other practices and agendas can and most 
definitely do intertwine with what might be seen to be the “core” purpose or 
“business” of biotechnological research.  
The current political and economic environment has raised significant issues 
regarding the importance of curiosity based or basic research in conjunction 
with strategic or applied research. Biotechnology is by generally accepted 
definition a product or “application” based, usually commercially oriented 
branch of science practice. Common definitions of biotechnology, as listed 
below, all describe a given organism or biological process as a means to 
producing or acquiring a given technology-based use, outcome or product.  
‘[Biotechnology is] The application of scientific techniques that use 
living organisms, or substances from those organisms, to make or 
modify products, improve plants and animals, or to develop micro-
organisms for specific uses’ (US Office of Technology Assessment). 
‘The use of biological systems - living things - to make or change 
products. It has been used for centuries in traditional activities like 
baking bread and making cheese’ (CSIRO).  
‘Development of products by a biological process. Production may be 
carried out by using intact organisms, such as yeasts and bacteria, or by 
using natural substances (e.g. enzymes) from organisms’ (International 
Industrial Biotechnology Association).  
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‘Biotechnology is a very broad term referring to any practical or 
commercial use of living organisms, such as using yeast to make beer or 
bread’ (Washington Biotechnology Action Council).  
Obviously though, the simple, familiar examples of beer, bread and cheese 
as featured in the above definitions have little to do with modern 
biotechnological and biomedical processes such as producing ‘human ears 
growing on the backs of mice’, ‘reattached and functional hands and limbs’, 
‘sheets of artificially produced human skin on sale from biotechnology 
firms’ (Wildman, 1999, p. 3).  
As indicated above, understanding biotechnology as media requires us to see 
biotechnology as a process of mediation: that is, a process of shifting 
meanings (Silverstone, 1999, p. 13). Silverstone defines mediation as:  
‘the movement of meaning from one text to another, from one discourse 
to another, from one event to another. It involves the constant 
transformation or meanings, both large scale and small, significant and 
insignificant, as media texts and texts about media circulate in writing, 
in speech and audiovisual forms, and as we, individually and 
collectively, directly and indirectly, contribute to their production 
(1999, p. 13). 
The process of mediation and movement of biological and discursive 
resources for meaning making is, as Silverstone points out, ‘fundamentally 
political or perhaps, more strictly, politically economic’ (1999, p. 4). In 
taking on the notion of biotechnology as media, we also need to recognise 
that one movement and/or politicisation (for example the mapping of the 
human genome) precipitates and enables any number of subsequent 
movements (for example, codifying and privatising genetic information; 
selling access to knowledge and information about a particular country’s 
  54
gene pool; new vaccines and treatments; new services and products; new 
desires and expectations). As Silverstone identifies, ‘[m]ediation is like 
translation…it is never complete, always transformative, and never, perhaps, 
entirely satisfactory’ (Silverstone, 1999, p. 14). So in this sense, it is not 
only our DNA that is mediated via the social practice of biotechnology, it is 
also a very broad range of social contexts, relationships, and products that 
are affected or directly created via biotechnology mediations, including, for 
example, legislation and regulation created to monitor and regulate the “use 
of” genetic and biological material (such as DNA and discarded foetuses), 
the range and purposes of drugs on the market, “geneticised” discourses 
concerning what constitutes a good and healthy life, new areas of investment 
and venture capital companies.  
Within biotechnology’s orientation toward application or product 
development, there are also a number of broader, historically salient 
trajectories at hand. My understanding of the political and economic 
orientations of biotechnology as media is particularly influenced by 
Marcuse’s (1964) analysis of the ways that modern societies can work to 
dilute and devalue any form of ‘antagonistic’ or ‘subversive’ public opinion 
(p. 9). Marcuse argues that technological innovation in the form of media in 
particular has allowed antagonistic/subversive content to be recontextualised 
into the “everyday” operations of the productive apparatus. The point is, that 
in modern biotechnological processes, something so wondrous as the 
foundations of life somehow are translated into the form of a product to 
which only a select few have access. We take DNA for example, from a 
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hitherto secret place, and move it progressively toward something that is part 
of our everyday existence such as vaccines, treatments, products, services, 
and so on. But not only is DNA moved, it is also changed, altered, 
politicised so as to fit with existing social trajectories or demands. The 
groundbreaking scientific discovery in effect loses its initial meaning and 
value by being diluted and subsumed under the commodity logic into which 
it is currently being recontextualised. Perhaps more correctly, the great 
scientific “discovery” has its meaning and value reinterpreted by different 
human agents, its potential evacuated and replaced with something else that 
is relevant to its new context for example, the ‘price system’ (Innis, 1942). 
Steiner offers a parallel story to that offered above:  
‘art dies when we lose or ignore the conventions by which it can be read 
[attending the theatre, museum, or concert hall], by which its semantic 
statement can be carried over into our own idiom’ (1975, p. 30).  
The point is that when something, or someone, is subject to mediation and 
recontextualising movements, things change. The original values that were 
attributed to the thing, process, whatever, do not remain constant as the 
discovery or creative work is moved into new contexts. Neither do the 
practices or people that surround the production and/or reproduction of the 
thing, object, or process. I will return to this consideration in more depth in 
the following sections on Alienation, Translation, Recontextualisation, and 
Absorption. 
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Media as epistemology 
In framing biotechnology as media, I am presupposing a certain function of 
mediation more generally that goes beyond the social practice of 
biotechnology. This function has been fully explicated in the field of media 
studies, in particular McLuhan’s (1964) ‘The Medium is the Message’ and 
Postman’s (1985, pp. 16-30) ‘Media as Epistemology’. As such, it may be at 
least familiar to a range of readers. Postman explains the notion of media as 
epistemology as follows: 
Every medium of communication, I am claiming, has resonance, for 
resonance is metaphor writ large. Whatever the original and limited 
context of its use may have been, a medium has the power to fly far 
beyond that context into new and unexpected ones. Because of the way 
it directs us to organize our minds and integrate our experience of the 
world, it imposes itself on our consciousness and social institutions in 
myriad forms. It sometimes has the power to become implicated in our 
concepts of piety, or goodness, or beauty. And it is always implicated in 
the ways we define and regulate our ideas of truth. (Postman, 1985, p. 
18, italics added) 
Postman’s examples of metaphor’s ‘writ large’ include the character of 
Hamlet (associated with madness, jealousy, Oedipal syndrome etc) or the 
city of Athens (associated with Greek gods, ancient Greek civilisations etc) 
(1985, p. 12). The phrase, person, location, or object becomes a metaphor 
for certain shared meanings and attributions—a metonymic shortcut to 
interpretation that helps us not to have to think too much in order to get a 
general understanding—and, depending on the prevalence of use, a way of 
seeing. Biotechnology in Postman’s terms can be seen as both metaphor and 
medium. In its metaphorical sense, biotechnology has evolved over time to 
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represent for many people some very distinct orientations to the world and 
what is in it. Perhaps more directly, biotechnology is analogous to many of 
our contemporary mass media practices because, increasingly, we cannot 
easily evade its presence; its influence on ourselves and others; or its 
representations of the true, the good, the bad, the desirable, the undesirable, 
the normal, the abnormal, and so on (cf. Lemke, 1998).  
The movements of mediation 
The four mediating processes discussed in this chapter are not intended to be 
mechanistic or linear. Rather, at any particular moment of mediation the four 
mediating processes can be identified in multiple contexts and practices, in 
different orders of progression, and even simultaneously. Indeed, alienation, 
translation, recontextualisation, and absorption are closely featured in most, 
if not all, biotechnology mediations to be explored in the following analysis 
chapters. Each of the processes are integral dimensions of mediation in, and 
surrounding, the social practice of biotechnology. As the following sections 
illustrate, each of the four processes are in fact required if biotechnology is 
to develop according to the values, objectives, and purposes prescribed in 
state, national, and trans-national policy texts.  
Alienation 
Alienation has once again become a point of interest in discussions 
regarding intellectual property rights for biotechnology processes and 
products (cf. Andress and Nelkin, 1998; Flowers, 1998; Nelkin and 
Andrews, 1998; Thompson, 1995). However the main reason the term has 
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re-emerged is not to discuss the alienation of human labour from human 
beings or the ultimate alienation of humans from nature, but as a 
precondition for commoditising bio-products (cf. Thompson, 1995). 
Thompson states that ‘a good or the right to enjoy a good is “alienable” to 
the extent that it can be dissociated from one owner of the good and 
transferred to another’ (p. 281, italics added). Rivalry on the other hand 
‘refers to the situation where the use or consumption of the good by one 
person diminishes the amount of good available for others’ like, for 
example, a can of tomato soup (Thompson, 1995, p. 281). Lighting on public 
streets on the other hand is in most cases a non-rival good. Excludability 
refers to how easy or hard it is to exclude others from using a particular good 
(Thompson, 1995, p. 281). By consuming a can of soup, a person excludes 
the possibility of anyone else consuming it. On the other hand it would in 
most cases be very difficult to restrict others from accessing the light thrown 
off from street lamps in your neighbourhood.  
The three conditions of alienability, rivalry, and excludability, according to 
Thompson, are the prerequisites for declaring something as property. 
Thompson’s explanation is particularly effective: 
One person cannot listen to the song of a dove while someone else eats 
the same dove roasted, because these are rival uses of the dove. 
However, if the dove’s song is alienated from the dove itself with a 
recording, previously rival uses become associated with separable 
goods, their rivalry diminishes, and the potential for hearing the dove’s 
song while feasting on its flesh becomes possible. Alienability of a good 
is thus a necessary condition for regarding it as exchangeable property. 
(Thompson, 1995, p. 281, italics added) 
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Thus, the process of alienation – as Thompson would describe it – in the 
context of this thesis is where the biotechnology as a technological medium 
function is most concentrated: Humans use modern genetic technologies to 
dissociate biological materials from one ‘owner’ (plant, animal, human, or 
other living organism) or context to another ‘owner’ ( in the form of 
“intellectual property”) or context (for example, DNA shifted from the 
context of the body to a laboratory setting or computer database). 
Recombinant DNA techniques used in contemporary biotechnology are 
significant in that they 
represent means to alienate goods from previous patterns of ownership 
and exchange and to establish new rights of ownership and exchange. 
Although conventional plant or animal breeding was capable of 
introducing substantial changes in the traits or composition of 
individuals, it did not permit the alienation of those goods from 
representative individuals themselves. (Thompson, 1995, p. 282) 
Although it is a powerful and consequential movement, alienation in itself is 
not sufficient to explain the way in which previously inalienable aspects of 
life are transferred into economic goods for exchange on the commercial 
market. Indeed, the significance of alienated genetic ‘codes’, cells, DNA and 
so on are, in their purely technical forms, accessible only to those discourse 
communities versed in the discourses associated with Recombinant DNA 
technologies and molecular genetics. Like Postman’s metaphors writ large 
above, for the alienated ‘goods’ to be taken beyond the laboratory context, 
they must undergo several interrelated processes of meaning production and 
reproduction, including translation, recontextualisation, and absorption.  
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Translation 
We cannot accurately conceive what it must have been like to be the 
first to compare the colour of the sea with the dark of wine or to see 
autumn in a man’s face. Such figures are new mappings of the world, 
they reorganise our habitation in reality. (Steiner, 1975, p. 23, italics 
added) 
Translation is the process of recasting a system of meaning in the form of 
another, often fundamentally different system of meaning and 
representation. Translation is the most overt discursive function of the four 
media movements. Translation is, of course, inherently political and 
interpretive. Far from being a process concerned with opening access to new 
spaces, alienation can be seen as a process of translation and encoding (or 
codifying) rather than “decoding” the human genome; it is the translation 
and narrowing of previously inalienable meanings and biological resources 
into alienable scientific discourse, applications, material, biological 
products, and so on (cf. for example DeCode Genetics’ corporate logo 
“decoding the language and life”, nd, np). In Steiner’s words, ‘[t]he 
translator invades, extracts, and brings home’ (1975, p. 298). Steiner’s use of 
the word “extracts” is particularly pertinent in that it emphasises the 
selective and interpretive nature of translation, and its potentially minimising 
filtering effects on the previously inalienable, merely potential meaning 
system. Like Steiner, Silverstone argues that in ‘translation we enter a text 
and claim ownership of its meaning’ (1999, p. 15). Translation is ‘a move 
which involves both meaning and value. While it might seem at times a 
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largely technical or pragmatic activity, translation is in fact ‘both an 
aesthetic and an ethical activity’ (Silverstone, 1999, p. 15).  
Translation is process in which meanings are produced, meanings that 
cross boundaries, both spatial and temporal. To enquire into that process 
is to enquire into the instabilities and flux of meanings and into their 
transformations, but also into the politics of their fixings. (Silverstone, 
1999, p. 16, italics added) 
Because it is a process of transforming and, according to Steiner (1975), 
fixing meaning, translation, particularly in the case of previously inalienable 
‘goods’ in knowledge, involves limiting potential meanings and also 
potential “audiences” (or discourse communities) who may access these 
newly translated meanings. For example, the human genome directory is 
expressed in a series of codes that use four letters of the alphabet. This is 
where the discursive boundaries around the social practice of biotechnology 
are perhaps most evident.  
Thacker (2000) in particular has explored the translation of “the body” into 
data that is suitable for processing via ICTs in the human genome project. 
The graphic over page illustrates four different ways in which the human 
genome has been mapped for scientific purposes, including information 
sharing between scientists across the world. The diagram is taken from the 
information booklet titled Mapping the Human Genome produced by the US 
Department of Energy and the Humane Genome Project (1996, p. 11). It 
provides a graphical representation of the various ways in which the human 
genome has been ‘mapped’. To the non-scientist, or even a scientist not 
involved in molecular genetics, genomics, and related disciplines, this 
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translation or ‘mapping of the human genome’ can be completely 
meaningless and inaccessible in the sense that a molecular geneticist, for 
example, would understand it.  
Figure 1: ‘Genomic Geography’ in the Human Genome Project (Source: Department 
of Energy and the Humane Genome Project (1996, p. 11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Figure is not available online.  
Please consult the hardcopy thesis available 
 from the QUT Library. 
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Another example from an article titled ‘A crystallographic map of the 
transition from B-DNA to A-DNA’ utilises the four letter coding system for 
DNA in written form: 
The transition between B- and A-DNA was first observed nearly 
50 years ago. We have now mapped this transformation through a set of 
single-crystal structures of the sequence d(GGCGCC)2, with various 
intermediates being trapped by methylating or brominating the cytosine 
bases. The resulting pathway progresses through 13 conformational 
steps, with a composite structure that pairs A-nucleotides with 
complementary B-nucleotides serving as a distinct transition 
intermediate. The details of each step in the conversion of B- to A-DNA 
are thus revealed at the atomic level, placing intermediates for this and 
other sequences in the context of a common pathway (Vargason, 
Henderson, and Shing Ho, 2001, p. 7265).  
Granted, the article by Vargason et al. is not intended for general audiences 
–and thus is not written in a language that general audiences will understand 
–yet it is obvious to all that the sequencing “d(GGCGCC)2” is an encoding 
translation of the human genome. As an earlier reviewer of this thesis notes, 
those who are able to read this language may take several years to become 
fluent in this language of DNA in much the same way that one might take 
several years to become fluent in Greek or Arabic. Vargason et al.’s use of 
terminologies and phrases such as ‘A-nucleotides’, ‘distinct transition 
intermediate’, and ‘common pathway’ is similarly mystifying to an outsider-
audience, despite the fact that they still employ common English vocabulary 
(i.e. commonly accessible words such as distinct, transition, intermediate, 
common, pathway, etc).  
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The direct translation process from the previously inalienable “language of 
life” into technocratic scientific discourses and modes of representation is 
apparently separate from any contemplation over the ethical and moral 
aspects of the technologies. As we move away from the encoding of DNA 
itself, we see further translations and recontextualisations at play, from 
scientific discourse to the discourses of economic and entrepreneurial 
enterprise. In the 1998 Hastings Centre Report, Nelkin and Andrews (1998) 
make the following translations into the technocratic discourse of market 
economics: 
These expanding markets have increased the value of human tissue, and 
institutions with ready access to tissue find they possess a capital 
resource. Access to stored tissue samples is sometimes included in 
collaborative agreements between hospitals and biotechnology firms. 
(Nelkin and Andrews, 1998, p. 30, italics added)  
Note here that the agents are different from those in the example from 
Vargason et al: here examples of agents include markets; collaborative 
agreements; hospitals; and biotechnology firms. Obviously, the 
biotechnological context Nelkin and Andrews are talking about is a different 
one from Vargason et al, and at a different stage of mediation and 
recontextualisation. Note particularly that ‘expanding markets’ are the 
agents that have imbued human tissue with ‘increased … value’.  
All processes of mediation, just like technologies themselves, are imbued 
with inscribed value judgements as to which biological resources are 
desirable and important in any setting – not merely in the context of 
economic exchange (cf. Martin, 2000). In its crudest form, commercial 
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“viability” becomes a litmus test for which products will become readily 
available resources for making meaning within the broader discourses to 
which biotechnology research and commercialisation are shifted. It is 
implicitly accepted, therefore, that ‘free market acceptance of a good or 
technology [is] equivalent to an ethical endorsement’ (Thompson, 1995, p. 
276).  
Even if members of the general community cannot access the technocratic 
discourses surrounding the translation and absorption processes, they are 
able to draw their own meanings from the everyday productive 
manifestations of these processes or specific programs to influence social 
understanding (and usually acceptance) of biotechnology practices and 
products. Non-scientists and non-economists can draw on the commodified 
version of biotechnology as media simply by buying it, selling it, using it, 
being aware of it, and so on. Hence the process of translation is enacted 
once again at the point of capital exchange and consumption.  
General understandings of biotechnology research and development are 
conveyed through the everyday sale of commercial goods and services, as 
well as through wider media and political discourses and rhetoric 
surrounding biotechnology processes themselves. Biotechnology products 
and services, as manifestations of biotechnology as media, are literally 
absorbed via consumption into the everyday lives of members of the public. 
Biotechnology techniques and technologies themselves are in many cases 
the product of a long process of alienation, translation, recontextualisation, 
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and absorption with imbued values, motivations, and judgements as to their 
viability, worthiness and so on. 
The already abundant range of bio-products and services circulating in 
global pharmaceutical and “life” markets indicates the extent to which 
previously inalienable or incomprehensible aspects of human life have 
already been absorbed in the everyday productive apparatus: 
In recent years, biotechnology techniques have transformed a variety of 
human body tissue into valuable and marketable research materials and 
clinical products… the catalogue from the American Tissue Culture 
Catalogue lists thousands of people's cell lines that are available for 
sale. Body tissue also has commercial value beyond the medical and 
research contexts. Placenta is used to enrich shampoos, cosmetics, and 
skin care products…There is also a market for services to collect and 
store one's tissue outside the body. People can pay to store blood prior 
to surgery or embryos in the course of in vitro fertilization…There are 
about fifty private DNA testing centers in the United States, hundreds of 
university laboratories undertaking DNA research, and over 1,000 
biotechnology companies developing commercial products from bodily 
materials. (Nelkin and Andrews, 1998, p. 30) 
At each stage of translation, recontextualisation, and absorption, the 
discourses, and physical bio-products themselves are produced as a result 
of, certain technocratic practices and orientations (cf. Martin, 2000). 
Attributions of value, desirability, worthiness, ethicality and so on are 
specific to the particular discourse communities and social contexts. For 
example, where the successful cloning of a human being might be seen as a 
major scientific breakthrough for the scientific community and those who 
will directly benefit from the technology, cloning a human may be seen as 
an immoral practice fraught with danger and fear for other members of the 
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general community. Individuals involved in discourse communities 
concerned with ethics or public policy may also attribute the scientific 
“breakthrough” with different meanings, consequences and so on. 
Obviously, the social embeddedness of all social practices, and the persons 
that constitute them, ensure that they do not operate in complete isolation 
from one another. But, when the practices and processes associated with 
biotechnology enter distinctly different social systems and settings (such as 
the system of commercial exchange, regulation, or politics) their meanings, 
significance, perceived value, desirability, degree of familiarity and so on 
can and do identifiably change.  
All uses of the term “translate” in the corpus are consistent with the use of 
the term in relation to mediation. There is an acknowledgement that a 
movement from one context to another both precipitates and requires 
translation or fundamental shifts in meaning systems. For example, the 
following excerpt from an industry magazine article refers to a series of 
‘translations’ that are involved in contemporary biotechnology scenarios. I 
have underlined the sections that specifically refer to translation. 
‘BioPLATFORM will: - extend the foundation for translating excellence in 
research into economic benefits’ (NSW Govt Biofirst 2001 Strategy); ‘Australia 
has strengths in scientific discovery, which are not currently being translated 
into exploitable intellectual property’ (Victorian Strategic Plan 2000); ‘It is 
essential to have the capacity to translate knowledge into new products, 
processes and services, that in turn will generate benefits to society, skilled jobs 
and prosperity’ (A Strategy for Europe); ‘Industry…has a key role in translating 
our research base into products, services and wealth’ (Victorian Strategic Plan 
2000); California-based Genentech has made remarkable progress in 
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translating genetic information into tangible, practical information to change 
drug development (Black Art Industry magazine article)’. 
The orientation of translations portrayed in this text is different from the 
orientations that feature in the official rationalisation of biotechnology: that 
it is intended to improve our standard of living, health and well being for all. 
This excerpt mentions the following translations: 
- Excellence in research into economic benefits; 
- Strengths in scientific discovery into exploitable intellectual 
property; 
- Research base into products, services, and wealth; 
- Genetic information into tangible, practical information to change 
drug development; and 
- Genetic information into a new system of drug development. 
For me, this excerpt highlights that translation is not merely a linguistic 
phenomenon: translation in biotechnology is coupled with movements in 
language, space, and substance. It also introduces a phenomenon that 
emerges consistently in the thesis corpus: Biotechnology transforms not only 
individual living organisms and things, it also transforms practices such as 
‘drug development’. 
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Recontextualisation 
The translating of an entire, and until recently unknown, aspect of life into 
commodifiable products and services is also highly dependent on processes 
of recontextualisation (cf. Bernstein, 1990; Iedema, 1997a). 
Recontextualisation is the process by which discourses are encapsulated in 
‘increasingly durable materialities’ as a direct result of their translation and 
entry into new social systems and contexts (Iedema, 1997a). The 
consequence of recontextualisation then is that these ‘increasingly durable 
materialities’ – such as a hospital building, a technology, or a product – are 
seen to encapsulate the discourses that have shaped their being and 
becoming: They are discourse materialities.  
Sarangi (1998) extends on Iedema’s work to emphasise that 
recontextualisation is necessarily coupled with processes of 
decontextualisation and entextualisation. He observes that  
…putting something into context (contextualizing it), putting something 
out of context (decontextualizing it), and putting something into a 
different context (recontextualising) are both everyday and scientific 
activities…In between decontextualization and recontextualization, 
Bauman and Briggs (1990) suggest, there is a process of 
‘entextualization’ in narrative performance: an event is entextualized 
into a discourse with a controllable set of truth-
values…Recontextualization is thus not ‘representation’, but ‘re-
presentation’ or re-production’ which implies creativity (Sarangi, 1998, 
pp. 306-7, italics added). 
  70
The process of recontextualisation, then, requires concomitant processes of 
decontextualisation, transformation, and entextualisation8. For example, 
when pieces of foreskin tissue or placenta are alienated from their origin 
body-context and re-contextualised into other contexts such as the 
laboratory, clinic, or hospital, the original and typically tacit value and 
meaning of “foreskin” or “placenta” are replaced by other overt and 
functional meanings, use values, and exchange values by agents in these new 
contexts. A point to note also is that the range of persons who have power to 
entextualise the foreskin and placenta with meaning and value, and to use it 
for specific purposes in research or treatment contexts, are vastly different 
from the original and personal ‘owner’ of the tissue in its body-context. 
Both Iedema and Sarangi see the creation of written texts as a significant 
part of the recontextualisation process. Texts in particular are significant 
indicators of which meanings and values get ‘left behind’ and which are 
foregrounded at various stages of recontextualisation (cf. Lojek, 1994, p. 84; 
Mehan, 1993; Sarangi, 1998, p. 308). 
An important part of this process (recontextualisation) is the 
transformation of discourse into texts…Such texts, generated from a 
particular event in the sequential process (e.g., a testing encounter), 
become the basis of the interaction in the next step in the sequence (e.g., 
a placement committee meeting), These text become divorced from the 
social interaction that created them as they move through the system 
institutionally isolated from the interactional practices that generated 
them in the preceding events. 
                                                 
8 In later sections of the thesis I will use the one term ‘recontextualisation’ to refer to the related 
processes of decontextualisation, recontextualisation, and entextualisation. 
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The following excerpt from the UN Human Development Report 2001 
provides a detailed example of the role of texts in recontextualisation. 
recontextualising process from the thesis corpus. The excerpt details the 
steps by which the UK Government’s Technology Foresight Program moves 
from its initial conception to being implemented in various contexts, in 
various forms, by various agents. I have underlined the different contexts 
and genres that the ‘UK Technology foresight program’ moves through 
toward its ‘applications’ and ‘outcomes’. The contexts range from particular 
institutional genres, such as ‘the steering committee’ to more abstract 
discursive formations, such as ‘four themes’. 
The UK technology foresight programme, announced in 1993, is forging a 
closer partnership between scientists and industrialists to guide publicly 
financed science and technology activity [hybridity]. More market oriented and 
less science driven than similar efforts elsewhere, the programme has had 
three phases. First it set up 15 panels of experts on the markets and 
technologies of interest to the country, each chaired by a senior industrialist. 
Each panel was charged with developing future scenarios for its area of focus, 
identifying key trends and suggesting ways to respond. In 1995 the panels 
reported to a steering group, which synthesized the main findings and identified 
national priorities. Next the steering group produced a report distilling its 
recommendations under six themes: social trends and impacts of new 
technologies; communications and computing; genes and new organisms, 
processes and products; new materials, synthesis and processing; precision 
and control in management, automation and process engineering; and 
environmental issues. The steering group assigned priorities to three 
categories: key technology areas, where further work was vital; intermediate 
areas, where efforts needed to be strengthened; and emerging areas, where 
work could be considered if market opportunities were promising and world-
class capabilities could be developed. Now the recommendations from the 
exercise are being implemented. For example, research in the four priority 
areas- nanotechnology, mobile wireless communications, biomaterials and 
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sustainable energy-is being supported through a research award scheme. 
Another example is its application in Scotland. Scottish Enterprise hosts the 
Scottish foresight coordinator, who focuses on promoting foresight as a tool for 
business to think about and respond to future change in a structured way. The 
coordinator works with a wide range of public, private and academic actors. 
While a key goal is to help individual companies better manage change, this is 
being achieved by channelling efforts through a range of trusted business 
intermediaries-industry bodies, networks and local delivery organizations -that 
have a sustainable influence on company activities. All panels and task forces 
address two underpinning themes: sustainable development and education, 
skills and training. (UN Human Development Report, corpus text, cwn9. 54,126)  
A significant point to note regarding the processes of recontextualisation 
illustrated above is that the point of motivation, concern, exchange, interest, 
or desire associated with the Technology Foresight Program underwent 
multiple transformations that were beyond the reach of the original program 
authors. The reader will note that recontextualisation in this example entails 
shifts not only in text types and genres (from reports to meetings, to 
strategies, to taskforces, to training), but also shifts between contexts and 
agents: who is involved, which institutions, which spaces, which practices.  
I have translated the above excerpt into the diagram below in order to 
illustrate these movements more clearly. The boxes that feature dotted 
borders are intended to convey discourse formations such as “themes” or 
“priorities” rather than particular social contexts or texts which are presented 
in solid boxes. Interestingly, it is the themes or priorities that are the 
                                                 
9 cwn refers to Corpus Word Number. This is a limitation of the wordsmith program I used to manage 
the corpus texts. The program requires texts to be in ‘text only’ format which does not allow for 
individual texts’ page numbers to be preserved. The cwn refers to the word number of the citation 
within the full corpus. 
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currency of recontextualisation in this example: they are the links in a chain 
between one context and another. The themes and priorities themselves are 
heavily condensed summaries of all of the discussions and interests that have 
emerged in prior contexts. They are nominalisations. 
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Diagram 1: Recontextualisations in the UK technology foresight 
program  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A final point to note in regard to the movement of recontextualisation is that 
recontextualised abstractions, when absorbed in objectified material culture, 
such as the various bio-products now on offer, themselves become ‘a 
component in the process of communication’ (Streeck, 1996, p. 366, in 
Iedema, 1997a): that is, a consumable resource for meaning making and 
evaluation. As intimated above, many members of the general public – i.e. 
those who are not members of the technocratic genetics discourse 
community – will, to a certain extent, draw on the objectified material 
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culture as resources for meaning making. The material manifestations of 
biotechnology themselves are imbued with, and indeed ontologically 
produced and defined by, a set of technocratic (economic and scientific) 
values, judgements, and evaluations.  
But, as discussed in the Introduction, the durable materialities of 
biotechnology recontextualisation are not merely ‘products’ such as a 
particular diagnostic kit or vaccine, they are also living plants, animals, 
humans, and other organisms such as bacteria. These outcomes of 
biotechnology become a component in the process of communication. We 
may come to understand and evaluate GM foods, for example, through their 
availability for sale in supermarkets. We may have a friend who aborted a 
child because of the results of a genetic test taken during the early stages of 
pregnancy. We may have a nephew who was conceived through 
reproductive technology. These persons are within our families, our friends, 
and colleagues. These persons, whose lives have been directly manipulated 
by biotechnological mediation, may choose to contribute their own ‘lived 
experience’ evaluations of these technologies to public discourse. This is 
where the notion of alternative voice in heteroglossia and ethics becomes 
perhaps most important. 
Absorption 
Technological innovation provides a means by which humans can move 
previously non-routine aspects of human cultural expression and life to into 
“everyday” mediated contexts. Marcuse’s (1964) description of the way that 
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abstract cultural expressions and antagonistic or subversive cultural content 
are depleted and transformed (homogenised so as to fit within the media 
form) via mediation is particularly instructive here. Marcuse (1964, p. 61) 
argues that mediation affects not only how things appear, but also where 
they appear, and in what form (for example, the salon, the concert hall, the 
theatre, the market) . All of these variables, he argues, impact upon the 
perceived social significance, meaning, and political (non)potential of both 
the media form and its “content” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 62).  
Marcuse contends that the antagonistic or subversive potential of content – 
that is, the potential to be other than what is and to effect consciousness of, 
or desire for, something other than the current path of mediation – is 
depleted by ‘the absorbent power’ and more or less “everyday” status of a 
particular media form. A particular media form, for instance, cannot help but 
filter and shape the content that is passed through it because of its own 
limitations, transmission channels, intended uses, and so on. The context 
within which an “audience” interprets content (for example, a theatre, 
concert hall, laboratory, supermarket), in conjunction with the filtering 
effects of a media form itself, is also significant to the range of possible 
meanings that are attributed to that content by the audience or “consumer”.  
‘The absorbent power of society depletes the artistic dimension by 
assimilating its antagonistic contents. In the realm of culture, the new 
totalitarianism manifests itself precisely in a harmonizing pluralism, 
where the most contradictory works and truths peacefully coexist in 
indifference…Whether ritualised or not, art contains the rationality of 
negation. In its advanced positions, it is the Great Refusal – the protest 
against that which is. The modes in which man [sic] and things are 
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made to appear, to sing and sound and speak, are modes of refuting, 
breaking, and recreating their factual existence. But these modes of 
negation pay tribute to the antagonistic society to which they are linked. 
Separated from the sphere of labour where society reproduces itself and 
its misery, the world of art which they create remains, with all its truth, 
a privilege and an illusion…The salon, the concert, opera, theatre are 
designed to create and invoke another dimension of reality. Their 
attendance requires festive-like preparation; they cut off and transcend 
everyday experience (1964, pp. 61-63, italics added). 
The key aspect of absorption, as distinct from the other movements of 
mediation, is that it deals specifically with these processes of rendering new 
technologies familiar, invisible, and part of the “everyday”. All of the 
movements of mediation discussed above are, however, intimate in this 
inherently political process of absorption. As the following diagram 
indicates, all of the movements of mediation are intimately involved in 
moving biotechnologies, and the living products they engender, into the 
everyday lives of citizens. Absorption in biotechnology requires a movement 
from inalienability to commoditisation; from abstraction to absorption; and 
from spaces and times where the technology or product is new and contested 
to spaces and times where is nothing more than an everyday, acceptable 
product or service, and familiar. 
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Figure 2: Abstraction, absorption, alienation, and commoditisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An integral part of the absorption movement is, then, the process of 
rendering a new technology desirable, acceptable, and familiar. This 
movement may have to occur in an atmosphere of considerable opposition, 
as has been the case with some areas of biotechnology including GM foods, 
cloning, and stem cell research. Among other things, dissent disrupts the 
invisibility of a new technology and focuses, rather than deflects, critical 
consciousness.  
The rhetorical imperative is paramount in some areas of technological 
absorption because the hopes that surround technological revolutions are, 
characteristically, not the hopes of the many – at least in their first 
incarnation. Rather, the nature of technological ‘advance’ is such that new 
technologies have to be “introduced” to social systems and be rendered 
familiar, acceptable, and desirable through strategies of influence and 
persuasion. In mediation, even technologies that have been hotly contested 
can become part of the accepted and familiar everyday by becoming 
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familiar, available, and gradually indispensable. As such, the most crucial 
role of the introducers of new technology is to make others desire the new 
technology, and the outcomes it may accrue. In high technology industries, 
the most important people to convince are arguably the funding agencies 
which, in current climes, equals industry representatives and politicians.  
New media forms and products find their way into the everyday as material 
objects and processes and even as further abstractions of capital and value, 
for example, spin off companies, stocks and bonds, currency, and “futures”. 
These products, technologies, and their intangible abstractions become part 
of the everyday through rhetorico-political processes of routinisation and 
naturalisation. The need to ‘introduce’ technologies to a society, and to 
secure their ‘place’ in that society, is manifest in the imperatives of 
industrialists and academics who have become increasingly concerned with 
processes of ‘technological diffusion; ‘innovation infusion’; ‘early 
adoption’; ‘early adopters’; ‘critical mass’; ‘media saturation’; and so on (cf. 
Green, 2002; Hauben and Hauben, 1997; Takacs and Freiden, 1998).  
The State of mediation 
The reaction of the state power upon economic development can be one 
of three kinds: it can run in the same direction, and then development is 
more rapid; it can oppose the line of development, in which case 
nowadays state power in every great nation will go to pieces in the long 
run; or it can cut off the economic development from certain paths, and 
impose on it certain others. (Frederick Engels, Letter to Conrad 
Schmidt, Oct. 27 1890, in Marx and Engels, 1947, p. 4) 
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The current pathways of biotechnology mediation have been officially 
sanctioned and promoted by governments across the globe. In Engels’ terms 
above it seems that governments have chosen the “run with it” option. Yet, 
the rhetorical enhancement of technologies and common declaration of 
technological revolution that is evident in much public policy on 
biotechnology is in no way insignificant or rare. One may even argue that 
the declaration of technological revolution in these policy documents has 
become little more than a rhetorical device designed to inscribe new 
technologies with unquestioned overtones of social betterment and the 
improvement of human life. The most pervasive and uncritical claim in the 
discourses of technological revolution is that a technologically 
‘revolutionised’ society is one that is more ‘advanced’ than others. A 
technologically revolutionised country is, apparently, forward looking, bold, 
innovative, modern, cutting edge, and leading the way. Moreover, to join the 
‘industrialised’ world, developing countries are told that they must adopt the 
latest technologies, and perhaps more significantly, the dogma that 
accompanies their inculcation. 
Like all technological ‘revolutions’ of our history, biotechnology is defined 
by profound hopes for the future. Whether these hopes match the 
expectations of those who initiated them or not, the outcomes of any 
technological revolution are of great consequence. This is because 
technological revolution hinges on transformation: Technological revolution 
happens when some thing, society, process, practice, or one, is transformed. 
But a revolution does not necessarily mean that the dominant modes of 
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valuing, worldviews, or ideologies are transformed. The most prolific 
transformations, it seems, are in fact rendered upon what can be 
transformed: what is the object of technology. Technological revolution is 
deemed to be revolutionary to the extent that it opens up new or expanded 
spaces of physical, biological, and social life for exploitation according to 
the dominant means and imperative of the system from which it is borne and 
into which it is [re]introduced. Technological revolution does not, 
historically, stop exploitation from occurring but, rather, simply increases 
the range of natural human and non human life forms that are subject to 
productive exploitation. 
Once a new technology has been factored significantly into a nation’s policy 
mix it becomes authorised, rather than aberrant and strategic rather than 
abstract. The new technological ‘innovation’ is recontextualised as the stuff 
of enlightened public policy. As Feenberg (1999) posits, this focus on 
technology and scientific revolution as a precipitant of human progress is a 
characteristic feature of modern western societies: 
There is, however, another fateful path by which technology enters the larger 
conversation of modernity: the historicizing trend in the emerging biological 
and social sciences of the late 18th and 19th centuries. This trend was firmly 
rooted in the idea of progress, which found its surest guarantee in the promise 
of technology. By the end of the 19th century, under the influence of Marx and 
Darwin, progressivism had become technological determinism. Following the 
then common interpretation of these materialist masters, technical progress was 
believed to ground humanity’s advance toward freedom and happiness 
(Feenberg, 1999, pp. 1-2). 
Once advancements in a particular area of technological development 
becomes policy, the state moves henceforth as the primary medium of 
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technological-ideological diffusion: that is to say as the primary force of 
mediation. The ‘new’ – rather than ‘aberrant’ – technology is literally 
‘frameshifted’ to the level of national and international policy and 
consciousness (Waller, 2001). Through the medium of the state and 
productive apparatus, both the material and non material aspects of the new 
dogma enter schools, universities, public institutions, public spaces, homes, 
ecosystems, and bodies. The substantive basis of these movements from idea 
to the everyday involves the ‘interlocking apparatus of scientific research, 
technological innovation, and industrial mass production’ (Leiss, 1994, p. 
xii). Such paths of officially sanctioned mediation are difficult to contest 
precisely because official rationales for mediation become ensconced in 
representations of the (future) good life. The result is that anyone who 
argues against it is often rhetorically pitted against the ‘future wellbeing of 
all of humanity’, or the economic growth and prosperity of their nation and 
their children.  
As Chapters Six and Seven discuss, these diffusion, routinisation, and 
naturalisation strategies are predominantly carried out via existing social 
media including the State, mass communication media, and markets of 
exchange. As new technologies emerge, the institutions of governance, law, 
and even ethics are invoked to regulate and patrol the development and 
diffusion of the technology and to advocate in the interests of public ‘safety’. 
Programs also emerge, usually post facto the initial surge of economic 
activity and division of property rights, in an attempt to ensure equality of 
access to the materialisations and capital abstractions of the new technology. 
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An important part of the routinisation of new technologies is the 
phenomenon whereby ‘access’ to the material outcomes of a new technology 
becomes a basic human ‘right’: a measure of human development and the 
good life. When this occurs, it is assumed that all persons should have access 
to these technologies because they are unquestionably good, beneficial, and 
desirable. A person who does not have “access” to the new technology can 
be literally excluded from accessing some very basic social services which 
now depend upon that technology – the use of electronic banking over face 
to face and services delivered via the Internet is a classic example that has 
led to declarations regarding ‘the digital divide’ etcetera.  
The most prominent example of this in the context of biotechnology is in 
relation to the severe lack of access to HIV/AIDS drugs in sub Saharan 
Africa. What the UN (2001, cwn. 65,919) has termed “Poor People’s 
Technology” programs (publicly funded technology) have been introduced 
to ensure that ‘disadvantaged’ communities in ‘developing’ nations have the 
same opportunities to access drugs and vaccines as rich people in western 
industrialised countries (United Nations, 2001, cwn.72,647). The function of 
not for profit programs and social policies run out of the United Nations and 
other social and environmental justice bodies are to attend to persons or 
ecosystems who/that may be left out of the dominant modus operandi of the 
large pharmaceutical companies. What these groups are responding to is the 
fact that some people are literally rendered vulnerable by the current paths 
of mediation and development in biotechnology. As the authors of the UN 
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Report state, the role of the UN’s Poor People’s Technology programs is to 
fill in gaps that are created by ‘market failure’. 
Examples of biotechnology as media  
Example 1: Cilento turns to tourism 
It was announced on 30 October 2000 that ten remote villages in southern 
Italy will be the subject of ‘one of science’s most ambitious attempts to trace 
the roots of inherited illnesses by spotting genetic differences between a 
homogenous people’ (Carroll, 2000).  
The villagers agreed to become a living laboratory after it was 
explained they possessed a unique gene pool that could help create 
better drugs…Scientists chose Cilento because its inhabitants…have 
been undisturbed by large-scale immigration for millennia…The project 
is funded by Italy’s national research council but private backers are 
being sought, a move that could be controversial if profit-making 
companies are given exclusive access to data…Playing a role in 21st-
century medicine is gratifying but Cilento’s inhabitants hope the 
researchers’ arrival will reverse an atrophy that has left villages half-
abandoned, according to Andrea Salati, mayor of Gioi Cilento. “Many 
of our children have gone, it’s mostly old people, which means our 
communities are dying. This has given us hope for the future. It is a 
chance to create tourism. (Carroll, 2000, italics added) 
Similarly, the Estonian Genome Foundation announced in November 2000 
that it is looking for investors to fund the world’s biggest database of 
medical and genetic data taken from a potential 1.445 million citizens of 
Estonia, a move supported by the Estonian Government earlier in 2000 
(Gross, 2000; see also www.genomics.ee for publicity on the venture). Like 
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the people of Cilento, the Estonian people are seen to be ‘just perfect’ for the 
purposes of the database: they  
have been settling in their present location for at least 5000 years, but 
not too isolated from the rest of the world. Their family trees can 
normally be traced back into the 17th century…Opinion polls suggest 
that more than 90% of the 1.445 million Estonians are ready to part with 
50ml of their blood and a detailed account of their medical history. 
(Gross, 2000) 
In some cases the individual, tribe, or even isolated village is defined in legal 
and corporate discourses as a “partner” in the process of alienation and the 
profits arising thereof because without the medium (biotechnology) and the 
controllers of the medium (the technocratic scientific community) the 
content would be “useless”, inalienable etc. The conflict between being the 
owner and partner in exploiting one’s own genetic material is obvious 
because the processes of alienation, translation and so on require an “object” 
on which to work which is, inevitably, yourself.  
Example 2 Moore Vs Regents 
Consent – naïve or otherwise – is not always required for alienability and 
property rights to hold as we have seen in the case of Moore v Regents of the 
University of California. When alienation is enabled through technological 
innovation, the individual from whom property is alienated is not yet 
guaranteed any recompense, even from his/her unique genetic 
characteristics. The case arose when Doctor David Golde and research 
assistant Shirley Quan were able to patent a cell line derived from tissue 
extracted from Mr John Moore, a sufferer of hairy-cell leukaemia. Without 
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consent from Mr Moore, Golde and Quan were able to develop and patent 
the Mo cell line with potential profits of US$3 billion (Faigus, 1993). As it 
was, ‘the court sided with the interests of the defendants. Its reasoning was 
that giving the patient a property right to his tissue would impede progress 
and "destroy the economic incentive to conduct important medical 
research"’ (Andress and Nelkin, 1998, p. 59). In this particular case, one 
might question the extent to which institutional hybridisation has already 
delivered us to a state where courts of law are making decisions overtly in 
the interest of commercial business outcomes (!). 
Conclusion 
As we have seen in this chapter, all of the primary mediations (alienation, 
translation, recontextualisation, and absorption) that form biotechnology 
research and commercialisation make the distance between the initiators of 
scientific discoveries, and those who ultimately are affected by or consumers 
of the technology, or product further and further apart. With each new 
context that is identified in biotechnology and its related practices, new 
actors are also either identified or implied. So too, with every change of 
context do we see new representations of biotechnology emerge.  
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Chapter 3 Discourse, social practice, and 
mediation 
Overview 
A key understanding of the previous chapter was that the boundaries 
between any given social practice, other practices, and the broader society 
are discursively constituted and hence are permeable. Social practices such 
as biotechnology and science more generally are interdependent, 
overlapping, and interwoven with other practices precisely because members 
of any given social practice participate in a number of social practices, 
traditions, and social systems in and over time. The extent to which 
discursive freedom arises out of the natural embeddedness of a practice and 
its members is, however, often strongly patrolled by both internal and 
external actors in various practices and social contexts. 
This chapter expands upon the role of language and discourse in producing, 
reproducing, and revising shared ways of seeing, being, and acting within 
the social practice of biotechnology over time. The social practice 
framework used in the thesis provides a way of mapping and understanding 
the potential social and political implications of biotechnology research and 
commercialisation. Moreover, the social practice framework articulates a 
view of biotechnology as a socially constructed, socially constituted, and 
socially and historically embedded practice that is capable of functioning as 
media.  
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Discourse and social practice 
As outlined in the Introduction chapter, Isaacs identifies six characteristics 
of social practice that are fundamental to the mediation framework and 
critical discourse analysis: 
1. Social practices are constructed and constituted by persons; 
2. Social practices are directed toward an overall purpose; 
3. Social practices are shaped by tradition i.e. of what to do within 
the practice and how to do it; 
4. Social practices depend on processes of learning and 
socialisation to recreate themselves; 
5. Social practices have an institutional authority dimension. The 
production, revision, and reproduction of social practices is 
often closely controlled by persons in positions of formal and 
informal authority; 
6. Social practices exist as part of a broader, fluid ecology of 
social and other systems (Isaacs, 1998, pp. 3-9). 
The above characteristics emphasise the importance of understanding social 
practices, and any other conceptualisation of social interaction, in their 
ongoing social and historical contexts. But, perhaps more importantly they 
emphasise that social practices can both shape, and be shaped by these 
surrounding contexts, persons, and practices. Isaacs emphasises that social 
practices are both socially constructed and constituted. Isaacs emphasises 
also that social practices are produced and reproduced over time via 
processes of learning and socialisation. The difference between Isaacs’ 
model of social practice and this thesis is that I have foregrounded the role 
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of discourse and language as central to not only socialisation and learning 
within social practices, but also the relationship between a given social 
practice and other external practices and contexts. I posit that the recursive 
formation of individual and collective identity within the practice of 
biotechnology, as well as the overall conception of the practice of 
biotechnology in society, is a function of language and discourse (cf. also 
Halliday and Martin, 1993; Lemke, 1995; Massey, 1998). Language and 
discourse are the primary means by which members of the practice and the 
broader society not only come to understand and identify the practice of 
biotechnology, but also, and as a result, the primary means by which it is 
produced and reproduced over time.  
Routine aspects of the practice of biotechnology − such as the use of 
particular terminologies, technologies, assumptions, and ways of (not) 
relating − reflect, at a surface symbolic level, the deep power structures, 
ways of seeing, being, and acting within the social practice (Frost and Egri, 
1991, p. 242). Language and discourse are hence both a phenomenological 
representation of the epistemological, ontological, and moral resources on 
offer, and a contestable medium via which these resources are produced, 
reproduced, and revised over time. The discourses that existing members of 
a practice use in describing themselves, and the overall practice, is an 
integral element of the socialisation10 process for new members. Through this 
process, new members of a practice come to identify with salient traditions, 
                                                 
10 Isaacs defines socialisation as the process whereby ‘shared beliefs, actions, and commitments’ are 
learnt and thus reproduced within the social practice (Isaacs, 1998, p.6). 
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institutions, and their experiences in particular settings within the practice. 
The importance of language in processes of socialisation and identification 
is reflected in Gee’s (1990) emphasis on discourse and social identity:  
‘A socially accepted association among ways of using language, of 
thinking, feeling, believing, valuing, and of acting that can be used to 
identify oneself as a member of a socially meaningful group’ (in Falk, 
1994, p. 3). 
Gee identifies the essential interrelatedness of ways of using language and 
the ways of seeing and acting that inform the collective consciousness of a 
social practice. Furthermore, his definition emphasises the importance of 
language and discourse in producing, reproducing, and revising/contesting 
shared ways of seeing, being, and acting in the process of identifying with 
the social practice.  
To gain “entry” to the social practice, neophyte members must gain access 
not only to this system of shared meaning but to the system (discourses, 
genres) of ethical engagement and orientation this involves. A person’s 
access to this system of meaning and evaluation can be as “routine” as the 
basic administrative knowledge required to operate within the practice, or it 
may be as specialised as knowledge required to execute novel gene splicing 
procedures in a laboratory setting. The sites and contexts within which we 
are embedded have distinct influence upon our individual and shared ways 
of seeing, being and acting: ‘our embeddedness provides both the source and 
the contours of our be-ing and be-coming’ (Isaacs, 2002a, p. 12).  
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Social life in all its forms is produced and reproduced via learning and 
education. In John Dewey’s words: 
The most notable distinction between living and inanimate things is that 
the former maintain themselves by renewal… Education, in its broadest 
sense, is the means of this social continuity of life. Every one of the 
constituent elements of a social group, in a modern city as in a savage 
tribe, is born immature, helpless, without language, beliefs, ideas, or 
social standards. Each individual, each unit who is the carrier of the 
life-experience of his group, in time passes away. Yet the life of the 
group goes on. Society exists through a process of transmission quite as 
much as biological life. This transmission occurs by means of 
communication of habits of doing, thinking, and feeling from the older 
to the younger. Without this communication of ideals, hopes, 
expectations, standards, opinions, from those members of society who 
are passing out of the group life to those who are coming into it, social 
life could not survive. (Dewey, 1922, 2001, np, italics added) 
Just as Dewey refers to the communication of habits from the older to the 
younger in societies, so too can we can talk about the communication of 
habits from established members of social practices and institutions to 
neophyte members. Dewey’s notion of the renewal of life through 
transmission effectively captures the dynamic nature of both our social and 
historical embeddedness. It is also true that each ‘genre’ of interaction in the 
social medium has a rich and complex history and political economy of 
standards and resources for understanding, interacting, evaluating, valuing, 
relating, and defining among other functions. Each genre makes powerful 
claims upon our sense of self and our sense of, and engagement with, others.  
The politics of discourse are ongoing but are most clearly identifiable in 
processes of learning and socialisation. Learning and socialisation are the 
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means by which neophyte members of the practice come to be seen, and to 
see themselves, as being “a member” of the practice. Scientists for example, 
learn specialised terminologies that many other members of the community 
cannot understand. These terminologies form the basis of a corequisite 
system of shared meaning across the profession. A subgroup of scientists 
who specialise in molecular genetics might have another set of terminologies 
that ecologists or physicists are not aware of, or do not use frequently, and 
vice versa. In this sense we can see that discourse operates in a very much 
political fashion to include and/or exclude certain actors from entire systems 
of meaning and activity. 
Apart from discursive and institutional boundaries that keep others out (for 
example the use of specialised terminologies or specific educational 
requirements) members of social practices actively define their borders 
through means of rhetorical demarcation and negotiation in the social 
medium. Taylor (1991) observes, 
"If we want to take a rhetoric of (as opposed to about) science seriously 
. . . we then must confront questions concerning how science is 
demarcated as science" (403). In other words, our inquiry into the 
rhetorical functions of scientific discourse should also lead us to explore 
popular texts that instruct our culture as to the "proper" place of science. 
It is also important to look at how science has opposed itself to other 
sense-making systems in our culture, attempting to dismiss their logics 
and affirm its own (Taylor, 1991, p. 1991, italics added). 
Members of a particular practice or discourse community also draw on, and 
simultaneously define, other social practices in order to differentiate 
themselves, their ways of seeing, acting, and so on from the wider society. 
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For example, we often hear of syllogistic statements such as ethics is based 
on reason, religion is based on belief; you can argue with reason, but you 
cannot argue with belief; hence religion has no place in the practice of 
applied ethics (cf. Savulescu, 1998). The effect of this kind of reasoning is to 
demarcate between practices by stating or creating differences. 
Socialisation  
Social practices and systems are different from other types of systems, such 
as machines or organisms, in that they are constituted by the production and 
reproduction of shared meanings and understandings that are expressed 
primarily through language over time (Luhmann, 1995). In other words, a 
social system can be seen literally as a system of shared meaning that some 
or all of us have access to. Dewey’s description of the regeneration of 
socialisation for new born members of society provides an analogy for the 
ways in which new members of a social practice are socialised into shared 
ways of seeing, being, and acting that ‘characterise’ the practice. 
On one hand, there is the contrast between the immaturity of the new-
born members of the group -- its future sole representatives -- and the 
maturity of the adult members who possess the knowledge and customs 
of the group. On the other hand, there is the necessity that these 
immature members be not merely physically preserved in adequate 
numbers, but that they be initiated into the interests, purposes, 
information, skill, and practices of the mature members: otherwise the 
group will cease its characteristic life. Even in a savage tribe, the 
achievements of adults are far beyond what the immature members 
would be capable of if left to themselves. With the growth of 
civilization, the gap between the original capacities of the immature and 
the standards and customs of the elders increases. Mere physical 
growing up, mere mastery of the bare necessities of subsistence will not 
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suffice to reproduce the life of the group. Deliberate effort and the 
taking of thoughtful pains are required. Beings who are born not only 
unaware of, but quite indifferent to, the aims and habits of the social 
group have to be rendered cognizant of them and actively interested. 
Education, and education alone, spans the gap. (Dewey, 1922/2001, np) 
There are several points that I will emphasise here. First, neophyte members 
of a practice do in time become the ‘sole representatives’ of that group, they 
rise to powerful positions within the group and can influence the direction of 
a practice over time. This is at least one reason why it is important for 
members of a particular practice to be cognisant of the practice and their 
relative power or powerlessness to contribute to the conditions of their 
existence. Without formative and deliberative communication between 
‘generations’ of practitioners, the social practice would, in Dewey’s words, 
‘cease its characteristic life’. Second, while I do not discount the potential 
for members of a social practice (new or old) to revise or add to the shared 
understandings that characterise a social practice, I do recognise that it is 
primarily the established, powerful, and/or senior members of a social 
practice who ‘hold’ and communicate the ‘interests, purposes, information, 
skill, and practices’ of the group to new members. Third, and most 
importantly, while socialisation involves the transference of technical skill 
and specialist languages, it also involves a fostering of commitment, care 
for, and loyalty to the practice and its associated ways of seeing, being, and 
acting. Learning and socialisation are the processes whereby ‘shared beliefs, 
actions, and commitments are learnt and thus reproduced within the social 
practice’ (Isaacs, 1998, p.6). Neophyte members of a social practice have to 
be rendered cognisant of the shared beliefs, actions, and commitments of the 
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practice, but more importantly, they have to be rendered actively interested 
in, and committed to, them.  
While socialisation can be both formal (for example combined degrees in 
biotechnology and business) and informal (workplace norms, culture, 
language, hierarchy, peer relationships), it is always political, ethical, and 
interpretive to the extent that it actively and deliberatively shapes individual 
practitioners’ ways of seeing, being, valuing, and acting according to 
dominant paradigms. The extent to which an individual member of a 
practice is free to voice uncharacteristic ways of seeing, being, and acting 
within the practice can to a large degree, determine the extent to which he or 
she can identify with the practice, its stated and unstated objectives, and 
other members of the practice.  
The silencing of a marginalised group or individual in a particular context or 
social practice should not, however, be interpreted as a complete absence of 
dissenting views and ways of seeing in a practice altogether (Sherrif, 2000): 
while a practice may be characterised by certain ways of seeing, being, and 
acting, it is not limited to those ways of seeing, being, and acting. Rather, 
there are various ways in which individual actors within a social practice 
may contest and transform dominant ways of seeing, being, and acting – not 
least through the way they relate with other members of the social practice 
and educate new members as they enter the practice.  
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Ways of seeing as 
Any form of socialisation, be it vocational or otherwise, requires persons to 
learn new terms and languages. With additional words and meanings come 
new or clarified concepts and understandings. Thus, socialisation “into” a 
social practice and its concomitant languages, literally, changes the way that 
practitioners “see things” both in the work context and in other personal 
contexts. Technological and scientific changes or innovations in a particular 
practice such as mechanics bring about wider changes in shared ways of 
seeing (cf. Kuhn 1977). Kuhn, for example, identifies a historical trend of 
widespread shifts in perception as shifts in science and knowledge that were 
then materialised in technologies.  
What my reading of Aristotle seemed therefore to disclose was a global 
sort of change in the way men [sic] viewed nature and applied language 
to it, one that could not properly be described as constituted by 
additions to knowledge or by the mere piecemeal correction of 
mistakes. That sort of change was shortly to be described by Herbert 
Butterfield as “putting on a different kind of thinking –cap”… (1977, p. 
xiii, italics added). 
The following example on conceptions of the heart more fully illustrates 
Butterfield’s (in Kuhn 1977, p. xiii) description of ‘putting on a different 
kind of thinking cap’:  
‘in primitive societies, where technical images are few and far between 
and very simple at that, most explanatory metaphors are drawn from 
nature. In the effort to understand his [sic] makeup, primitive man 
inevitably resorts to images of wind and water, breezes and tides, 
floods, fruits and harvests. But the development of technology created a 
whole new stock of metaphors—not simply extra metaphors, but ones 
altogether different in their logical character. Once man succeeded in 
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making equipment which performed—looms, furnaces, forges, kilns, 
bellows, whistles and irrigation ditches—he was confronted by 
mechanisms whose success or failure depended on the efficiency of 
their working parts: things which could block or break, silt up or go out, 
mechanisms which were intelligibly systematic and systematically 
intelligible’ (Miller, 1978, p. 181). 
There are three important points to note here. First, discourses produce and 
reproduce certain ways of seeing the world, our relationships and 
responsibilities toward others, and ourselves. Second, these discourses are 
dynamic not static. Meanings, values, and orientations develop and change 
over time. Finally, Kuhn’s fundamental argument that scientific and 
technological change can bring about broader movements in ways of “seeing 
as” is key in understanding the way that biotechnology can mediate broader 
ways of seeing, being, and acting in society.  
Discourse, ethics, and practice 
Both ethics and language find their primary expression, production, and 
reproduction in ‘the social medium’: the social ‘spaces’ of interaction, 
relationship, and meaning. Dewey (1922/2001, np) articulates ‘[t]he bare 
fact that language consists of sounds which are mutually intelligible is 
enough of itself to show that its meaning depends upon connection with a 
shared experience’. Ethics, like power, like language, like any form of 
collective social engagement, lives in the spaces between persons in the 
social medium both in the present and over time. The significance of both 
the broad (social systems, practices, and institutions) and narrow 
(interpersonal relationships) aspects of the social medium to the practice of 
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ethics should not be underestimated, nor as language and discourse theory 
shows, be seen in separation from other levels of social organisation (cf. 
Lemke, 1995, pp. 104-106).  
As Dewey (1922/2001, np) observes, our engagement in the social medium 
is fundamentally educative: our primary linguistic, aesthetic, moral, and 
political understandings and orientations are produced, shaped, and 
reproduced via our engagement/embeddedness in the social medium, from 
our environment(s), and our relationships with and for others11. The 
understandings and orientations we develop by way of our embeddedness in 
the social medium are more and less unconscious orientations precisely 
because they are part of the ‘constant give and take of relationships with 
others’: 
While this [the] "unconscious influence of the environment" is so subtle 
and pervasive that it affects every fibre of character and mind, it may be 
worth while to specify a few directions in which its effect is most 
marked. First, the habits of language. Fundamental modes of speech, 
the bulk of the vocabulary, are formed in the ordinary intercourse of 
life, carried on not as a set means of instruction but as a social necessity. 
The babe acquires, as we well say, the mother tongue… We rarely 
recognize the extent in which our conscious estimates of what is worth 
while and what is not, are due to standards of which we are not 
conscious at all. But in general it may be said that the things which we 
take for granted without inquiry or reflection are just the things which 
determine our conscious thinking and decide our conclusions. And these 
habitudes which lie below the level of reflection are just those which 
                                                 
11 Note: relationships with and for other[s] includes the individual person’s interactions with and for 
other individual persons and with and for social groupings, institutions, practices, and so on. Thus is 
the nature of the social medium. 
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have been formed in the constant give and take of relationship with 
others. (Dewey, 1922/2001, np) 
Urban-Walker (1998) also emphasises the moral significance of this daily 
‘give and take’ in what she calls ‘the moral medium’: 
Any particular system of mutual moral accounting is a cultural practice 
already there that we learn from others. We arrive at any situation of 
moral assessment with moral concepts, maxims, deliberative strategies, 
and intuitive convictions shared, even if incompletely, with some others. 
So too we come with sensibilities, emotional responses, and sense of 
relevance and seriousness shaped by a history of interactions in some 
personal and political environment, and by our places in that. By 
accounting to each other through his moral medium, we acknowledge 
each other as responsible. At the same time we renew and refine the 
moral medium itself, keeping it alive as we keep our identities as moral 
persons afloat within it (Urban-Walker, 1998, p. 63) 
Narrative ethics in particular has increasingly been recognised as a valid 
approach in applied ethics for promoting and emancipating those ‘voices’ 
and ‘stories’ that have been marginalised or excluded from public debate, 
regard, or even consciousness (cf. for example Haraway, 1999; Josselson 
and Lieblich, 1993; Kohler Riessman, 1993; Massey, 2001a, 2001b; 
Schneewind, 1982). Urban Walker (1998) also notes that there are ‘shared 
vocabularies and grammars of moral discourse that give us things we can 
say, and an understanding of when to say them (“kind,” “ungrateful,” “fair,” 
“wrong,” “irresponsible,” “promise,” “honour,” “lie,”)’ (p. 61). Urban 
Walker acknowledges that there are commonly recognised and widely 
shared examples and models that ‘teach us the accepted sayings of things’ in 
any given language (1998, p. 61).  
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Discourse materialities  
Apart from the more intangible social aspects of social practices such as 
shared understandings and ways of seeing, other physical elements of the 
practice, such as a particular machine or product, can also act as 
communicative and political media within and over time: as discourse 
materialities. Fairclough states that different elements of social practice – 
such as objects, technologies, discourse – are ‘dialectically related’. That is 
to say, ‘they are different elements but not discrete, fully separate, elements. 
There is a sense in which each “internalizes” the others without being 
reducible to them’ (Fairclough, 2001, p. 1). While I would prefer to name 
this relationship as ‘dialogic’ rather than dialectic, Fairclough’s observation 
is an important one. Technologies – and more specifically biotechnologies – 
are discourse materialities: These technologies are designed out of particular 
human knowledges and understandings and are, moreover, designed for a 
particular range of purposes. 
A full recognition of biotechnology as media is not possible if we do not 
comprehend the ways in which all meaningful elements of a social practice 
can act as media in contexts within and beyond the social practice of 
biotechnology itself. But, a further appreciation of the extent to which 
biotechnology as a social practice mediates our social identities and 
relationships requires us to look at the resources for meaning and evaluation 
that are materialised within those technologies and products which are 
consumed by individuals for varying reasons and with varying degrees of 
informed consent. As indicated in the previous chapter, I have used the 
  101
concept of recontextualisation to fully explore the movement of meanings 
between discursive forms, genres, and contexts and, in particular, the 
discursive movement toward ‘increasingly durable materialities’ (Iedema, 
1997a). 
I frame both discourse materialities and ways of seeing, being, and acting as 
media forms to the extent that they can effect meaning in contexts 
immediately linked to biotechnology research and commercialisation and 
contexts that are not immediately linked to biotechnology research and 
commercialisation. Novel genetic technologies for example can literally 
function as “portals” to the future for a whole range of assumptions, ways of 
seeing, being and acting that have characterised science practice, and 
human-non-human interactions for millennia. By this I mean that 
technologies – and I use this term here to refer both to physical and social 
technologies – that are created or adopted within a given practice 
imbue/materialise certain functions, motives, ways, of seeing, being, and 
acting. When bio-technologies and techniques are deployed in different 
social contexts, for different purposes, the functions, motives, ways of seeing, 
being, acting that are imbued within them are deployed as well. In other 
words, technologies, techniques, products, people, ways of describing, new 
vocations as biotechnologists and bioinformaticists etcetera can function all 
as media, not only between and across socio-political contexts, but also over 
time. 
  102
Conclusion 
Social practices are shaped by traditions of ‘what to do within the practice 
and how to do it’ (Isaacs, 1998, pp. 3-9). The corollary is that social 
practices such as science, ethics, or public policy are also shaped by 
traditions of what not to do and how not to do it. The production and 
reproduction of social practices such as biotechnology is an infinitely social, 
political, and discursive process. Any instance of shared culture, shared 
ways of seeing, being, and acting – such as the social practice of 
biotechnology – ‘depends on the transmission of meaning across time’ 
(Steiner, 1975, p. 31).  
Yet, while we as social beings inevitably draw on the linguistic and 
discursive resources that are on offer to make sense of our and others’ 
responsibilities, purpose, and place in the world, we are also capable of 
contesting these resources, re-evaluating them, and revising them. 
Imperatives for ‘applied’ and ‘strategic’ research in biotechnology and 
universities more generally literally currently places pressure on 
biotechnology practitioners to translate their research into commodities and 
commercial opportunities for the university or organisation they are involved 
in. In responding to these imperatives, biotechnology practitioners 
themselves function to produce and reproduce powerful discourses and 
trajectories that are focused on commoditisation, alienation from nature, and 
technological interventions. The individual practitioners of biotechnology, in 
learning and passing on the practice, are a vector for the production and 
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reproduction of the practice, and for the trajectories and discourses that 
historically constitute it. 
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Chapter 4 Filters of analysis  
Overview 
As I have argued in the previous chapter, discourse is a central dynamic in 
the production and reproduction of social practices such as biotechnology 
over time. The following chapter outlines some ways that these 
understandings about the functioning of discourse in social practice can be 
translated into meaningful methods for critical discourse analysis (and vice 
versa). The intention of the chapter is to familiarise the reader with key 
interpretive lenses employed within chapters five, six, and seven, which deal 
significantly with the thesis analysis. 
Introduction  
Discursive resources for meaning making and evaluation emerge from 
numerous recognised and unrecognised sources in the social medium. 
Governments in Australia have attempted to shape public attitudes toward 
biotechnology research and commercialisation through a number of media, 
including public awareness and relations programs and more indirect policy 
and funding statements/initiatives. But our understandings of biotechnology, 
like the practice itself, are not influenced only by those texts or brochures 
that are trying to make us think of biotechnology in a certain way. Although 
I only analyse written texts in this thesis, I note that both textual resources 
such as brochures and news items, and discourse materialities, such as 
particular products on offer or procedures, constitute resources for meaning 
making within this intertextual spectrum. The different ways of seeing 
 105 
included in the heteroglossia are engaged in a politics of representation. 
Some ways of seeing are foregrounded and esteemed, ‘on sale’, officially 
sanctioned, while others are unavailable, marginalised, or silenced.  
The corpus of texts has been developed over a three year period from July 
1999 to July 2002 in an attempt to draw on a range of resources for meaning 
and evaluation that are available in the public sphere. The final analysis 
portrayed in this thesis has foregrounded those texts that are designed to 
represent, and/or are produced within, a specific context. I have chosen this 
approach specifically to highlight the various movements of biotechnology 
under the biotechnology as media framework – from alienation to 
absorption. Where possible I have analysed texts that are produced within 
the different social contexts that are consistently mentioned in relation to 
biotechnology research and commercialisation, for example, basic research 
contexts; commercial contexts; investment and stock market contexts; 
regulation and public contexts; policy contexts; education contexts. This 
approach is consistent with Stillar’s observation that ‘discoursal and 
rhetorical acts [both] shape and reflect the social practices of groups in 
particular contexts’ (1999, p. 91).  
The analysis has included multiple rounds of text analyses and 
reconceptualisation across the duration of the thesis work, only some of 
which is presented in this thesis. Reiterative analysis and conceptualisation 
provides for an ever deepening understanding of the complex interdiscursive 
and intertextual thematic patterns (Lemke, 1995, p. 42) that have emerged 
across genres and contexts. As indicated in the Introduction, the “pilot” 
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analysis for the thesis consisted of a comparison of two public education 
documents dealing with biotechnology (cf. Sunderland, 2000). The 
outcomes of the analysis, combined with initial content analysis of policy 
documents and interview data I conducted for the Brisbane Institute, were 
the basis of the biotechnology as media framework for the thesis. Using the 
concept of mediation or “movement” as a basis, I began to collect texts that 
were produced in, or intended to be representative of (for example, policy, 
ministerial statements, press releases), those contexts that were most 
consistently referred to in the initial corpus of public education, policy, and 
interview transcripts. 
Key analysis filters 
The analysis was conducted using a range of methods and concepts arising 
out of critical discourse analysis that are suitable to the biotechnology as 
media framework and the initial findings of the pilot study. The methods 
and concepts identified were used as “filters” or “probes” with which to 
read, interpret, and evaluate whole corpus texts, and subsections of them. I 
use the term “filters” here to acknowledge the selective nature of the final 
analysis and also to highlight the nature of corpus analysis. Analysing a 
large corpus of texts using the Wordsmith software program requires this 
filtering process due to the sheer amount of data that is available. The key 
filters I have used in analysing the thesis corpus are explained below. 
Interdiscursivity and intertextuality 
In order to track mediation across and within various social contexts the 
analysis had to be interdiscursive (Fairclough, 2002). This is a basic 
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prerequisite of discourse analysis to the extent that all meanings are 
intertextual: ‘the meaning of a utterance or event must be read against the 
background of other utterances and events occurring in the community’ both 
past and present (Lemke, 1995, p. 25).  
The first section of the thesis analysis is hence dedicated to discourse-
historical concerns. Discourse-historical analysis is primarily employed to 
promote interdiscursive and intertextual analysis and to ‘situate’ 
contemporary discourses within a wider historical context (Wodak, 2001).  
In investigating historical and political topics and texts, the discourse 
historical approach attempts to integrate much available knowledge 
about the historical sources and the background of the social and 
political fields in which discursive ‘events’ are embedded. Further, it 
analyses the historical dimension of discursive actions by exploring the 
ways in which particular genres of discourse are subject to diachronic 
change, that is, the intertextuality and interdiscursivity. 
The idea of the discourse-historical approach is that the analyst seeks to 
compare the current texts with historically significant discourses and trends. 
Understanding the social and historical bases of a given social practice is 
also the first step toward understanding how that social practice can act as 
media in broader social contexts over time. While this thesis does not 
provide the scope for a full discourse-historical analysis and comparison of 
biotechnology discourse (which is obviously a fruitful area for future 
research), I do provide some analysis of representations of history in 
biotechnology in the following chapter. 
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Mediation and context 
As identified in previous chapters, a key aim of the thesis analysis was to 
identify “official” mediations or the official path of movement for 
biotechnology research. This includes, for example, the thematic metaphor 
of a ‘product development pipeline’ that runs from research contexts to 
manufacturing contexts. This metaphor appears in multiple contexts in the 
thesis corpus, including interview transcripts, public policy, and industry 
magazines. A second aim was to identify how biotechnology is represented 
in different contexts and texts. Does it change noticeably for example 
between a research laboratory context and the pharmaceutical company 
context. 
The politics of representation  
A key consideration of critical discourse analysis is to identify the political 
and rhetorical significance of the way that things, relationships, persons, 
animals, etc, are represented. Mehan (1993) identifies, 
[t]he choice of a particular way of representing events gives them a 
particular meaning. There is often a competition over the correct, 
appropriate, or preferred way of representing objects, events, or people. 
In fact, although there are many possible modes of representing the 
world and communicating them to people, the course of history can be 
envisioned as successive attempts to impose one mode of representation 
upon another. (Mehan, 1993, p. 241, italics added) 
In paying attention to the politics of representation, I have sought to identify 
contending or uniform representations of persons, technologies, animals, 
and practices. I have also sought to identify who is attributed with agency in 
different contexts and scenarios. Through wider intertextual comparison, I 
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have also sought to identify who or what is objectified or absent in the 
politics of representation played out in the corpus texts. Competition over 
the ‘correct, appropriate, or preferred way of representing objects, event, or 
people’, gives rise to a politics of representation over biotechnology 
research and commercialisation (Mehan, 1993). Mehan describes this 
below: 
Proponents of various positions in conflicts waged in and through 
discourse attempt to capture or dominate modes of representation. They 
do so in a variety of ways, including inviting or persuading others to 
join their side, or silencing opponents by attacking their positions. If 
successful, a hierarchy is formed, in which one mode of representing 
the world (its objects events and people, etc.) gains primacy over other, 
transforming modes of representation from an array on a horizontal 
plane to a ranking on a vertical plane. (Mehan, 1993, p. 241) 
Even if there is no immediately noticeable difference in how things are 
represented in different texts and contexts, the politics of representation are 
still significant to the extent that one mode of representation or discourse 
can be seen to be repeated in multiple contexts: thematic patterns of 
representation and orientation. 
Thematic patterns and emic instances  
Thematic patterns are patterns in ways of representing and evaluating across 
multiple texts or within one text. In Lemke’s words  
[t]ext meaning is not reducible to or recoverable from word meaning 
potential alone. Text meaning is made by using thematic patterns as the 
direct meaning making resource…The same thematic patterns [can] 
recur from text to text in slightly different wordings, but recognizably 
the same, and each wording can be mapped onto a generic semantic 
pattern that is the same for all. (Lemke, 1995, p. 42, italics added) 
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When thematic patterns are present, it means that there is at least some 
uniformity in the way that things are being represented. If the same patterns 
are present in multiple texts, that originate from multiple authors and 
contexts, it is significant in terms of the range of discursive and evaluative 
resources that are on offer regarding the object of representation. Some 
examples of thematic patterns in biotechnology follow.  
[Heading] Why biotechnology is important to Australia[] ‘Australia’s industrial 
competitiveness, and hence our standard of living, will be strongly influenced by 
whether we can grasp the opportunities presented by biotechnology, and 
underpinned by the knowledge and skill of our researchers… Biotechnology 
promises to be the next great wave of technological change, bringing changes 
as radical and pervasive as those wrought by the IT revolution. 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2000,cwn. 1,587) 
In truth there are a many thematic patterns included in this one excerpt. For 
example, a common feature of biotechnology policy documents and 
education documents is to establish a causal relationship between our 
pursuing biotechnology and achieving ‘industrial competitiveness’ and a 
high ‘standard of living’. Another feature is the modalisation of these 
benefits: i.e. biotechnology merely has the potential to improve industrial 
competitiveness and living standards. This modality is reaffirmed in 
repeated phrases such as ‘biotechnology promises to be’; ‘biotechnology 
will be’, etcetera. The attribution of human and transcendent agency to the 
non human biotechnology is also standard: ‘biotechnology allows us…’; 
‘biotechnology delivers…’; ‘biotechnology helps us to…’; ‘biotechnology 
provides us with…’ . These are just a few examples of thematic patterns of 
representation and orientation in the corpus. 
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Yet, in addition to identifying thematic patterns, I would like to highlight 
deviations from the patterns: I would like to highlight any contexts or 
discourses where a particular way of representing and evaluating 
biotechnology is unique or peculiar. I use the term ‘emic instances’ to 
describe these peculiarities. This is taken from Pike’s discussion of the 
insider and outsider world views of particular communities. Pike (1958) 
observes that the view of a local scene through the eyes of a native 
participant in that scene ‘is a different window’ to the one that an outsider 
looks through (1958, p. 144). It is a reality that no one but an inhabitant of 
that scene can have access to that window.  
Consistent with Dewey’s description of the regeneration of social life 
through transmission, and Isaacs’ account of particular social practices as 
being produced and reproduced through processes of learning and 
socialisation, Pike identifies that individuals can only gain ‘access’ to emic 
views 
…by being “born into” a system – by suddenly finding themselves in a 
series of events which they at first do not comprehend. Here they 
gradually learn to act as normal participants, as through contrastive 
situations (or by receiving instruction) they gradually learn to make the 
kind of responses to these events which elicit appropriate reactions by 
other members of the community. (Pike, 1958, p. 146) 
I posit that in identifying peculiarities and inconsistencies in ways of 
representing and evaluating in the range of discursive resources on offer, we 
can go some way toward helping ‘outsiders’ to identify the emic views that 
characterise and constitute a particular practice or context. An example of an 
emic ‘instance’ in the corpus is the focus on stock market prices and minute-
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to-minute figures on multinational pharmaceutical companies’ websites (cf. 
for example the corpus illustrations included on p. 185). These figures do 
not appear in any other of the contexts explored in the analysis. Likewise, 
the United Nations Human Development Report (2001) is the only text that 
highlights successful models for collaboration among researchers toward the 
provision of public health services in developing countries. 
Steiner (1975, p. 78), acknowledges the relationship between language and 
particular ways of seeing in arguing that language is a) specific to cultural, 
social, and historical contexts and b) both opens up, and reflects, peculiar 
ways of seeing/knowing that persons outside of language system cannot 
‘access’: 
…language is not the vehicle of thought but its determining medium. 
Thought is language internalised, and we think and feel as our 
particular language impels and allows us to do. But tongues differ as 
profoundly as do nations. They too are monads, ‘perpetual living 
mirrors of the universe’ each of which reflects or, as we would now put 
it, structures experience according to its own particular sight lines and 
habits of cognition. (Steiner, 1975, p. 78, italics added) 
If nothing, else, the recognition that emic views exist reaffirms the 
importance of selecting texts that are produced within a range of different 
contexts and practices and that are written by a range of authors. In 
comparing and contrasting the different texts, the analyst can identify 
particularities, as well as similarities, between them. 
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Silences 
While participating in a CDA reading group in 2000, I became interested in 
the possibilities not of discursive politics or obviously rhetorical forms of 
discourse, but of ‘silences’ and, in particular, the contexts, persons, 
processes, and events that are not represented in, or who are actively 
silenced by, those who perpetuate powerful discourses on biotechnology. 
Sheriff highlights the inherently ethico-political function of silencing in the 
article ‘Exposing silence as cultural censorship’. In her words, 
The kind of silence I am concerned with does not rely upon obvious 
and explicit forms of coercion or enforcement. Although there may be 
meaningful, even profound, psychological motivations underlying this 
silence, it is socially shared; the rules for its observance are culturally 
codified. Unlike the activity of speech, which does not require more 
than a single actor, silence demands collaboration and the tacit 
communal understandings that such collaboration presupposes. 
Although it is contractual in nature, a critical feature of this type of 
silence is that it is both a consequence and an index of an unequal 
distribution of power, if not of actual knowledge. Through it, various 
forms of power may be partly, although often incompletely, concealed, 
denied, or naturalized. Although the type of silence I refer to may be a 
more or less stable and widely shared cultural convention, it is 
constituted through, and circumscribed by, the political interests of 
dominant groups. While silence tends to penetrate social boundaries it 
is not seamless; different groups, whether constituted by class, 
ethnicity, racialized identities, gender, or language, have markedly 
divergent interests at stake in the suppression of discourse. Silence, like 
discourse, must be deconstructed in such a way that these interests are 
explicitly located within a range of differentiated and opposed social 
positions in which both linguistic and nonlinguistic form of power are 
distributed'. (Sheriff, 2000, pp114-15, italics added) 
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Silences are different from emic instances because they are meaningful in 
their absence rather than their peculiarity. To identify silences, an analyst 
requires intertextual and interdiscursive knowledge of the subject area he or 
she is dealing with. He or she must be aware of the different voices in a 
debate, the different perspectives, and the politics of a situation prior to 
engaging with a corpus.  
As explored in previous work (cf. Sunderland 2002), some forms of 
engagement in biotechnology currently function specifically as 
‘technologies of silence and silencing’: They are socio-political tools that 
some actors in our society use – both advertently and inadvertently – to 
reinforce positions of influence, power, and powerlessness; to create certain 
reputable or disreputable images of others; and to intimidate and/or silence 
others. The effect of these technologies of silence and silencing is that 
particular individuals and groupings of people are silenced. 
To the extent that silence is a collective practice that contributes to shared 
meaning, it too can be seen as discourse. All discourse – including silence – 
is a collective practice which happens within shared social contexts 
(Fairclough,1992; Lemke, 1995). The simplest way to understand silence as 
contributing to shared meaning and understanding is to think about where 
there are “gaps” in those forms of communication we would normally think 
of as discourse (eg speech, text, pictures, non verbal communication, and so 
on). This in itself is more meaningful than it may at first appear: It is part of 
our common knowledge for example that something can be known or tacitly 
accepted without ever being overtly stated by anyone. We can for example 
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“know” or “sense” that it is not “the done thing” to talk about X in a certain 
context or to discuss Y and Z with certain people. We come to learn, know, 
or sense these often unstated rules for communicative engagement from a 
range of sources. For example, we can be influenced by 
- Things that we have directly experienced or seen in the various 
social contexts we engage in; 
- Interpersonal engagements and reactions or attacks we, or others we 
know, have experienced in the past;  
- Attitudes and opinions others in positions of power have expressed 
to us or to others we know;  
- Formal institutional and organisational policies, strategic plans, and 
so on; 
- Shared ways of seeing, being, and acting; and/or 
- By not being aware that X, Y, or Z even exist or are of interest or 
concern for others. 
Obviously, silence, while still meaningful and collaborative, is not readily 
identifiable, particularly to people who exist outside of , and hence are not 
witness to, the emic experiences and contexts of those who are silenced and 
marginalised.  
The very significance of silencing and marginalisation is that voices are not 
readily heard, that experiences are not shared, and understanding is not 
easily developed by others outside of that sphere of experience. Practices of 
silence and silencing are hence ethically problematic because the 
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communicative “media” of ethical engagement and mutual understanding 
are immobilised when silence and silencing proliferate. Apart from the 
ideologically limited, and limiting, evaluative, socio-political, and socio-
ethical orientations that are ‘inscribed’ (Martin, 2000) in publicly available 
biotechnology education materials, there are a number of further socio-
political and institutional technologies that prevent, inhibit, and threaten – 
both explicitly and implicitly – informed, critical, debate in relation to 
developments in biotechnology research and commercialisation. In light of 
the often personally challenging and inherently anti-democratic effects of 
these technologies of silence and silencing should definitely be subject to 
critical analysis and, where possible, transformation. 
Genre considerations 
Genre is significant to the analysis in a number of ways that have been 
explored in previous chapters. Genre in its traditional literary sense, is also a 
very important consideration in textual analysis. Genre is the guiding 
normative system of a text or, if you like, the guidelines that authors use to 
produce a certain “kind” of text. We know that a policy document for 
example is a policy document based on a range of things which may 
include, for example, the content; its presentation; the style of language and 
diagrams used; who the authors are; patterns of evaluation; the rationality 
behind patterns of evaluation; the logic or function of the text; the persons 
who are portrayed in the text; and so on. The document can be recognised as 
“policy” because it has generic features in common with other texts of its 
“kind”.  
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Genre is also a rhetorical device to the extent that it produces, reproduces, 
and normalises generic patterns or modes of evaluation and representation. 
We come to “expect” certain things from certain kinds of documents, often 
to the point where the generic features of a text become invisible. Education 
and policy documents on biotechnology are a case in point because they are 
often presented as a source of ‘information’ or ‘authority’ and hence, 
through their genre alone, achieve significant rhetorical appeal (ethos).  
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the core analytical filters I have used to analyse 
the thesis corpus. Each of the filters presented significantly enhances my 
understanding of the political nature of discourse, and moreover, the degree 
to which official sanctioned representations of biotechnology – through 
government policy and education documents in particular – promote certain 
ways of seeing and evaluating biotechnology. The following three chapters 
will highlight different aspects of the thesis corpus that have been 
highlighted by these various analysis filters. The first of the three analysis 
chapters deals with the discourse-historical approach and provides an 
analysis of the various ways that ‘history’ is presented in official 
biotechnology discourses. The second identifies official ‘mediations’ in the 
social practice of biotechnology and, in particular, the way that hybridity 
between science and industry is produced and reproduced in policy. The 
third analysis chapter highlights some of the ethical and social implications 
of official biotechnology mediations. The politics of representation are 
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particularly significant in the way that various actors in, and opponents of, 
biotechnology are identified (or not) within specific contexts. 
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Chapter 5 Discourse-historical? The bases 
of biotechnology 
Overview 
The previous chapters have outlined the way that contemporary definitions 
and discourses of biotechnology research and commercialisation foreground 
its economic and commercial private value but also make significant claims 
regarding the public value of biotechnology in promoting human well being, 
health, and prosperity more generally. This style of representing new 
technologies is not new. To the extent that biotechnology continues to 
reinvigorate and rearticulate (loudly) technocratic discourses associated with 
rational science and market economics, it is also a temporal medium that 
functions to reproduce historically powerful ways of seeing, being, and 
acting in new or expanded socio-biological contexts.  
The ultimate impact of biotechnologies is thus not merely experienced in 
contexts of consumption, therapy, or treatment (as the authors of certain 
texts within the thesis corpus want to suggest) but, rather, the impact of 
biotechnology can also be felt in the closing down, and marginalising, of 
socio-political spaces, voices, and discourses that seek to offer alternative 
and dissenting ways of seeing, being, and acting other than those officially 
endorsed and propagated by the increasingly powerful and economically 
oriented discourses of biotechnology research and commercialisation. In 
order to introduce these broader movements, this chapter will outline some 
discourse-historical and social trajectories within which contemporary 
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biotechnology operates. This is an important grounding to the thesis not 
least because one of the primary observations is that biotechnology acts as 
media not only between social contexts in time, but also between social 
contexts over time.  
The traditions and trajectories highlighted in this chapter are not 
acknowledged in official discourses on biotechnology despite the fact that 
they provide important intertextual understandings of biotechnology in 
contemporary society. The corpus analysis shows that the dominant 
representations of the history of biotechnology are, rather, positivistic, 
linear, and misleading. As I will argue, though, a lack of historical context 
for biotechnology – particularly discursive context – fundamentally subverts 
heteroglossia in biotechnology discourses and confiscates vital resources for 
understanding and evaluating contemporary biotechnology. 
Biotechnology as a time medium 
Although it is often portrayed as being “new”, “revolutionary”, or 
“emerging” by critics and protagonists alike, our current preoccupation with 
genetics, improvement, and perfection is arguably not new but, rather, re-
emphasised, rearticulated, and reinvigorated by recent developments in 
genetic technologies, the biggest one of which is the much touted “mapping 
of the human genome”. As the corpus analysis shows, modern approaches to 
biotechnology have been, just like eugenics, frameshifted to the level of 
national policy, in fact to the level of the public interest for all Australians, 
all of humanity, and all future beings. Animal husbandry and farming 
practices have routinely sought to “optimise” desired traits, and eradicate or 
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reduce undesired traits, of animals, crops, and plants for a range of aesthetic, 
commercial, agricultural, and manufacturing purposes.  
The Australian national economy and technology and pharmaceuticals stock 
markets for example have and are being [re]geneticised. So too have race 
relations; interpersonal relations; property rights; social class; science 
degrees; public funding of research, scientific and otherwise; business 
ventures in the “new economy”; venture capital and investment; social 
behaviour, tastes, and fashion sense; agriculture; aggression; spousal choice; 
smoking; alcohol consumption; obesity; cancer; and intelligence. But how 
do the practices and objectives of modern genetics differ from genetics other 
than the technologies that are used? What are geneticists other than a nation 
of animal husbandmen – but for humans? 
But, there are some new traditions that have entered into mainstream 
biotechnology practice as it moves into new contexts such as multinational 
markets and the stock market. Thomas Kuhn’s work, as outlined in Chapter 
Three emphasises the role of technological and scientific innovation in 
creating new ways of seeing old things, old ways of seeing can be recast and 
entextualised in new technologies. 
Rhetorical ahistoricity in contemporary biotechnology 
discourse 
Mr BEATTIE: That is the truth. It is important that we have an 
informed and educated debate about genetically modified food. I am 
concerned generally about a number of alarmist headlines and stories 
that I have seen. When talking about genetically modified food, we 
have to understand that humans have been eating genetically modified 
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food for thousands of years. Ever since we got out of the trees, we have 
been modifying food. If you think about it— 
Ms Bligh: Some are not out of the trees! 
Mr BEATTIE: I know that some in this House have come out of the 
trees more recently than others. I accept that. For those on this side of 
the House, who have indeed been out of the trees for a long time, I want 
to make a very serious point about this. As a species we have been 
modifying food since we came out of the trees. If you think about it, 
when Adam and Eve were around, there were not the special breeds of 
dogs or horses or cattle or the grains of wheat or merino sheep. The list 
goes on and on. We need to be aware that we have modified our grain 
and we have modified our livestock. The wheat, sheep and cattle that 
we grow today bear little resemblance to the wheat, sheep and cattle of 
even two centuries ago. 
Let us not be alarmist in this debate about biotechnology. 
Biotechnology will be the greatest shot in the arm for primary 
industries in this State that we have ever seen. That is why it is 
absolutely essential that the media contains its normal exuberance for 
alarmism and has a sensible debate about this issue. As I say, there 
needs to be a sensible education program through the media, not 
headlines that cause people to worry unnecessarily. As to labelling, we 
should have some truth in labelling and state that every product that we 
eat has been, somewhere along the line, genetically modified. 
- Queensland State Government Premier Peter Beattie, Ministerial 
Statement on Biotechnology recorded in Parliamentary Hansard 19 
August 1999 - 
History is presented in a number of ways in discussions surrounding 
biotechnology research and commercialisation. A few of these are illustrated 
in Beattie’s “Out of the Trees” Ministerial State of 1999 above. The ‘out of 
the trees’ version of biotechnology is the one where biotechnology has, 
allegedly, been around for ‘millennia’: biotechnology is part of the natural 
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evolution of humans. Arguments related to this version of biotechnology 
history include: if we have accepted ‘traditional’ biotechnologies such as 
beer, bread, and cheese, for so long, why would we reject any of the natural 
post-cursors to these technologies in the form of modern genetic 
technologies.  
Another common version of history in biotechnology is the biotechnology 
time line (see over page). This timeline is most common in texts that are 
designed to be “educational” for a “lay” audience. I have included a typical 
example of the biotechnology timeline over the page. To the extent that it 
has become the predominant way of representing a history of biotechnology 
in these ‘public education’ texts, the “biotechnology time line” can be 
regarded as a genre or way of interacting very selectively with the origins of 
biotechnology research and commercialisation. In both genre and content, 
the biotechnology time line, as it is presented in so many web sites and 
publications, reaffirms the dominant scientific discourse surrounding 
biotechnology as being positivistic in ideational and evaluative content. 
Although it may seem mundane, presenting history on a ‘timeline’ as a 
chain of “events” is significant. The Timeline, presented in logical blocks 
and apparently related ‘developments’, invokes the mathematical equation  
or logical series function/expectation that is common in intellectual quotient 
testing and high school mathematics competitions a la: 
Identify the next two numbers in this series: 
1, 3, 5, 7, __ , __ 
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Like the mathematical series above, the timeline format encourages us – or 
indeed requires us – to “see” or find links and patterns between the various 
plots on the line. The development from one plot to another is linear and, 
apparently, logical. Biotechnology time lines display none of the complexity 
and richness of the history of the science and biotechnology that is in fact 
long, interdiscursive, and multicontextual.  
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Table 2: Biotechnology Timeline. Source: North Carolina Biotechnology Center (accessed 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Table is not available online.  
Please consult the hardcopy thesis available 
 from the QUT Library. 
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A third and final version of history I would like to point out is the future 
history of biotechnology. Biotechnology policy discourse features an 
interesting and complex rhetorical usage of future, past, and present tense to 
create causal relationships between a selective view of biotechnology 
history, current actions and policy stances, and a future bio-mediated utopia 
(cf. Hindmarsh and Lawrence, 2001). At the same time that biotechnology 
is defined as an age old – and even a instinctual – process, the benefits of 
biotechnology are always portrayed as being actualised in a future time and 
place. The example below is taken from the NSW State Government 
Biotechnology Policy document. I have underlined those sections of the 
excerpt that make specific claims on time period and tense.  
At the start of a new century few industries encapsulate the meaning of 
innovation better than biotechnology. Within a few months the human genome 
will be mapped a development which will revolutionise medical science and the 
discovery of new therapies for human disease. Other developments in 
agricultural biotechnology promise a similar revolution in food production. (NSW 
State government, cwn. 13725) 
The emphasis on revolution and the misappropriation of historical context in 
biotechnology is a significant feature of the discourse. As illustrated above, 
biotechnology is being portrayed as the stuff of social and economic 
revolution: biotechnology is portrayed as the defining technology of a ‘new 
age’ and a ‘new century’. The excerpt below portrays similarly grand 
notions of biotechnology. The policy writers are actually quoting former US 
President Bill Clinton in this excerpt. Once again, references to tense and 
time period are underlined: 
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As we stand at the dawn of the new century, we recognise the enormous 
potential that biotechnology holds for improving the quality of life here in the 
United States and around the world. These technologies, which draw on our 
understanding of the life sciences to develop products and solve problems, are 
progressing at an exponential rate and promise to make unprecedented 
contributions to public health and safety, a cleaner environment, and economic 
prosperity. U.S. President Clinton January 2000. (Victorian Government, cwn. 
3661) 
So, although biotechnology has in Beattie’s ‘out of the trees’ and the 
‘timeline’ versions of history been around for millennia, biotechnology is 
still largely a possibility for Clinton, a possibility that must be nurtured and 
supported. The rhetorical significance of time and tense is large in policy 
discourses on biotechnology. The so-called Biotechnology Age or 
Biotechnology Revolution is historically significant because it has been 
promised before it has actually happened12.  
In foregrounding only these limited views of biotechnology history, 
biotechnology policy authors and others fail to acknowledge the extent to 
which biotechnology practice is produced by historically significant 
trajectories. Indeed, apart from the homogenized version of the linear 
biotechnology timeline that starts with Sumerians brewing beer and leads to 
the mapping of the Human Genome, discourses on contemporary 
biotechnology are largely devoid of historical context. The serious 
implication of this is that a limited appreciation of history limits the range of 
resources on offer to society in understanding and evaluating biotechnology: 
                                                 
12 I acknowledge personal communication with Peter Isaacs in 2001 where he observed that the 
biotechnology revolution is being declared before it has happened.  
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an ahistorical or mis-historical account inhibits the natural heteroglossia of 
understanding in biotechnology.  
Biotechnology as a time machine: Reinvigorating 
discourse through social practice 
Leiss (1972) argues that the human domination of nature through 
technological means enables a concomitant but hidden domination of 
persons by powerful scientific and technological trajectories. He argues, 
further, that one of the primary ways that technological innovation, and its 
inculcation in society, achieves ends of social control is by creating and 
controlling human longings, wants, needs, and desires.  
The objective of transforming all of nature (including consciousness) 
into the material of production becomes compulsive, blindly repetitive, 
and finally self-destructive. The apparatus of production expands 
infinitely – steady growth is its Nicene Creed – while all rational 
criteria for judging the human value of its fruits are subverted. The final 
stage is reached when the only rationale for production that can be 
offered is that many persons can be induced to believe that they really 
want and need the newest offering of commodities in the marketplace. 
At this stage domination over nature and men [sic], directed by the 
ruling social class, becomes internalised in the psychic processes of 
individuals; and it is self destructive because the compulsive character 
of consumption and behaviour destroys personal autonomy and negates 
the long and difficult effort to win liberation from that experience of 
external compulsion which marked the original relationship between 
human and nature. (Leiss, 1972, pp. xv-xvi) 
In this way, technological innovation in biotechnology facilitates not only 
the alienation and commoditisation of biological life, but also the alienation 
and commoditisation of human characteristics and traits, social 
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relationships, human aspirations, activities, and identity. The range of bio 
products and services on sale, and the official rationality behind them, are 
designed to inspire the imagination and desire of persons in both direct and 
indirect ways. They are direct in that they inspire the literal consumption of 
new or altered products into the imagination, lives, and bodies of 
individuals. They are indirect in that they are absorbed through organic and 
social mediation into social and organic systems: that is, into the pool of 
biological and meaning resources (biodiversity and heteroglossia). 
Biotechnology’s temporal mediating function is fed by technological 
development because technological development creates new products, new 
market places, and new consumers. The nature of both consumerism and 
technological development is that they are future oriented: Consumers are 
incessantly upgrading their products, taking advantage of the new, and 
discarding the old. But scientific and technological elites, via their 
commercial technological ‘revolutions’, also create new forms of 
dependence on technology. The notion of critical mass in particular betrays 
the notion that, once a technology has ‘diffused’ in society to the point of 
universal accessibility, or even partial accessibility, it becomes a necessity 
for persons to access that technology if they are to fulfil the requirements of 
everyday life. As a technology moves toward ‘critical mass’, and is 
inculcated in the productive, state, legal, and social systems, it becomes 
harder – and in some cases impossible – for an individual to not use the 
technology or be affected by it as is currently the case with information and 
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communication technologies such as email and the Internet for many 
people. 
Apart from creating and controlling consumer wants and desires, 
technological developments produce new vocations, disciplines, jobs, and 
practices that determine how and where we live our lives. As Marcuse 
(1964) notes, ‘[i]n this society the productive apparatus tends to become 
totalitarian to the extent to which it determines not only the socially needed 
occupations, skills and attitudes, but also individual needs and aspirations’ 
(Marcuse, 1964, p. 13). 
The degree to which technology comes to define notions of progress is 
evident in the UN’s recently developed Technology Achievement Index 
(TAI) on which all countries around the world were ranked. The number of 
technology precincts/hubs are one of the defining criteria of a country’s TAI 
rating along with human resources, innovation funding, and science 
citations.  
Human progress in the past 30 years shows what is possible. So does this 
year's Report. One of its main messages is that technological advance has 
contributed greatly to the acceleration of human progress in the past several 
centuries. Those contributions have the promise of even greater acceleration. 
Technological advance has contributed greatly to the acceleration of human 
progress in the past several centuries. Technological innovation is essential for 
human progress. From the printing press to the computer, from the first use of 
penicillin to the widespread use of vaccines, people have devised tools for 
improving health, raising productivity and facilitating learning and 
communication. Today technology deserves new attention. Why? Because 
digital, genetic and molecular breakthroughs are pushing forward the frontiers 
of how people can use technology to eradicate poverty. These breakthroughs 
are creating new possibilities for improving health and nutrition, expanding 
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knowledge, stimulating economic growth and empowering people to participate 
in their communities. Today's technological transformations are intertwined with 
another transformation-globalization -and together they are creating a new 
paradigm: the network age. These transformations expand opportunities and 
increase the social and economic rewards of creating and using technology. 
They are also altering how-and by whom-technology is created and owned, and 
how it is made accessible and used. A new map of innovation and diffusion is 
appearing. Technology growth hubs-centres that bring together research 
institutes, business start-ups and venture capital-are dotted across the globe, 
from Silicon Valley (United States) to Bangalore (India) to El Ghazala (Tunisia), 
linked through technology development networks. (UN Human Development 
Report, 2001, cwn 19,985) 
The fact that the UN discursively narrows the concept of ‘human 
development’ so as to be measurable by the number of technology precincts 
a country owns or operates is very significant. In effect, human development 
is being presented as being synonymous or contemporaneous with, not just 
the outcomes of, but the mere existence of technology in a country. At the 
same time as the presence of technology is assumed to engender human 
development, that presence is largely outward oriented: toward international 
“markets” and economic competitiveness.  
As is the case with South Africa, for example, technology, and in particular 
biotechnology, is seen as a utopian path toward joining the ‘industrialised 
world’. Just as Australia and other countries are aiming for the official 
utopia of the biotechnology future, ‘developing’ countries merely aim to use 
biotechnology to reach the ‘first world’. The apparent global ‘peer pressure’ 
toward biotechnology industrialisation is particularly evident in the South 
African policy on biotechnology. The South African policy is distinctive in 
the corpus because it is written from the perspective of a “reintegrating” 
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economy. The South African policy illustrates the sheer extent to which 
western economies dictate the direction of nations through technological 
‘innovation’. South Africa sees investment in biotechnology, and particular 
trends in research and commercialisation, as being key to their emergence 
into the category of ‘global science and technology’.  
South Africa has a solid history of engagement with traditional biotechnology. It 
has produced one of the largest brewing companies in the world; it makes 
wines that compare with the best; it has created many new animal breeds and 
plant varieties, some of which are used commercially all over the world and it 
has competitive industries in the manufacture of dairy products such as cheese, 
yoghurt and maas and baker's yeast and other fermentation products. 
However, South Africa has failed to extract value from the more recent 
advances in biotechnology, particularly over the last 25 years with the 
emergence of genetics and genomic sciences (the so-called 3rd generation). 
Already many companies and public institutions elsewhere in the world are 
offering products and services that have arisen from the new biotechnology. In 
the USA alone, there are 300 public biotechnology companies with a market 
capitalisation of $353 billion and an annual turnover of $22 billion p.a. 
Moreover, the growth of biotechnology industries is not restricted to the 
developed countries. Developing countries such as Cuba, Brazil and China 
have been quick to identify the potential benefits of the technology and have 
established measures both to develop such industries and to extract value 
where possible and relevant.  
The strategy outlined in this document is designed to make up for lost ground 
and to stimulate the growth of similar activities in South Africa. Biotechnology 
can make an important contribution to our national priorities, particularly in the 
area of human health (including HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB), food security and 
environmental sustainability. In the pursuit of these priorities, we are fortunate 
in that we can be guided by the experiences of other countries. For instance, 
we know that to achieve success a country requires a government agency to 
champion biotechnology, to build human resources proactively, and to develop 
scientific and technological capabilities. In addition, successful 
commercialisation of public sector-supported research and development (R&D) 
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requires strong linkages between institutions within the National System of 
Innovation and a vibrant culture of innovation and entrepreneurship, assisted by 
incubators, supply-side measures and other supporting programmes and 
institutions …  
As South Africa re-integrates into global science and technology it has to be 
aware of important changes in international understanding of the way in which 
research is undertaken and knowledge is generated. In the industrialised 
countries it is increasingly acknowledged that:  
- Knowledge is to an ever growing extent produced in the context of its 
applications and there are greater expectations that support for research will 
lead directly to economic and social benefits for the nation providing the 
support.  
- There is an inescapable trend towards larger and more interdisciplinary teams 
working in more transdisciplinary research activities.  
- There is a growing diversity of participating organisations to be found in 
today's research teams.  
- There is a continuing trend towards greater international linkages in research 
teams. (A National Biotechnology Strategy for South Africa, 2001, cwn 11) 
For South African policy makers at least, biotechnology now defines the 
‘developed’ and ‘industrial’ world. Moreover, the biotechnology utopia 
South Africa is aiming to buy into is contingent upon a range of specified 
government actions that have been set by countries who have been 
‘successful’ in ‘extracting value’ from the ‘new biotechnologies’. The 
proven government actions and conditions for biotechnology include:  
- ‘A government agency to champion biotechnology, to build human 
resources proactively, and to develop scientific and technological 
capabilities’; 
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- ‘Strong linkages between institutions within the National System of 
Innovation and a vibrant culture of innovation and entrepreneurship, 
assisted by incubators, supply-side measures and other supporting 
programmes and institutions’ to promote ‘successful 
commercialisation of public sector-supported research and 
development (R&D); 
South Africa is also following the lead of industrialised countries in 
structuring the way that ‘research is undertaken and knowledge is 
generated’. According to the authors of the South African policy, 
industrialised countries that excel in extracting value from the new 
biotechnologies exhibit the following conditions for research: 
- Knowledge is to an ever growing extent produced in the context of its 
applications and there are greater expectations that support for research 
will lead directly to economic and social benefits for the nation providing the 
support;  
- There is an inescapable trend towards larger and more interdisciplinary 
teams working in more transdisciplinary research activities;  
- There is a growing diversity of participating organisations to be found in 
today's research teams.  
- There is a continuing trend towards greater international linkages in 
research teams. (A National Biotechnology Strategy for South Africa, 2001, 
cwn. 7946) 
According to this catch up, mentality, any innovation can be potentially 
good, desirable, and valuable as long as it is seen to be innovative in the 
contexts of ‘global science and technology’. While ‘human health (including 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB, food safety), and environmental sustainability’ 
 139 
are named as a specific priority for South Africa that can be achieved 
through biotechnology, these specific goods do not appear as frequently as 
the ideal of more general ‘extracting of value’ that is, apparently, an 
unquestionable good for any economy or country. 
As argued previously, a technological innovation does not prosper unless it 
is mediated through the existing capitalist productive apparatus. But, most 
significantly, the productive apparatus is also by necessity the site of 
alienation of human labour: human labour (including ‘intellectual’ labour) is 
rendered as but one element in the chain of production: simultaneously a 
resource and tool of production. The nature of scientific, technological, and 
capitalist systems is to render processes into things. The consumer system 
relies on consumers continuing to consume: that is, in not having their wants 
and needs met. The system relies just as much on new productive 
technologies and human labour as it does on human wants, needs, and 
desires. 
Owning the natural [and unnatural] world 
The tendency toward defining genetic material in property terms links into a 
wider trajectory of ongoing alienation and commoditisation that Graham 
(2001) refers to as ‘hypercapitalism’: a period where the ‘development and 
diffusion of technology within capital has tended towards an emphasis on its 
ability to firstly appropriate and commodify, and later to replace, 
increasingly intricate and intimate aspects of human labour power’ (p. 135). 
Using biotechnology as media in direct and indirect ways, humans from a 
number of inter-textual and inter-temporal backgrounds, practices, 
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professions, intentions, and persuasions continue to expand the number and 
range of territories, sites, and contexts within which they or other 
individuals and institutions can produce economic exchange value. Graham 
argues,  
Today, few if any aspects of human activity are now beyond the 
technical, conceptual, or legislative grasp of formal commodification. 
This appears to be a characteristic of capital. As it progresses as a 
system of social organisation, increasingly intimate aspects of human 
experience are subsumed under its formal processes. The very idea of a 
“knowledge economy” exemplifies the trend... Consequently, the 
complex of historically derived abstractions we have come to call “the 
economy” has appeared to move ‘closer’ to people (cf. Castells 1989: 
16-17; Jessop 2000), thoroughly infusing the most fundamental levels 
of human existence, thought and language, while at the same time 
appearing to speed rapidly away from the control of human agency, and 
even from that of national legislatures. (Graham, 2000, p. 135) 
The historical significance of biotechnology is that it allows humans to 
render – if only in a more thorough fashion – living organisms both as sites 
of economic activity and ownership and as materials of production. In the 
case of biotechnology, we are witnessing a distinct expansion in human 
ability to appropriate, commodify, and replace/transform not only human 
labour, but the very foundation of human and non human social and 
biological being. The Bayh Dole Act 1980 was one of the first Acts to 
inscribe that patents could be held in the USA on ‘non human and non 
naturally occurring life forms’ and license these patents for private 
commercial use (US Council on Governmental Relations, 1999). Prior to 
this, the US government had ‘retained title and made these inventions 
available through non-exclusive licenses to anyone who wanted to practice 
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them’ (US Council on Governmental Relations, 1999). Companies could not 
have exclusive rights under government patents to manufacture and sell 
resulting products.  
The corpus texts include consistent references to ‘intellectual capital’ and 
‘intellectual property’ with a few references to natural capital, genetic 
resources, natural resources. The point to note is that what humans do to, 
and with, animals in biotechnology is presented as ‘intellectual property’ 
that can be transferred from human mind to human mind and from context 
to context. In reality it is not just ‘intellectual property’ that is being 
produced by humans in biotechnology, it is any living thing of value, or 
potential value, to humans. 
As an example of the degree to which biotechnology invokes old 
conceptions of property and ownership, the following excerpt is taken from 
a industry magazine called CMA Management. As the reader will note, the 
metaphor of mining the earth for materials of production have carried over 
to new contexts of alienation and exploitation in biotechnology: namely, in 
this instance, the human genome. I have italicised those sections of the 
excerpt that invoke the conflation between mining and contemporary 
genetic technologies. 
Barth [CEO of pharma company] likens drug discovery today to the oil and gas 
industry just before a number of technologies affected that sector, such as "3-D 
seismic…Oil drilling used to be a real black art - a hit-and-miss exercise," he 
explains. "Each find would last for about 10 years before the company would 
have to find a new deposit, not unlike pharma companies searching for their 
next blockbuster because of patent expiry." This changed in the oil and gas 
industry with seismic technology, which allowed a three dimensional 
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characterization of deposits, and greatly reduced the risk associated with 
deposit discovery. On a larger scale, changes in drug discovery today parallel 
those of the oil and gas industry several years ago, Barth points out. "It is 
becoming less of a hit-and-miss venture and more predictable - the art has 
become a science." (Parker, 2002, cwn 354)  
What is perhaps most interesting in this text is the way existing ways of 
seeing as are rendered upon current or emerging activities, such as 
‘mapping’ and ‘mining’ the human genome. The emphasis on “extraction” 
and on moving from ‘hit and miss’ techniques to ‘precision’ techniques 
through the intervention of new technologies is also common to mining 
metaphor. This notion of precision is actually one of the more common 
“benefits” that are assigned to contemporary genetic technologies, 
particularly in reference to genetic selection for breeding purposes. 
Eugenics and national policy  
Gene testing: Testing of a person's genetic material for abnormalities, defects 
and deficiencies, including carrier status (the possibility that a healthy person 
carries particular genes that may affect his/her descendants) (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2001, cwn. 12,198) 
Gene therapy holds great promise for treating disease by replacing or changing 
a very small part of the overall genetic program of carefully selected cells 
perhaps permanently, producing a cure. It aims to restore the healthy function 
of cells by replacing or correcting the defective gene. Gene therapy can be 
used to replace an abnormal gene with a normal one, to insert a missing gene, 
to switch off rogue genes that may cause cancers and to stop viruses 
multiplying within cells. The modified cells and genes are not passed onto 
children. (CSIRO, Gene Technology: How’s it done? 2001, cwn. 2,373) 
In his article titled ‘Ideas of heredity, reproduction, and eugenics in Britain, 
1800-1975’, Waller (2001) argues that popular accounts of eugenics that 
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identify Francis Galton as the “father of eugenics” are misled in thinking 
that “eugenics” (as Galton named selective breeding of humans in 1883) 
emerged out of nowhere around 1865. Waller argues, rather, that ‘notions of 
mental heredity and the dangers of transmitting hereditary “taints” were 
already serious concerns among medical practitioners and laymen [sic] in 
the early nineteenth century’ (2001, p. 457). Waller’s argument is that 
Galton’s work on eugenics arose out of the conditions and assumptions of 
hereditarianism in pre-Victorian and Victorian Britain: they are not a view 
from nowhere. Apart from the ideational and lexical cross over between 
discourses on eugenics and contemporary discourses on biotechnology (viz 
“normality” and “abnormality”, “detecting” genetic imperfections) Waller’s 
argument is perhaps more significant in that it identifies the ways that 
practices of eugenics ‘came from’ somewhere and were recontextualised 
and translated into other discourses and contexts such as public policy, 
public health, and social science. Like biotechnology, Galton’s eugenics 
was presented as a strategy for developing the health and wellbeing of the 
British ‘race’, a matter of public health and economic policy for British 
governments. In Waller’s words, eugenics ‘saw traditional concerns over the 
quality of lineages projected onto the national stage in the form of eugenical 
thought and fears of biological degeneration…discourses of hybridity were 
“frameshifted” to the level of national health’ (2001, p. 458).  
Like biotechnology today, eugenics can be seen as media to the extent that it 
was informed by, and reinvigorated, the hereditarian ideals of pre Victorian 
Britain. Eugenics as media was so successful that these traditional 
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hereditarian ideals were elevated to the level of national governance 
(Waller, 2001, p. 458). Waller argues that popular accounts of eugenics in 
Britain have failed to identify or appraise the ‘range of social, ideological 
and intellectual factors that rendered eugenical thought unprecedentedly 
credible in the mid-Victorian period’. As I have outlined above, the genre of 
biotechnology timelines presented in classrooms and public education 
programs dealing with biotechnology do not seek to provide any form of 
social, ideological or intellectual historical context for biotechnology.  
Science as separate from society  
Waller’s argument that eugenics has tended to be decontextualised from its 
social, cultural, and political origins can be applied more generally to 
science and biotechnology. Indeed, the term “physical science” was 
originally coined to exclude certain “non-physical” or “metaphysical” 
activities and practices. T.H. Huxley (1893) in his essay On the 
Advisableness of Improving Natural Knowledge documents the emerging 
split between natural science and non-natural science at the Royal Society 
for the Improvement of Natural Knowledge. Huxley remarks that the ‘half-
dozen young men, studious of the “New Philosophy”, who met in one 
another’s lodgings in Oxford in London, in the middle of the seventeenth 
century’ was later to become the ‘Royal Society for the Improvement of 
Natural Knowledge’ (p. 23).  
The Royal Society’s self defined charter was ‘to discourse and consider of 
philosophical enquiries, and such as related thereunto:- as Physick, 
Anatomy, Geometry, Astronomy, Navigation, Staticks, Magneticks, 
 145 
Chymicks, Mechanicks, an Natural Experiments’ (Huxley, 1893, p. 21). 
These activities, collectively referred to as ‘physical science or knowledge’, 
explicitly excluded ‘matters of theology and state affairs’ (Huxley, 1893, p. 
21). This separation of natural science from ‘matters of theology’ 
constituted part of a wider political strategy designed to sift superstition and 
emotion from “fact” in the conflicts between religious positions during the 
period (Toulmin, 1990, p. 81). Scientific rationality, apparently 
characteristic of the natural sciences, emerged as a “neutral” position in 
these conflicts and was construed hence as an advantageous, selective, and 
civilised option not available to those people still locked ‘in the tyrannous 
societies and superstitious cultures that existed before the age of modernity’ 
(Toulmin, 1990, p. 3).  
Claims to both scientific rationality and objectivity are surprisingly overt in 
today’s debate over biotechnology, a la 
There is no science to support the ban of insect-resistant corn, which forced 
Frito-Lay's producers to revert to chemical insecticides. Two much larger grain 
purchasers have already reversed anti-biotechnology decisions: Archer Daniels 
Midland, one of the nation's largest purchasers and exporters of grain, and 
Cargill, the nation's largest grain merchant. Cargill declared "it's business as 
usual'' when it followed ADM's lead and began accepting transgenic grains 
again. These hold-the-line decisions are extremely important in blunting the 
pseudo-science of the activist community and moving toward biotechnology's 
potential to help feed a hungry world. The anti-biotechnology community claims 
there are "10 reasons why biotechnology will not ensure food security, protect 
the environment and reduce poverty in the developing world.'' In stark contrast, 
more than 1,800 members of the scientific community have signed a statement 
declaring their belief that biotechnology is a powerful and safe way to enhance 
substantially our quality of life by improving agriculture, health care and the 
environment. (Prakash, 2000) 
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This section from a magazine article written by agricultural biotechnology 
advocate Channapatna Prakash uses oppositional categories of characters in 
the biotechnology “debate”. In this case it is “The anti biotechnology 
community” versus “the scientific community” and, also, “science” versus 
“pseudo science”. In invoking the ‘science – pseudo science’ binary, 
Prakash forces his debate to be carried out in the terms and evaluative 
orientational schema that are emic to the scientific community. Note in 
particular that when activists or opponents are cited, their arguments are 
presented as ‘claims’ rather than facts: ‘the anti biotechnology community 
claims’ or ‘some claim’ or ‘opponents of biotechnology claim’. This is in 
contrast to scientific ‘facts’, ‘results’, and ‘evidence’.  
The predominance of technical scientific and fiscal modes of representation 
and evaluation is consistent across the corpus13. As the following excerpt 
indicates, there is a slippery conflation between knowledge that is derived 
through scientific experimentation and ‘fact’. In entering any form of 
discussions regarding biotechnology, citizens are frequently asked/required 
to interact within the discursive perimeters of science and scientific 
evaluation or, depending upon the context, economic or fiscal evaluation. 
As the author of ‘Agricultural biotechnology questions and answers’ argues, 
Meaningful debate can only be achieved if the public is accurately informed, 
and informed opinions can only be reached when people are aware of the facts. 
The use of gene technology in agriculture and food production raises several 
important matters, particularly impacts on trade and regulatory issues. 
                                                 
13 With the notable exception of the New Zealand Discussion Paper (2002) which [at least] states that 
‘economic, social, environmental and cultural values’ should be given equal consideration 
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However, the most common questions asked by members of the public and 
special interest groups are in relation to the science itself. This booklet provides 
science-based answers to the most common technical questions raised about 
gene technology in agriculture and food production. It draws upon the scientific 
knowledge and current research findings of experts in various fields, including 
gene technology, molecular biology, microbiology, biochemistry, plant 
physiology and agriculture. Scientific progress in this area is developing rapidly 
and, as in other fields of science and technology, there are divergent views on 
some issues. This publication presents the current scientific thinking on these 
matters in a balanced way. It is hoped that communicating the science-based 
facts and current understanding of research results to date, will establish a 
basis for well-informed discussion about the broad range of issues 
accompanying the use of gene technology in agriculture and food production. 
(Bureau of Rural Sciences, 2000, cwn. 777) 
While I do agree that it is important to be informed of current scientific 
thinking and experimental results on biotechnology, and that the so-called 
‘emotional’ responses to biotechnology should also be explored and, where 
appropriate, subject to critique, I do not think it is appropriate that 
discussions on biotechnology be confined to the limits of scientific 
‘evidence’ or appeals to so-called scientific ‘fact’. This is for one simple 
reason: Biotechnology is not merely a technical or empirical practice. I posit 
that the above author’s delineation of questions that relate ‘to the science 
itself’ is not just a blind appeal to scientific ‘fact’, it is also a rhetorical 
demarcation upon the kinds of questions that can be asked of biotechnology 
and its proponents and, also, the kinds of answers that are appropriate and 
credible.  
The author emphasises that the answers to any questions, and the basis of all 
discussion, should be provided by ‘science based answers’. The author 
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proposes that these answers will come quite clearly from ‘scientific 
knowledge and current research findings of experts in various fields, 
including gene technology, molecular biology, microbiology, biochemistry, 
plant physiology and agriculture’; ‘current scientific thinking’; and ‘science-
based facts and current understanding of research results to date’. As 
Toulmin (1953/1960) argues, physical sciences are inherently idealistic and, 
at least to some degree, speculative. That is 
‘…the arguments of physics are conducted in terms of ideals, and there 
is always some limit to the extent to which we have found ways either 
of realising these ideals, or of recognising bodies or systems which can 
be accepted as realising them as accurately as we can measure’ 
(Toulmin, 1953/1960, p. 71) 
Toulmin recognises that the practices of hypothesis and empirical testing is 
inherently guided toward realising, or of operating within, certain ‘accepted’ 
ideals or laws. Toulmin’s description of natural science acknowledges the 
limits of human consciousness in identifying and hypothesising on nature as 
separate from human activity. Toulmin notes that even the natural sciences 
operate within value-laden political economic systems. The sites of strategic 
and “curiosity driven” biotechnology research activity in Australia – i.e. 
mostly universities and a relatively small number spin off and multinational 
pharmaceutical and diagnostics companies – are neither separate from, or 
immune to, this fact. 
Universities as industry partners 
Universities are a major site of institutional convergence and hybridity in 
Australian biotechnology. Much of the Federal and State Governments’ 
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plans for biotechnology industry development is based on the creation and 
nurturing of ‘innovation networks’, ‘clusters’, ‘technology precincts’, 
‘hubs’, etc. This phenomenon is not limited to Australia. The Australian 
industry development ‘cluster model’ is in fact modelled on high profile 
technology clusters in North American and European cities of Boston, San 
Diego, Cambridge, Munich, and Austin Texas. As the authors of the UN 
Human Development Report 2001 note, 
Encouraging links between universities and industry can stimulate innovation. 
High-technology companies thrive on state-of-the-art knowledge and creativity 
as well as the scientific and technical expertise of universities. Hubs are 
created as entrepreneurs purposely establish their businesses near 
universities. Tampere University of Technology in Finland links Nokia, the 
Technical Research Centre of Finland and firms in the wood processing 
industry. (UN Human Development Report 2001) 
This deliberative collocation of research contexts and commercialisation 
contexts is a feature of higher education policy more generally in Australia. 
In the domestic scene, those university research institutions that have high 
output in the form of “commercialisation of research” and “spin off”14 
companies attached to them are seen – at least in technocratic funding terms 
– to be the most successful and the most valuable (cf. Mahony, 1992, p. 
226; Williams, 1992, p. 286). Governments, industry magazines, and 
science bureaucrats alike exalt those research institutions and individuals 
who can “sell” or “licence” their “intellectual property” to multinational 
pharmaceutical, agricultural, and life science companies.  
                                                 
14 Spin off companies are companies based on “intellectual property” garnered through research 
contexts. Their aim is to make money out of research. They are usually tied to universities and public 
research institutions. 
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The distinction between ‘basic’ − or pure − research, and applied research in 
universities has also become increasingly blurred as OECD and domestic 
imperatives for any basic research to be commercially oriented penetrate 
government and university policy (Marginson, 1997a, p. 261). Relatively 
recent developments in OECD policy regarding basic research in 
universities collapses corporate managerialist and traditional academic 
practices and imperatives into one: the OECD developed a practice of 
strategic basic research which requires academics involved in pure research 
to ‘extend the underlaying capacity of innovation whilst maintaining 
commercial potential’ (Marginson, 1997a, p. 261). Such universal pressure 
to be market-oriented has invoked a reworking of the discourse of academic 
freedom generally (Marginson, 1997a, p. 260). A primary criteria for 
receiving competitively allocated funding is now predominantly based on 
whether proposed research projects will be readily saleable to industry in an 
applied, or applicable, form.  
These arrangements are challenging in the context of biotechnology for a 
number of reasons. First, publicly funded research is sold for private gain 
not only for individual researchers and universities but, most significantly, 
for those companies that are large enough to license technologies, fund 
product development and, where required, fund long winded rounds of 
clinical trial. The second, and perhaps not so readily identifiable point, is 
that what is sold as “intellectual property” is actually constituted of, or 
derived from, living organisms, or potential living organisms. This is not 
represented in the highly abstract and individualist claims that are made 
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upon the ownership and discovery of “intellectual property”. Finally, despite 
the fact that the majority of research in Australia and other OECD countries 
begins with public funding, the final outcome of research, licensing, and 
commercialisation is only public to the extent that it can be bought and/or 
consumed by the public. Finally, the hybridising of science and industry in 
the context of biotechnology does not end with funding and research 
contexts. The government’s plans to merge science with industry has 
entered the primary education system and, specifically, the training of future 
biotechnologists and science bureaucrats as will be explored in more depth 
in the following chapter.  
Defining future history 
It [biotechnology] is going to be the future, that's what it is going to be though, 
just write that down, going to be the future. (Interview, Research Institute 
Director) 
The current political economic form of global capitalism (however it may be 
defined) cannot be overlooked in attempting to identify and assess 
contemporary movements in biotechnology. The degree to which 
Governments have positioned biotechnology as a saviour of industrial and 
“developing” economies alike is evident across many texts and within the 
interview transcripts. I have listed a number of quotes below to illustrate the 
extent to which this theme is featured in the corpus, primarily in policy texts 
but also significantly in education documents and interview transcripts. The 
future space of a world transformed through biotechnology has arguably, 
through its indoctrination in policy worldwide, become an ‘official utopia’ 
of our time (Graham, 2001, p. 761). According to these statements from 
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policy and interview transcripts, biotechnology is a precondition, and an 
indicator, of innovation, progress, and economic development for all 
countries. I have underlined those sections of the texts that refer specifically 
to the imperative nature of biotechnology as an opportunity to be grasped so 
that we may secure our future in bio-utopia. 
Cr Lucy Turnbull Deputy Lord Mayor the City of Sydney 'The biotechnology 
sector is set to provide venture capital business with more exciting 
opportunities than the Internet ever could. Australia enjoys some clusters of 
world-class excellence in this sector; let's grasp the opportunity now. Policy 
makers should unapologetically back this sector in as a "winner" for Australia.' 
(quoted in the NSW Biofirst 2001 Strategy) 
[Heading] HARVESTING THE POTENTIAL [] The potential of life sciences and 
biotechnology is being exploited at an accelerating rate and is likely to 
engender a new economy with creation of wealth and skilled jobs. (Commission 
of the European Communities 2002)  
It is widely believed that biotechnology will be one of the most significant 
technologies of the early decades of the 21st century ... there is a huge 
opportunity for Ireland to join in, to contribute to, and to benefit from, the next 
phase of the biotechnology revolution ... no country with a strong food and 
pharmaceutical industry can afford to ignore the new biotechnology. (Ireland 
Modern Biotechnology Report 2000) 
… Staying out of the biotechnology revolution is not an option. (Victorian 
Strategic Plan 2000) 
The imperative nature of these statements is a consistent and readily 
identifiable pattern (viz statements such as we must; we will; we are; we 
should; we need to). This is even extended to the point where the authors of 
the Victorian Strategic Plan makes claims as grand as ‘Staying out of the 
biotechnology is not an option’.  
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These exhortative claims are consistent with the genre of technology policy 
more generally. Graham (2001c) observes that a primary function of 
technology policy is ‘to create prophetic perceptions of value for new, 
unexplored, or unknowable spaces that exist at a time-distance from the here 
and now – that is to create value for some imagined future place and time’ 
(Graham, 2001c, p. 761). This is where the biotechnology as time medium 
function reaches into the future: Biotechnology policies create ‘irrealis’ or 
potential spaces and times (the biotechnology age) and present them as if 
they were reality, an unquestionably desirable and attainable future. All 
policy initiatives, laws, funding decisions, regulations, and strategies are 
geared to “get us to” this future space. There is, apparently, no opportunity 
for deviation from the path. If we deviate we will miss out or we will fail to 
meet up with the rest of the ‘industrialised world’ in that place.  
I would like to suggest that rather than being simply beneficial or even 
innocuous, technological ‘innovation’ – when it is a true innovation – is also 
part of the biotechnology as time medium function. Innovation is repeatedly 
portrayed in the corpus as a movement or translation of something into 
some other form. Innovation implies that something that has existed 
previously is passed over in favour of something else that is new. As the 
following quotes illustrate, the assumption is that an innovative 
(transforming) movement toward newness is necessarily positive: 
Innovation is the process of developing an idea into a product for commercial 
benefit, while invention is the process of creating those ideas. Entrepreneurs 
are the people who turn invention into innovation. (Tasmanian State 
Government, 2001, cwn 1,829) 
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Innovation is widely recognised as a primary driver of growth and wealth-
creation. Innovation based on science and technology research is creating new 
industries and transforming existing ones. While Australia has an enviable 
world reputation for the quality of its science and technology, it has been less 
successful in creating a culture of innovation, in which discovery leads to the 
development of products and processes that generate wealth. (Tasmanian 
State Government, 2001, cwn 1,288) 
Decreasing arable land means that technical innovation is needed simply to 
sustain current levels of food production. (Monsanto Australia, 2002b, cwn 85) 
Innovation is important to us [the company], important to us is knowing that we 
are somehow benefiting people, indirectly people by taking care of their pets, 
and that is something we feature very strongly within the company. (Interview 
company CEO, cwn 1,951) 
Innovation is increasingly being regarded as the key factor underpinning a 
nation's export competitiveness, employment growth and economic well-being. 
Australia's future depends on investing wisely today in the foundations of 
economic competitiveness. (Victorian State Government, 2002, cwn 4,642) 
Innovation is not only the province of new or high tech industries, but also 
essential to the future of many of our traditional sectors such as agriculture, 
manufacturing and mining. (Commonwealth of Australia, Backing Australia’s 
Ability, 2001, cwn 982) 
Technological innovation is an expression of human potential …technological 
innovation is a means to human development because of its impact on 
economic growth through the productivity gains it generates. It raises the crop 
yields of farmers, the output of factory workers and the efficiency of service 
providers and small businesses. It also creates new activities and industries-
such as the information and communications technology sector-contributing to 
economic growth and employment creation. (UN Human Development Report, 
2001, cwn 20,812) 
The benefits of innovation presented in the corpus include: commercial 
benefit; growth and wealth creation; the development of products and 
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processes that generate wealth; the creation of new industries and the 
transformation of existing ones; sustained levels of food production; 
indirectly taking care of humans by taking care of their pets; a nation's 
export competitiveness, employment growth and economic well-being; 
Australia's future; the future of many of our [Australia’s] traditional sectors 
such as agriculture, manufacturing and mining; the foundation of economic 
competitiveness; human development; economic growth through 
productivity gains; higher crop yields of farmers; increased output of factory 
workers; increased efficiency of service providers and small businesses; the 
creation of new activities and industries; economic growth; and employment 
creation.  
Innovation is, as these quotes define, a process of inventing something new 
that then transforms something else, for example farming practices, 
manufacturing processes, drug development, daily life. As the Tasmanian 
policy makers state, invention is the process of creating ideas, it is 
‘entrepreneurs’ who ‘turn an invention into an innovation’. Innovation is a 
process not just of invention but of growth, transformation, and creation. 
Innovation is inherently competitive and technological (i.e. used to do, to 
change).  
Innovation, then, requires the movements of mediation. Yet, as we know, 
innovation is not a neutral process. Innovation is patrolled within the bounds 
of the social practice of biotechnology; by the priorities articulated in public 
policy and funding; by trends and traditions; by organisational dynamics 
and politics; by consumer demand; and the orientation of research cultures. 
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While a scientist interviewed from a regional research station tells that what 
he does depends on what he can do, mixed with what industry wants, and 
what the department’s ‘strategic priorities’, a CEO of one of Brisbane’s 
publicly listed biotechnology manufacturers says that product development 
does not happen without the marketing department’s endorsement. He says 
that marketing can persuade the public that they need a particular product: 
innovation mixed with marketing can create a market of the future. Here we 
can see the biotechnology as time medium function reaching into the future 
once again. The point to note is that innovation in biotechnology in fact 
requires the production of people who are willing to manufacture, endorse, 
buy, consume, and become dependent upon biotechnology products, not just 
the creation of new products. This is yet another way we can see 
biotechnology – which is a specifically product oriented branch of science – 
functioning as media in unexpected places. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have forwarded the idea that a social practice can act as 
media over time or, if you like, as a time medium. The basic point I am 
trying to make is that biotechnology is shaped by discourses that have 
emerged through historical traditions and practices. Biotechnology as a 
social practice in turn acts as media to, reinvigorate, invest and inscribe 
these discourses in a range of new or expanded socio-biological contexts, 
discourse materialities, practices, and people. In this way the social practice 
of biotechnology literally functions as a time machine to deliver historically 
salient ways of seeing, being, and acting into present and future contexts.  
 157 
While attention is given to ‘history’ in official biotechnology discourses, it 
is a linear, positivistic view of the history of biotechnology. Common 
representations of history in official biotechnology discourse have one thing 
in common: They all portray biotechnology as being a natural and 
inherently valuable postcursor to previous, inherently valuable technological 
developments or revolutions. Biotechnology time lines are a case in point 
because they portray recombinant genetic technologies along a continuum 
of developments and innovations that include, for example, making bread 
using yeast, the ‘discovery’ of penicillin, ‘mapping’ the human genome’, 
and cloning a sheep. The combination of everyday familiar items such as 
beer, bread, and cheese, with new and contested technologies is an 
inherently rhetorical movement. The timeline genre is also very effective in 
decontextualising scientific and technical ‘innovations’ from the more 
complex social conditions from which they emerged, or which they 
precipitated. 
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Chapter 6 Mediation and the social 
practice of biotechnology 
Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the movements, and the 
representations of movements, that are manifest in the analysis corpus. The 
chapter includes multiple references to the thesis corpus which includes a 
range of policy, industry, education, and interview texts from a range of 
different countries. As previous chapters have indicated, one of the key 
findings of the analysis was the sheer extent to which biotechnology is 
being defined as the basis of all future economic growth and prosperity. In 
order to reach this future biotechnology utopia, policies on biotechnology all 
prescribe that science must ‘partner with industry’ to ‘deliver on the 
promise’ of biotechnology.  
Where previous chapters have identified the discursive processes via which 
social practices are produced and reproduced over time, this chapter 
explores the extent to which science is required to hybridise with industry to 
birth the contemporary practice of biotechnology. Hybridisation is clearly 
evident in the stated features of biotechnology in the thesis corpus. This 
includes hybridity in the defined purpose of biotechnology; its means of 
achieving that purpose; the people who constitute the practice; the formal 
processes of socialisation and accreditation required to enter the practice; 
and perhaps most significantly, the geographical co-location of science 
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practitioners with industry groups in newly developed biotechnology 
“precincts”.  
Thematic patterns in mediation 
Movements in space: Spatial convergence and hybridity 
In addition to the great amount of attention given to attracting appropriately 
qualified and experienced ‘human resources’ in the bioindustries (the so-
called “brain drain” and “brain gain”), biotechnology industry policy 
emphasises bringing different sorts of people together in spatial as well as 
abstract ideological contexts in order to merge the two practices of science 
and business or science and industry. Indeed, the dominant function of 
biotechnology policy is in fact to ensure mediation between these contexts, 
i.e. to ‘industrialise’, to ‘commercialise’, to ‘commodify’, to ‘translate’, to 
‘deliver ’, to ‘develop’, to ‘license’, to ‘export’, to ‘make money out of’, to 
‘capitalise upon’, to ‘apply’, or to ‘activate’. I observe that “innovation 
networks” (vertical and horizontal integration between organisations) are 
identified as an organisational structure en par with hierarchies, flat 
structures, team based structures monopolies, or oligopolies: That is, the 
networked organisations are seen as being combined in purpose to such an 
extent that the innovation network is seen as a prominent form of 
organisation.  
As indicated in the Introduction, the socio-spatial nature of hybridity is 
evident to the extent that policy makers in biotechnology, particularly those 
in Australia, have created or funded biotechnology “precincts” via which 
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hybridising between specific research institutes and specific companies has, 
should and must occur[ed]. Examples include The Institute of Molecular 
Bioscience in Brisbane, Australia; Bio21in Melbourne, Australia; and the 
much cited clusters in Boston; San Diego; Cambridge; Munich; and Austin 
Texas. I have included the following quotes from the corpus as examples of 
what might be called “precinct hybridity”. See examples below: 
In New South Wales, Australia: 
Commercialisation of biotechnology requires more than the formation of start-
up companies. It requires skills to enter licensing agreements and strategic 
partnerships. The NSW Government is proactively ensuring a sustainable 
funding pipeline for biotechnology to maximise benefits from the platform 
strategies through targeted assistance for the following initiatives… Foster 
connections between investors and biotechnology sector A broad strategic view 
will be taken in the design of initiatives that aim to facilitate connection between 
investors and the biotechnology sector. (NSW Biofirst, 2001, cwn. 6,243) 
'One of the key platforms for change in the medical research sector revolves 
around the creation of critical mass among its scientists. Given that one of the 
primary objectives of science is to sponsor individual investigator-initiated, 
curiosity-driven fundamental research, it is now critical that we garner these 
skills into an overall framework of infrastructure and commercialisation support. 
The concept of "clustering" will greatly enhance research interaction and, most 
importantly, create major costsaving efficiencies and greater effectiveness.' 
Peter J Wills, AM (NSW Biofirst, 2001, cwn. 13,387) 
In Queensland, Australia: 
… so I really think that with government backing we have a very good bio 
industries group within bureaucracy and a lot of people who have been working 
towards growing bio-tech from all different levels, we are very strong in 
Queensland. We have got nice weather, we have got places we can put 
technology parks if that's the way we want to go. We have got the infrastructure 
that can build a very significant bio-technology cluster… we have actually been 
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clustering in Queensland for a long time. We were doing that under the 
development strategy, the South-East Queensland Development Strategy and 
we began at that point really starting to cluster the industries. At least at a sort 
of networking level. (Interview, Industry consultant, cwn. 1,832) 
In Victoria, Australia: 
Clusters allow participants to benefit as if they were larger or as if they had 
joined with others formally-without being required to sacrifice flexibility. Clusters 
drive the direction and pace of innovation. This in turn stimulates the formation 
of new businesses that expand and strengthen the cluster itself, thus creating a 
virtuous cycle of innovation and company formation… 
Melbourne is home to more than 40 leading medical research institutes and 
organisations including The Walter & Eliza Hall Institute of Medical Research, 
The Baker Medical Research Institute, The Howard Florey Institute and The 
Murdoch Children's Research Institute… It is envisioned that all these groups 
and many individual research institutes will come together and operate under 
the Bio21 umbrella’. (Victorian Government - Capturing the Opportunity, 2000, 
cwn. 12,590) 
Precincts, clusters, hubs, and networks in biotechnology policy include 
things other than persons and the relationships between them, most 
particularly high levels of investment capital, physical infrastructure 
including expensive information and communication technology and 
laboratory equipment, government policy, and/or particular politicians or 
science leaders/heroes. In biotechnology these are the things (capital, 
infrastructure, technology, policy, and heroes) that are presented as 
facilitating the hybridising, ‘interfacing’, or ‘bringing together’ of the 
practices of science and business. As the policy terms ‘interfacing’, or 
‘bringing together’ imply, policy makers and science bureaucrats are 
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holding on to the idea that science can serve economic goals and still remain 
intact.  
The relationships between science and industry within these clusters are 
consistently defined as “partnership”, “networking”, “collaboration”, 
“strategic alliance” yet it is still to be seen whether or not these precincts can 
bring about the desired outcomes in terms of hybrid aims, values, and 
outcomes between science and industry. Official terms such as “partnership” 
imply that the practices, individuals, and organisations involved retain 
autonomy and distinctiveness in the relationship. It is interesting that the 
policy makers use the term ‘partnerships’ so often. Partnership implies that 
the two practices remain distinct. Yet, one interviewee (Research Project 
Leader) indicated a conflation between what scientists can do, what their 
technical capabilities are, what industry identifies as a need, and what the 
department (state government) identifies as a strategic priority. S/he ranks 
the technical capacity of scientists equally with strategic priorities of 
government and ‘market need’.  
The following interview quote puts a finer point on the ways that 
“partnerships” and “alliances” between science and industry are in fact 
shifting science practitioners’ (researchers) understandings of the 
fundamental nature and purpose of their practice – albeit if reluctantly. In 
particular, this interviewee, who is Director of a Regional Research Centre 
for a Queensland Government Department, emphasises that government 
funding policies do not just encourage but, rather, necessitate institutional 
hybridity.  
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It is almost always up to the individual researchers to do the leg work initially, 
and approach either the funding providers or approach industry with project 
ideas. It also has to be compatible with the INTERVIEWEE’S ORGANISATION 
sort of strategic roles and whether they have resources to put into that area or 
not, with the ORGANISATION they have their sort of, I suppose you could call it 
their preferred sort of option in terms of where they want to put their resources. 
You know, you just wouldn’t say, look I can do something terrific and land in 
there when there is really no support there for you from industry. Therefore the 
institute would probably not provide any support for that work, so it really has to 
be hand in hand with what industry identifies as a need and what you can do to 
solve those problems as a researcher and then that ties up with some strategic 
directions provided by the institute or the DPI. So you always sort of trying to 
marry all those sort of groups together. We come at it from more the technical 
end, we know what we can do, we know what our technical capabilities are… 
(Interview, Centre Director & Research Project Leader, cwn 645) 
For this research leader, a primary influence on the direction of scientific 
research is whatever industry identifies as ‘a need’ combined with the 
‘strategic priorities’ of government, and ‘what scientists technically can do’. 
The technical capabilities of scientists are demarcated from market and 
strategic priorities under the assumption that they are separate from them. It 
is worth noting here that the scientists’ technical capabilities are presented 
as being descriptive rather than normative, i.e. this is simply what we can 
do: it is the case.  
The same imperative to pursue hybridity with industry through collaborative 
arrangements is evident for this Director of a university research institute: 
… basically if we maintain the same standard of people as we have got now, 
we are bringing in additional principal investigators and so forth, and the big 
one is that we need to increase our commercial income, our industrial income 
from about two million a year up to about twelve million a year, and that we will 
do by increasing the number of alliances and the number and size of the 
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alliances we form in the industry. Increasing the number of spin-out companies 
we generate, and basically we have to very strategically plan for the way in 
which we are going to develop those things. So that is what we are doing… 
(Interview transcript, Research Institute Director, cwn 2,731) 
The emic positioning of this University Research Institute Director is 
interesting in comparison to the Government Research Scientist quoted 
above. This Research Director emphasises that his/her institution is not only 
concerned with raising industry “income” (as opposed to “funding”) from 
$2 million to $12 million per year, but also in creating its own spin off 
companies: that is, in becoming (rather than just collaborating with) 
business.  
Aristotle’s functions of rhetoric – as outlined briefly in the Introduction – 
can apply here. There are differences in tense in the interviewees’ accounts 
of the three different influences of science, government, and industry. The 
differences in tense play a rhetorical-representative function and are 
consistent with functions of rhetoric. First, the scientists’ technical ability is 
portrayed as being in the present: the neutral-objective feature of the 
equation between science, industry, and government. Second, both the 
industry’s identification of market need and government priority are future 
oriented (deliberative): they seek to direct scientific research in a direction 
in/for the future. Both the future and present tenses are rhetorically 
significant.  
Strategic priorities for the Research Director are inherently deliberative and 
future oriented. The government research scientist sees that his/her work 
remains distinct from whatever industry or the department identifies; s/he 
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defines his/her core work in terms of “what we can do” and “what our 
technical capabilities are”; and s/he indicates that a major and consistent 
requirement of his/her role is to ‘marry all of those groups together’. 
Research Director on the other hand is looking for increased “income” from 
industry and direction translation of the Institute’s work into becoming 
business. As both interviewees indicate, there are pressures coming from 
both inside and outside the practice of science itself that influence what they 
do and why. While government policy and funding mechanisms do in fact 
require hybridity between universities, businesses, government, and so on, 
the Research Director’s interview comments indicate that corporate 
practices such as strategic planning have already entered the discourse of 
his/her emic university setting – at the very least in the form of him/her.  
Hybrid selves 
In keeping with dominant policy imperatives to merge science with 
industry, international policy documents and select interviewees emphasise 
the need for academics and future scientists to reflect and embrace hybridity 
both in their work and in themselves.  
[Heading] Exploitation [] A close relationship between the academic domain 
and the commercial or market-facing domain. In particular, academics must 
have ready access to business skills and financial and legal support. Such 
services are typically to be found in the incubators closely associated with 
biology departments and institutions. (South Africa Policy, 2001, cwn. 5,576) 
This quote from the South African Biotechnology Policy sits neatly with 
global trends in higher education policy that require universities to become 
more entrepreneurial in seeking research funding and ensuring the strategic 
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application of research. In relation to property rights it is the inventor and 
the university who benefits. Also the use of the phrase “market-facing” is 
very interesting and expressive because it connotes a particular 
responsibility and preoccupation across a whole “domain”. Once again 
though the academic domain is portrayed as being separate from this market 
facing domain which, based on the interviews taken for this research, and 
wider policy imperatives, appears to be patently false: 
Industrialists in science and technology spend 20% of their time at universities, 
giving lectures to students in their areas of expertise. The "adjunct professors" 
work on a challenging interface between industry and academia, and students 
learn the relevance of technology to industry. In China too, institutions of higher 
education support the technological work of enterprises. Tsinghua University 
established the Chemical Engineering and Applied Chemistry Institute jointly 
with Sino Petrochemical Engineering Company, which has given more than 
$3.6 million to support the university's research activities and recruited more 
than 100 of its graduates. The State Torch Programme encourages enterprises 
to strengthen their ties with research institutions, to accelerate the 
commercialization of research results. Chinese universities have also 
established science parks. The Shanghai Technology Park acts as an incubator 
for the rapid application of scientific and technological work in industry. In the 
1990s China emphasized the development of high-technology industry through 
a variety of government programmes to support R&D. Now China is also using 
R&D to improve the productivity of traditional activities in agriculture. The Spark 
Programme propagates Encouraging links between universities and industry 
can stimulate innovation (UN Human Development Report, 2001, cwn. 55,569) 
The examples from China cited in the UN Report once again herald links 
between universities and industry as a source of future development and 
‘innovation’ in biotechnology. 
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As outlined in Chapter 3, biotechnology is a socially constituted practice. It 
is produced and reproduced over time through processes of learning and 
socialisation. Knowledge of what to do and how to do it, as well as broader 
normative orientations toward that doing and knowing, are passed on 
between members of the practice in formal and informal ways. Both internal 
and external actors and governing bodies can influence the purpose and 
means of the practice. The Wills Review of 1998, for instance, makes the 
following recommendations about scientific research: 
Students should be exposed to the excitement of science and associated 
industry through greater interaction with our centres of excellence. We should 
also extend our graduate training to produce researchers capable of relating 
better to industry and health care providers and developing new specialist skills 
such as in bioinformatics. 
We should better equip researchers by extending graduate training to include 
topics – such as management, intellectual property and regulation – which bear 
on research; and by building research capacity for all health practitioners, 
especially in under researched areas. (p. 4) 
Consistent with the recommendations of the Wills Review, science 
bureaucrats, industry consultants, and company CEOs interviewed – as 
opposed to research scientists – made normative statements regarding 
education requirements for future biotechnologists. Consistent with current 
policy stances, science bureaucrats, industry consultants, and CEOs 
advocated that biotechnologists of the future should have skills in 
Intellectual Property; patenting; entrepreneurship; finance; management; 
and marketing. In particular, the research directors of large research 
institutes and industry consultants were the most adamant that science 
education should include a substantial “business” component. An industry 
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consultant interviewed similarly identified that current university staff 
needed to develop competencies in patenting and intellectual property: 
People at the universities need to understand much broader issues around IP 
rather than just patenting. It is just one facet. A bit of a side track. I think it 
actually needs to be embodied into the courses in the university so that 
everybody who is undergoing the science course or engineering course, or 
anything where you might end up with patentable ideas or protectable ideas, 
should have some understanding of IP right from the first year of university… 
(Interview, industry consultant, cwn. 2,829) 
One company CEO was also particularly interested in the role of marketing. 
Note in particular the CEO’s delineation between “marketing language” and 
“technical [scientific] language” and also the argument that a market can be 
made to want a product it does not necessarily want at present: 
So it's a particular passion of mine that marketing is not, when the product is 
finished and you are going out to sell it and put the best spin on it, it is creating 
the product that market wants or the market will buy. It [the market] may not 
exactly want it now but you believe that you can persuade them because of the 
benefits it will bring. But that is all marketing language, it’s not technical 
language. I would say that there is great opportunity for young people who want 
to be in our industry and are probably doing a science degree now that they 
round that off with communications or marketing. I think that there is, that that is 
particularly relevant to both ends of our industry, to the research end as well as 
to the marketing end. (Interview, Company CEO, cwn 2,955) 
The emphasis on marketing in this excerpt is indicative of the extent to 
which biotechnology actually incorporates or involves a growing number of 
scientific and industry subpractices. In my experience it is also quite rare to 
have a company CEO in the field of biotechnology making claims that ‘a 
market’ can be made to want something it does not necessarily want at 
present. The interview genre in this instance has presented viewpoints that 
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would not normally be voiced in, for example, public policy documents or 
public forums dealing with biotechnology. Nevertheless these viewpoints, 
are clearly important in unveiling the ways that public concerns or interests 
are perceived in relation to biotechnology commercialisation and product 
development. 
Hybridity in science and industry is being implemented at the earliest stages 
of socialisation into the practice of biotechnology. A university degree in 
biotechnology now requires science students to undertake a significant 
proportion of their studies in business, including marketing, finance, 
commercialisation, product development, and intellectual property. There 
are also formal mentoring strategies that seek to shape emerging 
biotechnologists as entrepreneurs. The Queensland Government’s recently 
announced Bioenterprise program is one example: 
Queensland's Innovation Minister Paul Lucas asked Queensland's 
corporate sector to help support a new student program that could create 
the start-up companies of the future. The "BioEnterprise" program is 
the first of its kind in Queensland, and allows second-year 
biotechnology innovation students to form their own companies with 
the help of industry mentors. The students run the company for the 
duration of their degrees, developing and marketing real products or 
services and keeping company records. Mr Lucas yesterday met with 
students from the program's first five companies and urged potential 
mentors in industry to get behind the initiative. "These students have 
come up with ideas that range from a personalised cancer diagnostic 
test; an information service for biotechnology investors; market 
research into the compound that makes some marine life glow in the 
dark; and an educational package promoting biotechnology in high 
schools," Mr Lucas said. (QUT Corporate Communication, 2002)  
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Secondary schools (grades 7-12) are also articulating links with 
biotechnology. The Cavendish Road State High School in Queensland, for 
example, has been commended in state, local and national newspapers, and 
awarded by the Queensland Government, for installing a biotechnology 
laboratory among other specialist programs in science and sports. The 
School has links with universities that have agreed to provide school 
students with dual accreditation towards university degrees if they take 
certain subjects in school.  
The pipeline of value creation between science and business 
A metaphor of the product development “pipeline” is also used to describe 
the connections between official biotechnology contexts. The pipeline 
metaphor is used to describe the “product development cycle” that runs from 
basic research to research and development to product development 
commercialisation, sale, and consumption (profits; market share; happy, 
healthy people). The pipeline metaphor is consistent across contexts and 
genres in the corpus but is particularly influenced by – and presumably born 
of – the emic contexts of large pharmaceutical companies who run their own 
internal organisational pipelines from Research and Development units, to 
product development, commercialisation, marketing, distribution, and so on.  
The pipeline metaphor is not surprisingly less prominent in education 
documents than in industry documents in the thesis corpus. The Australian 
biotechnology industry organisation Aus Biotech, for instance, devoted the 
2003 national conference to the theme of moving ‘invention to product’ (see 
flier below).  
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Interestingly, the research scientists I interviewed who were not involved 
directly in the generation of funding or liaison with governments did not 
refer to this pipeline even though they were cognisant of imperatives for 
industry oriented research (i.e. research that industry is willing to fund and 
identifies as a market need). Research-intensive companies and research 
institutes that do not have the capital required to commercialise (venture 
funds, clinical trial, marketing) their own research (which includes most 
small Australian biotechnology companies and University R&Ds) made the 
most references to this pipeline. Indeed, interview transcripts indicate that 
CEOs and Managing Directors of small spin off companies regard “feeding” 
this pipeline as a core purpose of their organisation:  
Fundamental research needs to be carried out in order to keep feeding the 
pipeline of commercial development. To date, COMPANY NAME has had to 
work both ends of this pipeline maintaining both fundamental and commercial 
activities. Investors will not fund us based on how much fundamental research 
we are doing. They will make their investment based primarily on where we are 
in the development of our commercial products. However, we cannot ignore the 
fundamental research because that develops the intellectual property which 
then in turn feeds our commercialisation activities. Added to this equation is the 
short term nature of start-up funds, which typically last 6 to 24 months. Thus the 
research program at this stage of the development of COMPANY NAME is a 
delicate juggling act balancing commercial and fundamental discovery 
activities. COMPANY NAME is in a fortunate position in that the company has 
been able to obtain rights to drug candidates in a reasonably advanced state of 
development. By quickly ‘value adding’15 further IP to these candidates the 
company will be in a strong position to license the ongoing drug development 
                                                 
15 Note, the interviewee added in these quotation marks when offered the transcript for review. He/she 
is a scientist by training. At the time of interview he/she was CEO of a small spin off company 
established to commercialise and develop research he/she was involved in at a public research 
institute. 
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programs. Deals of this type will support COMPANY NAME commercial and 
fundamental research base. (Interview, CEO, Brisbane Spin Off Company) 
This pipeline metaphor is significant because it constitutes a link between 
the practices of scientific research in biotechnology and industry contexts of 
product commercialisation and sale. The pipeline metaphor is significant 
because, in addition to the relational paths of two way mediation that are 
established through precinct hybridity, the pipeline metaphor presents a 
normative, apparently linear channel of mediation for biotechnology’s 
discourse materialities. The product development pipeline is an officially 
sanctioned channel of mediation in biotechnology. The pipeline is currently 
foregrounded in biotechnology discourses at the cost of other potential 
pathways of mediation, such as the collaborative not for profit research and 
development approaches canvassed in the UN Human Development Report. 
Like any medium, the product development pipeline in biotechnology is 
only intended to carry certain forms of “content”. In this case the acceptable 
content consists of bio-products (things) that are deemed to be desirable to 
the “receiving” context of larger multinational companies. Desirable in this 
context generally means that they can be sold for profit within the existing 
price system. 
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The “virtuous cycle” of biotechnology research and 
commercialisation 
In October 2000 the Australian National Health and Medical Research 
Council released a strategic review of Health and Medical Research in 
Australia titled The Virtuous Cycle: Working together for Health and 
Medical Research or what is otherwise referred to as ‘the Wills Review 
1998’. The authors define “Virtuous Cycle” as ‘a mutually reinforcing set of 
actions by the research sector, industry and government’ (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1998, p. 2). They state that ‘the outlook of health and medical 
research lies not only in greater government investment, but also in 
establishing the links between public funding, research and the 
commercialisation of findings through industry’ (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1998). The cycle is presumably ‘virtuous’, rather than ‘vicious’, 
because 
Commercialisation of research facilitates the delivery of new medicines 
and treatments to the community. If managed appropriately, it further 
benefits the community through employment and wealth generation. 
Minimising barriers between research and industry was a key element 
of the virtuous cycle outlined in the Review. (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1998, p. 2) 
‘The Virtuous Cycle’ of medical and health research, as it is presented in the 
Wills Review 1998, is synonymous with the product development pipeline 
discussed above. However, this time the emphasis is on the virtuosity of this 
pipeline as a way of sharing the ‘benefits’ of biotechnology around: that is, 
everyone benefits from the Virtuous Cycle through the products they 
consume. According to the Wills Review authors, value is ‘created’ as the 
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technology, idea, whatever, moves along the pipeline toward product 
development, manufacturing, the market, consumption, and profit. Once 
again, there is a strict partition between this profit oriented version of value 
creation and the Wills Review 1998’s comments on ‘benefits’ that accrue to 
the community through access to products arising from publicly funded 
research.  
Once again, ‘the community’ is not included as a benefactor in the contexts 
where this kind of commercial ‘value’ is created. Rather, the community is 
represented in public spaces such as the clinic, the hospital, or the 
workplace. 
There is great opportunity to create value between the public funded 
fundamental research and ultimate development for market. Australia 
has traditionally “sold out” or given away its intellectual capital early in 
the process. Formation of new businesses around key researchers is the 
best way to capture value from Australia’s intellectual capital and to 
generate substantial knowledge-based employment. We must develop a 
research culture that is positive toward commercialisation, build 
management skills both in the research enterprise and in related 
industry, and foster geographic clusters of biotechnology and research 
organisations. (Wills Review, 1998, p. 7) 
The Wills Review’s focus on commercialising publicly funded research for 
private commercial gain is consistent with developments in the USA two 
decades ago. The rationale for allowing private companies and universities 
to take and make life as property and gain from publicly funded research 
under the Bayh Doyle Act is presented as follows: 
Understandably, companies were reluctant to invest in and develop new 
products if competitors could also acquire licenses and then 
manufacture and sell the same products. Accordingly, the Government 
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remained unsuccessful in attracting private industry to license 
government-owned patents. Although taxpayers were supporting the 
federal research enterprise, they were not benefiting from useful 
products or the economic development that would have occurred with 
the manufacture and sale of those products. (US Council of 
Governmental Relations, 1999, np) 
The rationale behind the 1980 Bayh Dole Act is, like the Wills Review 
1998, that it will deliver hitherto inaccessible benefits to taxpayers in the 
form of products. The ideal is that publicly funded research would ‘deliver’ 
tangible outcomes to ‘taxpayers’ via the assistance – mediation – of the bio-
political economy: that is, the market is portrayed as the moral medium 
between research and the community.  
The virtuous cycle of the Wills Review 1998 is a good example of the ways 
in which discourse materialities are installed into the everyday lives of 
citizens via the productive apparatus for private gain whilst being 
represented all the while as public goods within the public interest. Industry, 
and the productive apparatus, is coopted as the medium via which 
governments can act in the public interest or for the benefit of ‘all 
Australians’. The Virtuous Cycle is presented as being circular but is, in 
fact, linear (apart for example from taxation health care etc). Biotechnology 
research is mediation with a focus on alienation and translation. 
Government Policy that advocates science-industry hybridity is mediation 
with a focus on translation and recontextualisation. The virtuous cycle is 
mediation with a focus on translation, recontextualisation, and absorption. 
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The Virtuous Cycle that leads to beneficial outcomes for communities has 
been presented in contexts other than Health and Medical Research. The 
following is taken from a speech delivered by the CEO of international data 
management company Recall. 
This cycle, in its current form, is benefiting people all over the world. 
This virtuous cycle of commerce benefits not only the employees who 
work in specific enterprises, but consumers. It benefits those who the 
cycle allows to step onto the stair of opportunity, often for the first 
time. The cycle starts with investment. Investment creates jobs, new 
opportunities for the people who hold the jobs. These jobs in turn create 
more demand for goods and services, which itself creates jobs. Many of 
these jobs, even entry-level jobs, teach skills that lead to better jobs. As 
more people become more skilled . . . opportunity increases for creating 
more better jobs. Again, Recall is a concrete example of the cycle: 
While providing a valuable service for our customers, and producing a 
profit . . . we are also providing new opportunities. This is how the 
virtuous cycle of commerce works. In our time . . .. another name for 
the virtuous cycle of commerce is . . . globalization. We all know that 
"globalization" has vocal critics. They would stop it if they could. But 
the fact is . . . no one . . . has developed a formula that benefits people 
as does the virtuous cycle of commerce. Over the millennia, it has 
proven to be the best way of enabling more people in more places to 
escape want and move into a growing circle of prosperity. 
Globalization is a force for good. (Mexico Speech delivered by Al 
Trujillo, CEO and President, Recall Corporation, 2002, see 
http://www.recall.com/english/news_white.asp)  
As the above excerpt indicates, the Virtuous Cycle as it is presented in 
biotechnology policy is an extension of wider discourses on neoliberal 
economics and globalisation where ‘public policy objectives couched in 
terms of social goods’ are replaced with ‘public policy objectives couched 
in terms of economic goods’ (Yeatman, 1993, p. 3). The righteous picture 
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presented by the Recall CEO is problematic for very well established 
reasons including, and most specifically, the inability of ‘the market’ to 
attend to social and humanitarian suffering and the exploitation of human 
and nature at the hands of powerful scientific, technological, and economic 
elites (cf. Argy, 1995; Rees, Rodley, and Stilwell, 1993; Wheelright, 1993).  
As Yeatman (1993) identifies, the shift toward market ideology actually 
inverts the socially responsive role of practices by replacing their social 
responsibilities with an overarching responsibility to promoting increased 
“efficiency”, “productivity”, and “growth” of their country’s economy. 
While proponents of the Virtuous Cycle of biotechnology claim that social 
goods will arise from biotechnology commercialisation, they do not specify 
how these benefits will be “delivered” through an amoral market medium 
given the history of inequality that erupts around the adoption of any new 
technology.  
In assuming that the marketplace will deliver benefits to society, proponents 
of the virtuous cycle in biotechnology seem to have taken a step back, rather 
than forward, in presupposing a mode of social responsibility that relies on 
market forces to ensure an even distribution of wealth, goods and services, 
and well-being. Yet, when equitable outcomes do not accrue from market 
facing policy stances and initiatives, it is apparently “the market”, not the 
governments or individuals who have relied on “its” invisible hand, that is 
to blame. What consumers see, or are led to see, as a consumer/market need, 
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does not always bring wellbeing, health, or ‘happiness’16. Continuing studies 
conducted by the UN and individual researchers show that economic growth 
and prosperity does not reach through socio-economic levels by the 
assumed “trickle down effect” but, rather, creates inequality and poverty 
(United Nations, 1990, in Wheelwright, 1993, p. 41; cf. also Bauman, 
1998).  
Moreover, in the corpus, companies, not governments, are the agents who 
are presented as being responsible for and to the community. This is itself 
problematic given the sharp, but contested, societal distinction between 
practices that are seen to be ‘for profit’ and those that are ‘not for profit’. 
The UN has, for example, identified that the monopoly of ownership of 
“intellectual property” in biotechnology industries already raises problems 
for social distribution of vital drugs, therapeutics, and diagnostics in poor 
countries. Gaining access to key patented inputs - often owned by private 
firms and universities in industrial countries - has become an obstacle to 
innovation and technology distribution especially in developing countries 
where public institutions often lack the resources for licensing and cross 
licensing proprietary research tools and products (UN, 2001). The authors of 
the UN Report state that while publicly funded research is ‘still the main 
source of innovation for poor people's technology’ it is shrinking relative to 
privately funded research globally (UN, 2001). Public funding for research 
that does exist has not been mobilised from national or international sources 
                                                 
16 I’m thinking here of the often quoted examples of thalidomide, nuclear power, mad cow disease, 
pink fluorescent disco socks, and high heeled shoes. 
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to support research that provides specifically for disadvantaged developing 
countries (UN, 2001), apart from the international collaboration on AIDS. 
This is despite the fact that policies are universal in their claims that 
developing countries are stakeholder who will directly benefit from 
developments in biotechnology.  
So, while government policy on biotechnology universally claims that 
biotechnology application and development via the Virtuous Cycle will 
bring untold benefits to communities and individual citizens, the policies 
they offer are industry policy, they do not feature mechanisms for expressly 
social, or not for profit, outcomes or distributing the benefits of technology 
other than funding for basic research in X & Y area. Apart from access to 
drugs, there are contradictory reports about the value of biotechnology in 
‘feeding the world’. While on the one hand Africa Bio, for example, states 
that ‘Modern biotechnology cannot eliminate poverty and hunger because 
these problems are rooted in the socio-political realm’, it also quotes a 
number of “experts”, including the World Bank who state that ‘Modern 
biotechnology offers many benefits for agriculture in Africa …The use of 
high yielding, disease-resistant, and pest-resistant crops will have a direct 
bearing on improved food security, poverty alleviation, and environmental 
conservation in Africa’ (Africa Bio). The problem still remains of how 
socio-political institutions can/will facilitate these benefits, if indeed they 
eventuate, when public funding for ‘poor people’s technology’ is decreasing 
and the outcomes of ‘the Virtuous Cycle’ are mediated by an apparently 
amoral market. 
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Apart from the UN whose charter is specifically to work for social justice 
outcomes, and supranational agreements such as the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, no national or state policy making body has developed 
strategies for dealing with issues of global disadvantage and inequality in 
relation to biotechnology. There are copious mentions of ‘equity’, 
‘equality’, and ‘distribution’ but these are all in relation to either stock 
markets (equity); technology transfer and supply chain logistics 
(distribution); current measurements and abstract statistics of inequality and 
[under] development; and gender in/equality. While the NSW Government 
does attend to ‘equality of access to genetic resources through its 
“BIOPLATFORM” initiative’, it is for the purpose of ‘developing a 
competitive and sustainable biotechnology industry’ not for ensuring a 
balance of benefits for communities (NSW Biofirst 2001).  
The UN is the only policy making organisation to offer authentic policy 
recommendations and strategies – as opposed to the hollow rhetoric that 
characterises Australian “policy” genres – on deriving ‘social’ and 
‘humanitarian’ as opposed to ‘private’ and ‘commercial’ value from 
biotechnology. The UN’s prescribed policy stance is fundamentally 
collaborative rather than “strategically competitive” as is the focus of 
Australian biotechnology policies which even seek to compete between 
states…: 
No national government can single-handedly cope with global market failures… 
The lesson of this Report is that at the global level it is policy, not charity, that 
will ultimately determine whether new technologies become a tool for human 
development everywhere… At a time when universities, private companies and 
public institutions are reshaping their research relationships, new international 
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partnerships for development can bring together the strengths of each while 
balancing any conflicts of interest. Many approaches to creating incentives are 
possible-from purchase funds and prizes to tax credits and public grants. One 
promising model is the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, which brings 
together academics, industry, foundations and public researchers through 
innovative intellectual property rights agreements that enable each partner to 
pursue its interests while jointly pursuing a vaccine for the HIV/AIDS strain 
common in Africa. (UN, 2001, cwn 7,293) 
While ever we are looking to the future, to the next great ‘opportunity’ or 
‘challenge’, our consciousness is diverted from the suffering that sits at our 
doorstep day in and day out. Biotechnology’s official utopia does not 
include an oasis for developing countries or even citizens within already 
industrialised countries who still rely on ‘poor people’s technology’. The 
Virtuous Cycle can deliver products, but can it deliver access to those 
products? And can it deliver the products that we need or will we have to be 
reconstituted via the productive apparatus and practices of marketing to 
think that we need them? 
While policy makers and politicians consistently claim that ‘society’ in 
general will benefit from biotechnology commercialisation, the translations 
that are named in the corpus do not support these claims. Perhaps most 
significantly, the actual positioning of the claims re societal benefit in the 
texts are most often located at the start and at the end of the document: That 
is, societal benefit is mentioned in the introductions and conclusions, but not 
predominantly in the body of the policy texts. This is possibly because the 
policy writers are not writing policies to bring about explicitly social 
benefits but just assume them. Societal benefit is pervasively and 
consistently portrayed as a secondary, sideline benefit of economic benefits. 
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The representations of deliberative translations happening in the corpus are 
most indicative in this respect. They identify exactly ‘what’ is being 
translated into ‘what’ in the eyes of policy makers. 
Conclusion 
In order for the social practice of biotechnology to develop in the ways 
advocated in public policy, the traditional practice of science is required to 
hybridise with a range of technological and industry subpractices. There are 
various elements involved in this hybridity, including perhaps most 
interestingly, the concept of ‘precinct’ or spatial hybridity that is prevalent 
in biotechnology policy and industry development programs. The notion of 
hybridity forwarded in this chapter stresses that hybrid discourses and 
practices are constituted by people – hybrid people who are embedded in 
multiple social contexts at any given time.  
Further, the science bureaucrats and industry consultants who are involved 
in government task forces and receive substantial government funding spoke 
of imperatives for commercialisation, intellectual property, and employment 
generation as core components of biotechnology practice. A point to note 
though is that the research scientists interviewed who do not frequent these 
government and industry contexts, did not mention any of these things. 
Perhaps most interestingly, scientists and science bureaucrats do not feature 
in the written parts of the corpus texts. They do feature though in the 
colourful and glossy pictures that go along with industry and government 
 184 
websites, education brochures, and policy documents, as the following 
corpus illustrations (over page) show.  
To extend on the dynamics of recontextualisation in biotechnology, the 
following chapter will highlight that, depending on the context involved, 
different stakeholders are named as primary beneficiaries or agents of 
biotechnology mediations in the product development cycle. The category 
of “community”, for example, is construed simultaneously as a group of 
customers, clients, or consumers in the corpus and are “located” only in 
specific market or public contexts such as “the clinic”, “the street” or “the 
supermarket”. In industry magazines, investors and shareholders are 
construed as the primary stakeholders and beneficiaries of biotechnology. 
On multinational pharmaceutical companies’ websites, investors and 
consumers are apparently paramount. Finally, in government policy, there 
are more frequent claims regarding the broad utility value of biotechnology 
in promoting the wealth, health, and prosperity of all citizens. Yet, as one 
delves deeper into the logic of the texts, the benefits that ostensibly accrue 
to the general (non-profiting) community are almost always presented as 
new, enhanced, or transformed products.  
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Corpus Illustrations 
The following illustrations (Illustrations 1-4) are taken from texts produced 
in, or intended to represent, five ‘contexts’ in the thesis corpus: Government 
and University Research; State Government Policy; Multi national 
companies; Health; and Biotechnology in ‘the developing world’. The 
illustrations have been included to provide the reader more of a chance to 
build his or her own experience of the thesis corpus. The photos and 
illustrations are such that if a member of the public were to access one of the 
websites or texts, he or she would be confronted with these graphical 
representations in full colour.  
The reader will note that with each new context presented, different persons, 
relationships, combinations, and ways of representing the practice of 
biotechnology (for example through graphs and tables) are introduced. 
Although I will not conduct a dedicated analysis of the illustrations, I have 
noted significant points following each Illustration. 
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Illustration1: Government and University Research Contexts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This illustration is not available online.  
Please consult the hardcopy thesis available 
 from the QUT Library. 
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Notes on Illustration 1 – Government and university research 
contexts: 
1. The only persons who remain constant throughout the five contexts 
are scientists yet, as noted in the following chapter, scientists are not 
featured in the written parts of the corpus texts; 
2. Animals are only featured in the University of Melbourne’s Centre 
for Animal Biotechnology website graphic, one (golden retriever) in 
a loving relationship with a woman and another (sheep) having its 
wool inspected; 
3. The Human Genome publication To Know Ourselves presents both 
the idea of science as a form of knowledge valuable in itself and, 
perhaps more obtusely, the idea of science as a vehicle of liberation 
from dogmatic attitudes and irrational faith. This representation is 
emic to the research contexts and, apparently, to the Human Genome 
Project; 
4. The Queensland Institute of Medical Research Gene Discovery and 
Genetic Diseases page collocates babies and ‘natives’ with 
computerised data in the context of biotechnology research; 
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  Illustration 2: State Government  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This illustration is not available online.  
Please consult the hardcopy thesis available 
 from the QUT Library. 
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Notes on Illustration 2 – State government contexts: 
1. The NSW Government Innovation Council combines a cool kid 
(future employment? Harmless technology?) with the slogan 
“profiting from biotechnology in NSW”; 
2. Graphs and tables are emic to State Government Policy and 
multinational pharmaceutical industry contexts; 
3. The Biotechnology Strategic Development Plan for Victoria situates 
a range of technology industries (information technology, 
biotechnology, materials technology, and microtechnology) in a 
continual process of ‘enabling technologies and technology transfer’. 
This implies that the four areas of technology are/should be 
convergent. Each area of technology is channelled into ‘business 
opportunities’. 
4. An entire mediation process is manifest in the Queensland 
Government graphic at the bottom of the State Government Policy 
page. The graphic starts on the left with trees in a forest, moves to 
DNA, then to a scientist studying something (presumably DNA), 
then to an illuminated light bulb (idea), then to a man at a computer, 
then to what is presumably a microchip or some part of a computer, 
then to a satellite, then to a blue plan map of the globe. 
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Illustration 3: Multi national pharmaceutical companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This illustration is not available online.  
Please consult the hardcopy thesis available 
 from the QUT Library. 
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Notes on Illustration 3 – Multinational Pharmaceutical Companies: 
1. The Biogen slogan ‘Delivering on the promise of biotechnology’ 
reiterates once again the idea that human benefits from 
biotechnological research will be/are mediated through commercial 
industrial apparatus. It also dictates, in no uncertain way, what form 
the benefits of biotechnology will take (i.e. products including 
consumer drugs, pharmaceuticals, diagnostics); 
2. The superlative abstraction in biotechnology as media appears only 
in the multi national pharmaceutical contexts with the Aventis 
‘Investor Centre’ graphics. A photo of a stock broker is overlayed 
with stock price figures as they would appear on a trading floor 
board. The stock price table translates, technologises, and 
recontextualises biotechnology developments into various categories 
of figures that shift quickly over times and dates. 
3. Another recontextualised abstraction in the form of the Sciona 
product range is presented on the multinational pharmaceutical page. 
Note that multinational contexts provide the most prolific 
representations of product outcomes of biotechnology. Most, if not 
all, multinational pharmaceutical companies include a ‘products’ 
page on their website. 
4. Everyday happy and satisfied humans (a small boy, a mother and 
baby, and an older man) are featured most prolifically in 
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multinational pharmaceutical and health contexts where, apparently, 
the benefits of biotechnology are ‘delivered’ to the public; 
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Illustration 4: Health contexts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This illustration is not available online.  
Please consult the hardcopy thesis available 
 from the QUT Library. 
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Notes on Illustration 4 – Health Contexts: 
1. The Amgen corporate slogan ‘dramatically improving people’s 
lives’ makes a direct claim on the virtuous nature of the business. 
The picture collocates a scientist at a microscope with 
microscope slides, numeric figures, and a woman sitting on a 
beach rock; 
2. Computer screens feature throughout biotechnology research 
contexts. The emphasis of the Johnson and Johnson picture in 
Illustration 4 Health Contexts, is on the speed of drug 
development and enhancing productivity. This also reflects the 
degree of technological convergence in contemporary 
biotechnology; 
3. The Queensland Institute of Medical Research Health Page 
features an older woman in a wheelchair looking at a collection 
of medication bottles that are foregrounded on the bed. There is 
more medication on the bedside table along with some flowers. 
The woman is apparently in some form of hospital room. While 
it is unknown what the intentions of the photo may have been, 
the photo seems to collocate the life of an elderly woman with 
dependence upon medication, a state of incapacity, and apparent 
sadness. Is the message that genetic technologies will deliver this 
woman from her dependence on medication? Or will they deliver 
others away from a life such as hers?  
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Illustration 5: Biotechnology in ‘the developing world’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This illustration is not available online.  
Please consult the hardcopy thesis available 
 from the QUT Library. 
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Notes on Illustration 5 – “Developing World” Contexts: 
1. The graphics included on the biotechnology in the developing world 
page most consistently contrast apparently humble, ‘conventional’ 
farming techniques and crops with modern scientific ones. 
2. The graphics used in these booklets are very different to the high 
technology computer and laboratory settings that feature in 
multinational and policy contexts. 
3. These pictures show basic food being produced, not pharmaceuticals 
or diagnostic kits – as with Sciona for example. As a reviewer of an 
earlier version of this thesis points out, the high technology 
examples of plant biotechnology used in these pictures appear to be 
very humble precisely because they appear in the form of everyday 
items such as “plants” – albeit more healthy ones than non GM 
varieties. 
4. The people in these pictures are black. 
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Chapter 7 The impact of mediation: Social 
and ethical considerations 
Overview 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the primary medium of benefit in 
biotechnology for non-profiting citizens is portrayed as being through this 
virtuous cycle of product development and ultimately through the market of 
exchange. The primary purpose of this chapter is to identify the persons who 
populate this virtuous cycle and the significance of their role in relation to 
biotechnology. 
Defining embeddedness: The relationships that [are] 
count[ed] in biotechnology 
The authors of the corpus texts are very specific in defining other practices 
and agents with who biotechnology practitioners should be relating. In this 
way policy makers are very actively defining the ‘embeddedness’ of the 
social practice of biotechnology. These relationships are significant not only 
because they are the media of hybridisation between science and industry, 
for example, but also because they are the official media of mediation in 
biotechnology: These relationships are the official channels of movements 
in meaning both toward and away from biotechnology. As such, these 
relationships stand in direct opposition to the unofficial relationships that the 
social practice of biotechnology has with other social contexts, persons, and 
practices. Unofficial relationships might include ones that are purely derived 
from profit maximisation activities or even those with persons who are 
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rendered vulnerable in relation to the new genetic technologies. As the 
authors of Biotechnology Australia fact sheet state, ‘Genetic information is 
special: It might confirm a diagnosis, or suggest a future likelihood of 
disease in an apparently healthy person’ (Biotechnology Australia, accessed 
2003, cwn. 373). In either case, the unofficial relationships are the ones that 
are not foregrounded, esteemed, or named at all. 
Representations of relationships such as the science-industry-government 
scenario discussed above are significant precisely because they ‘marry’ 
people, places, and things together. The are also significant in a corpus such 
as this one because they identify the primary agents involved in specific 
ways: i.e. in relation to other people, processes, and things.  
Other official relationships in the corpus include: 
 Intergovernmental relations (between governments at different 
levels); 
 Industrial relations (between employers and employees); 
 Relationships of heredity, paternity (between members of the 
same genetic family); 
 Academic – commercial or ‘market facing’ domains (between 
academics and industrialists); 
 Australian medical Diagnostics Industry and the 
Commonwealth Government (between and industry association 
and the commonwealth government of Australia); 
 DNA structure and function (a relationship of causality 
between DNA and its function); 
 Human – mouse genome (a relationship of comparability);  
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 Network relationships (between multiple individuals and 
groups that share interests in a given location or practice); 
 International relations (relationships between countries, usually 
the governments of those countries); 
 The University and Chamber of Commerce in Austin Texas 
(academics and the chamber of commerce); 
 Genetic make up and disease (causality); 
 Public relations (relations between an organisation such as 
government or industry and the consuming public); 
 Commonwealth – State governments (as with 
intergovernmental relations); 
 Investor relations (relations between a for profit organisation 
and its investors like PR but only for a specific community of 
investors); and 
 Related persons after a diagnosis of hereditary disease is made 
(relationships between genetically related persons). 
The relationships that are actually presented in the corpus (as opposed to 
those that can be inferred) are all between groups of people (not individuals) 
and biological organisms/processes. The agents in the relationships include 
governments; the public; industry organisations; chambers of commerce; 
investors; genetically related persons; employers; employees; genomes; 
DNA; and DNA function. The only mention of the non government or non-
industry public is within the particular context of ‘public relations’. So, 
while the community and the public are presented as being ultimate 
benefactors of biotechnology research and commercialisation, they are not 
figured in any of the relationships that are venerated in the corpus, other 
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than when they are presumed to be significant to one of the specific contexts 
of biotechnology research and commercialisation e.g. an investor or 
someone with a hereditary disease. The relationships presented above are 
constituted in a wider flowing trajectory that runs from research to industry 
to the market. This wider flow from research to industry is consistently 
referred to in multiple contexts and genres of the corpus, including the 
interview transcripts. 
Defining sites of moral responsibility in biotechnology: 
Onward to market 
One of the final considerations of this chapter is the extent to which a focus 
on the future, and the myriad of other silencing dynamics in official 
discourses on biotechnology, instil a sense of hopelessness in citizens 
regarding their part in perpetuating monologia. In ‘Towards a Humanized 
Technology’ (1968/1974), Erich Fromm identifies two versions of hope: 
passive and active. He identifies the pervasive trend in western industrial 
societies where citizens consciously hope for change and progress but at the 
same time are unconscious of the extent to which we are resigned to certain 
powerful paths or trajectories of “progress”. He relates Kafka’s story about 
the old man at the gates of heaven as an example of how passive hope 
contributes to the reproduction of existing power dimensions and the lack of 
societal transformation: how citizens are disempowered and rendered 
impotent literally through their own sense of hope. The moral of Kafka’s 
story is that people can hope, ‘but it is not given to them to act upon their 
heart’s impulse and as long as the bureaucrats do not give the green light, 
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they wait and wait’ (Fromm, 1968/1974, pp. 7-8). They put their hope in 
someone or something (technologies) else’s hands.  
A fixation with the agent-less, anonymous (i.e. some-body, some-thing) 
future defines Fromm’s passive and ‘generalised’ form of hope. As he 
articulates,  
‘[n]othing is expected to, or portrayed as, happen[ing] in the now, only 
in the next moment… [therefore] I do nothing, I remain passive, 
because I am nothing and impotent; but the future, the projection of 
time, will bring about what I cannot achieve’ (Fromm, 1968/1974, p. 7). 
Passive hope promotes an engagement not with others in complex socio-
political contexts, but with unnamed and potential individuals and things in 
the future tense. While hope is intrinsically future oriented by its very 
nature, the passive hope Fromm identifies prescribes engagement between 
some unnamed others in a future time and space, not in the immediate and 
responsive present. Instead of focusing on something I do or become, I 
focus on and rely upon something that I will not do (Fromm, 1968/1974, p. 
8). “The future” as the actor or agent will bring about something I desire 
without my doing anything, hence, I remain passive. This future orientation 
of engagement is vastly significant for discourses and public engagements 
surrounding biotechnology.  
References to the “public” or “community” or “consumers” or “the 
developing world” in the corpus are strictly demarcated into contexts of 
‘consumption’; ‘acceptance’; rejection; ‘ignorance’; ‘concern’; ‘opposition’; 
‘ethics’; ‘the providing of information to’; ‘awareness’; ‘benefit’; ‘well 
being’; and ‘uncertainty’. There is no inclusion of agents other than those 
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directly involved in the merger and forwarding of commercial 
biotechnology presented in these spaces. The agents that are represented 
include ‘scientists’, ‘industrialists’, ‘the public sector’, pharmaceutical 
companies, and governments. The following quote provides an example of 
how the positioning of persons in these contexts is constructed in policy 
texts:  
Genetic research and its application also open significant ethical and consumer 
issues and there are potential risks to the environment which need to be 
managed. The Australian community needs to be engaged in an informed 
debate on the ethical and regulatory issues. A challenge for Australian 
biotechnology will be to work with the community and earn its confidence as 
consumers and investors. (Commonwealth of Australia, National Biotechnology 
Strategy, 2000, cwn, 2,094) 
As with the UN Human Development Report 2001, the industry in this case 
labelled as “Australian Biotechnology” in relation to “the community” is 
portrayed as being responsible to consumers but in a very specific context: 
the marketplace. The ‘community’, moreover, is presented as amorphous 
collection of individuals who are free to pursue their personal interests, 
wants, needs, and wellbeing in the marketplace (Upton, 1987, in Peters, 
1994, p. 66).  
The reference to ‘consumers and investors’ at the end of the quote is quite 
overt, but very consistent with the representations and inclusion/exclusion 
of persons in different biotechnology contexts. Australian biotechnology is 
personified and active in comparison to the nominal, passive ‘public’. When 
the government relates with the community, they are described as ‘the 
public’ or ‘the community’. When companies (Australian Biotechnology) 
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relate with the community they are ‘consumers and investors’. The context 
of interaction here and assumptions of social responsibility are paramount to 
how the community is described i.e. as citizen or consumer/investor.  
Moreover, while the Commonwealth Government policy makers indicate 
that ‘the Australian community’ in total needs to ‘be engaged in an 
informed debate’, there is no mention of how this engagement in debate can 
and will affect policy or regulatory developments in biotechnology. 
Apparently then the only way a company impacts upon or interacts with 
everyone else in the universe is in an exchange relationship and 
responsibilities are governed by this relationship:  
[Heading] SHAPING CHOICES: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION In 
democratic systems public opinions of risk trade-offs are often key 
determinants of whether a technology is promoted or prohibited. Public 
preferences matter, since it is ultimately individuals and communities that stand 
to gain from change or to bear its costs. But views that dominate the global 
debate can lead to decisions that are not in the best interest of local 
communities. (UN Human Development Report, 2001, cwn, 2,745) 
This is the kind of representation of “why public preferences matter” that 
underpins neoliberal industry obligations to the public i.e. ‘the consumer is 
the ultimate arbiter of the acceptability of products’. This view of why 
public perceptions matter relies upon very strict definitions of people in 
specific contexts and relationships and also very strict definitions of their 
power to create or inhibit change in those relationships. BUT the 
“consumer” can only be an arbiter when the “product” is indeed in the form 
of a product at one of the latest stages of mediation. In other contexts, such 
as the ones where research is funded, regulated, or marginalised, the 
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“arbiters” are elite members of government and corporations. “Activists”, 
not consumers, is the term that is used to describe people who seek to enter 
into decision making processes in contexts when the “product” is not yet a 
“product”.  
This is problematic in quite significant ways. First, framing consumers as 
powerful arbiters of whether or not a technology is “accepted” (i.e. bought 
and consumed) does not at all acknowledge the wider political or ecological 
systems within which they are produced and consumed. Second, the 
presentation of the market as the primary space of moral action and 
engagement is a very narrow representation of the company’s relationship 
with “the rest of society” which ignores the various ways that a company 
seeks to create acceptance, to create future markets for future products. A 
market-as-medium-for-moral-exchange view does not even come close to 
recognising the social and political embeddedness of a company or the 
people that constitute the company.  
Third, the dominant presentation of industry responsibility does not 
acknowledge the multiple facets and political-ethical features of 
relationships. Rather, corporate responsibility – and the ‘benefits’ that 
accrue to the general public from biotechnology in the form of products – 
are mediated by and through the market. From this perspective, government 
policy makers apparently assume that it is, and ought to be, “the market” 
which constitutes the basis of moral engagement in our society and, as such, 
that the market can and should dictate the ethical, social, and economic 
outcomes of human interaction. 
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The market, marketing, and PR are hence construed as, mediating practices 
of ‘engagement’ or, more precisely, ethical engagement within the market 
context. Even policy makers have attributed “public opposition” and 
“distrust” to poor PR and marketing practice (!): 
The biotechnology industry is not unique in its corporate structures or 
commercial strategies. A similar process of concentration has seen the 
emergence of giant global corporations in many other sectors -electronics, 
automobiles, media, aircraft, pharmaceuticals and consumer electrical goods 
among others. Companies in other industries pursue market share and protect 
their intellectual property with the same vigour as biotechnology corporations 
but are seldom subject to the level of criticism directed at the latter. Where they 
are so criticized, the distinction between the possibly undesirable nature of 
some corporate practices and the beneficial character of the technology is 
readily appreciated. Few would suggest rolling back the revolution in 
information and communication technologies because of dislike of the power or 
policies of major electronics corporations. Nor should the advances in modern 
biotechnology be dismissed solely on these grounds. These points 
notwithstanding, the ethical issues raised by biotechnology differ in important 
ways from those associated with other industries. Heinz Imhof, president of 
Novartis Seeds, the leading Swiss biotechnology company, has acknowledged 
that companies had 'perhaps asked for trouble' in first introducing crops which, 
although beneficial to farmers, offered few benefits to consumers. A number of 
leading figures in the industry have since acknowledged that the introduction of 
GM crops and foods to the European market-place was not well handled.22 The 
companies concerned lost sight of the fact that, in a market economy, the 
consumer is the ultimate arbiter of the acceptability of products and did not take 
effective steps to address public concerns or convince consumers of the 
benefits of their products. (Ireland Modern Biotechnology Report, 2000, cwn. 
36,615) 
Interviewees generally attributed more agency to “the community” and “the 
general public” than authors of policy and education texts. The majority of 
interviewees acknowledged that “the community” has rights regarding 
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genetically modified organisms and that certain developments in 
biotechnology research and applications simply would not go ahead without 
community support. Interviewees used the terms community, public, and 
client/consumers interchangeably. Several scientists who displayed an 
interest in public awareness of biotechnology (some did not bring up the 
public or the community at all other than when questioned on responses to 
ethics) noted, though, that there needs to be a significant “information” 
and/or “education” campaign to inform non-scientist members of the public 
about what the technology involves, how it is used, what are its benefits, 
and what are the potential risks. One research team leader had interesting 
views on the non scientist community as opposed to his/her other main 
clients: growers. 
The growers seem to be quite accepting of GMOs. They are familiar with new 
plant variety, you know they have been introducing new plant varieties for 
years, and their Dads did, and they are just familiar with the concept of genetic 
improvement. They are a lot more familiar than the general public about the 
ways that you can go about modifying plants and improving plants to make 
them better and more productive and disease resistant. So generally the 
growers and people associated with the industry accept GMOs but they are 
also very concerned about the wider public acceptance of GMO, so now we are 
talking about the person we will bump into in the street or supermarket who are 
very ill informed about GMOs. Their concept of GMOs is what they saw in the 
latest X File movies, and they're concerned about things they don't understand, 
they are fearful maybe of things they don't understand, they don't trust 
scientists and they don't trust governments the way they used to and all of this I 
think has left a bit of a backlash in the community perceptions about GMO. 
(Centre Director, Research Project Leader, cwn. 2,109)  
This quote is significant for at least two reasons. First, this scientist, 
throughout the entire interview does not refer to discourses of jobs creation, 
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venture capital, economic growth, industry clustering as others who are 
involved in those contexts (e.g. research institute director, industry 
consultant) do. This scientist states that s/he is not involved in policy 
making and is not ‘in the circle of government funding’. This scientist 
orients more toward the agricultural discourses and the traditions of 
farming. S/he identifies two clients for this work: growers and consumers. 
S/he gives an account of why growers are more familiar with genetic 
modification: because they are familiar with genetic improvement and 
because their dads were also familiar with ‘genetic improvement’. 
Reference to the family involvement – specifically patriarchal inheritance of 
vocation and the family business – is a very specific formation, emic to 
farming.  
Second, the interviewee counterposes growers with “the general public”. 
S/he attributes “the general public” category with the following 
characteristics: 
- They are concerned about things they don’t understand; 
- Their concept of GMOs is what they saw in the last X Files movie; 
- They are the kind of person you would bump into in the street or the 
supermarket (i.e. in public spaces not in labs or restricted spheres of 
engagement and authority); 
- They are very ill informed about GMOs; 
- They are fearful maybe of things they don’t understand; 
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- They don’t trust scientists; 
- They don’t trust governments the way they used to; 
As with the policy documents discussed above, this interviewee presents 
“the general public” as being situated within very specific social contexts 
that are apparently separate from the contexts in which biotechnology 
“happens”: the street and the supermarket. The growers by contrast are 
located in contexts where ‘genetic improvement’ is a family tradition. There 
is no recognition that the ‘everyday’ person you bump into in the street may 
also be an ecologist, hairdresser, lawyer, doctor, gardener, father, mother, 
sister, whatever. There is no recognition that this is the person who might 
frequent the court house, the council chambers, the bedroom, the stock 
market, the hospital, the environment, or the theatre. There is no recognition 
that the grower is also someone who shares these spaces, as may the 
scientist. The interviewee presents a stereotypical view of “the general 
public’s” attitudes toward GMOs. The presentation of distrust is also 
significant in that it taps into established discourses on social capital where 
the community’s lack of trust is presented as its own problem, its own fault 
so to speak. The historical and systemic origins of distrust are thus not 
acknowledged or addressed.  
Representations of ‘the community’ and ‘the general public’ are more subtle 
in policy texts than in the confidential interviews. This is consistent with 
Graham’s observation that ‘the hortatory content of contemporary policy is 
often implied in, disguised as, rationalised by, or buried under piles of 
ostensibly “value-free”, “objective”, pseudo-scientific statements of fact 
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(Lemke, 1995, pp. 60-61; McKenna and Graham, 1999). Moreover, policy 
texts are usually longer, they are premeditated, edited, censored, researched; 
they are a public document that is written in third person and attributed an 
institutional author and bureaucratic anonymity. Attributions and 
evaluations of a particular group are usually spread across the document. 
The 1998 Canadian Biotechnology Policy provides an example: 
[Heading] BUILDING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE AND AWARENESS, AND 
COMMUNICATING ACCURATE, BALANCED, EASY-TO-UNDERSTAND 
INFORMATION TO CANADIANS [] Public opinion surveys and focus group 
tests suggest that, relative to people in other industrialized countries, 
Canadians have a comparatively high level of interest in and acceptance of 
biotechnology. However, Canadians' detailed knowledge of biotechnology is 
limited. Most important, the public wants assurance that biotechnology products 
and services are safe for humans, animals and the environment. Consultation 
participants stressed: using credible sources such as government, health care 
professionals, scientists, educators and NGOs to convey information 
recognizing the difficulties of conveying science-based information in a 
thoughtful, understandable manner to reduce the potential for misinformation 
increasing the visibility of regulatory processes, providing support for the 
communication of regulatory matters, including risks and benefits, to the public 
to "de-mystify" regulatory operations, and better explaining of how they function 
and protect the public interest explaining more proactively the issues 
surrounding food labelling and Canada's current policy. Possible actions: work 
with public and private sector partners to coordinate and enhance respective 
information and public education functions develop a comprehensive, 
coordinated communications strategy to inform Canadians about the regulatory 
system and other biotechnology-related activity articulate and promote the CBS 
vision in Canada and abroad encourage biotechnology companies and/ or 
industry associations to work with customers and stake-holders to develop 
voluntary codes of practice for use in Canada and abroad (Canadian 
Biotechnology Strategy, 1998, cwn. 5,455) 
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This is a complex passage. There are two hedges/qualifiers before the 
statement that Canadians have a ‘high level of interest and acceptance’ of 
biotechnology. The first hedge is ‘suggests that’ the second is ‘relative to 
other industrialised countries’. Further information, while seemingly adding 
to the quantitative validity and factual nature of the statement, actually 
discredits it by saying that these same Canadians, who exhibit a high level 
of interest in and acceptance of biotechnology, do not understand it. It is not 
informed interest or acceptance. While the data cited by the Canadian policy 
makers may or may not be correct, I would argue that the actual presentation 
of the data, the sequence, tonality, and grammar, change the meaning, 
orientation, and overall impact of the text significantly. Moreover, the 
phrase ‘the public wants assurance’ pacifies the ‘public’ into a meek thing 
merely wanting assurance from the experts that everything is going to be ok. 
This is also an inaccurate presentation of the range of public attitudes and 
orientations toward biotechnology. It assumes that biotechnology is going 
ahead, that all is well, and the public merely needs to be informed of this. 
This theme recurs later in the passage with the repeated use of one way 
communication process eg ‘inform’, ‘educate’ ‘convey information’, ‘the 
communication of’, ‘de-mystify’, ‘explain’ . It is interesting also that when 
the government text gets to the point of talking about industry/company 
interactions with the ‘public’ they again become consumers.  
Magazine articles and some “public education” documents (brochures, 
fliers, websites, reports) are not so subtle as policy. The following quote is 
taken from an information brochure titled ‘Genetically Modified Foods in 
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Africa’. The document is co-produced by the San Diego Center for 
Molecular Agriculture (see www.sdcma.org for more information) and 
AfricaBio. AfricaBio describes itself as a “nonprofit, nonpolitical 
biotechnology association”. AfricaBio sets a clear hierarchy of categories of 
people with more and less desirable attributes/attitudes toward 
biotechnology: 
The agricultural scientists and farmers all over the world who improve our crops 
are the true heroes of our time… Most of us know very little about the way our 
food plants are grown and are far removed from the factories where they are 
processed. All we care about is that our food be wholesome, nutritious, and 
tasty. Critics of crop biotechnology are of the opinion that potential ecological 
and food safety disasters are looming on the horizon because genetically 
improved (GI) or genetically modified (GM) crops have entered the food chain. 
Alarmists have introduced emotionally charged terms into the debate and 
speak of "frankenfoods" and "genetic pollution." The debate that rages in 
Europe has now reached Africa. This debate has important consequences for 
us in Africa where many countries have limited arable soil and extreme 
climates. (Foods from Genetically Improved Crops in Africa, San Diego Center 
for Molecular Agriculture &AfricaBio, 2001, cwn. 694) 
Categories presented in this passage include the following: ‘agricultural 
scientists and farmers’ who are the ‘true heroes of our time’; ‘most of us’ 
who know very little about the way our food plants are grown; ‘all of us’ 
who only care about our food being wholesome, nutritious, and tasty; 
‘critics of crop biotechnology’ who see disasters looming on the horizon; 
‘alarmists’ who have introduced ‘emotionally charged’ terms into the 
debate; and ‘us in Africa’ who will be affected by the critics of crop 
biotechnology and the alarmists and who have ‘limited arable soil and 
extreme climates’.  
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This one passage, out of an educational booklet, provides not only 
information on who the author sees as being involved, or being 
‘stakeholders’ in debates over GM foods in Africa, but also attributes very 
specific ideological categories and characteristics to each of the stakeholder 
groups without modalisation. For example the scientists and farmers ARE 
the true heroes of our time, just as “surely” as ‘critics of crop biotechnology’ 
are of the [apparently singular] opinion that disasters are “looming”. The 
only other instances of such blatant and unabashed stereotyping of actors in 
the texts comes from media articles and opinion pieces.  
The rhetorical demarcation of ‘industry’ as distinct 
from ‘community’ 
Defined contexts and roles for ‘industry’ 
The following article excerpt taken from a pharmaceutical industry 
magazine illustrates a different representation of who benefits from 
biotechnology. It is produced by, and intended for, a different audience than 
policy. To start with, the article’s author quotes the voice of pharmaceutical 
company CEO Joshua Boger as a hero and expert in this context. Note, in 
particular, the positive focus in the article given to the increased speed of 
drug development. Note, also, the way that Boger attributes value: 
As Joshua Boger, CEO and founder of global biotechnology company Vertex 
Pharmaceuticals, surmises, the industrialization of drug discovery means 
"better drugs faster." Vertex Pharmaceuticals is considered an icon of 
industrialized drug discovery. The company recently signed one of the most 
lucrative drug discovery alliances in the history of biotechnology with Novartis, 
resulting in $800 million in research funding. This will provide eight new drugs 
for Novartis, and drug royalties for Vertex.  
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"Too often, companies are concerned with the rate at which they screen small 
molecule drugs for their clinical relevance rather than focusing on the quality of 
the leads they generate and the validity of the biology behind the assays they 
use," explains Boger. He adds that the industry average for the generation of 
new small molecule drugs to reach the point of human testing takes about five 
years, but that Vertex is now able to do this in three-and-a-half years.  
"We have combined a variety of techniques within our own research culture, 
which is the actual design of drugs to fit disease targets," Boger says. Vertex 
departs from many of its peers by coupling high-throughput screening of large 
libraries of compounds with the design of such candidates prior to screening…  
Thanks to industrialization, chemotherapeutic and biologic drugs are now 
produced at much faster rates than have historically been possible. While the 
enabling technologies behind this transformation may differ, the implication is 
the same - the pace and reliability of drug discovery has accelerated fast 
enough to disrupt the competitive landscape of the health-care industry. 
(Parker, 2002, cwn. 691) 
There are a number of insights we can gain from this passage. First, 
biotechnology is characterised as the positive “industrialisation” of formerly 
slow, conventional, and inefficient means of producing pharmaceuticals and 
health care products. In this way biotechnology is separated from other non-
industrialised areas of scientific research. Second, the primary benefit of 
industrialisation according to this passage is the speed with which drugs and 
other health care products can be manufactured. Third, the primary 
benefactors of industrialisation of science in the form of biotechnology as 
represented in this passage are the companies who manufacture or own 
licenses for them, in this case, Novartis and Vertex. Fourth, additional 
benefactors, for example patients, health care professionals, “consumers” 
are not signified as “stakeholders” or beneficiaries of biotechnology 
research and commercialisation in this discourse or context. 
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Defined contexts and roles for ‘community’ 
There is considerable mention of what is ‘acceptable’ to the community or 
the public or consumers throughout the corpus but consumers and investors 
or the general public are not represented in contexts where partnerships or 
collaborations occur between science and business. In a now well known 
two step flow, the public is informed that we (note global use of “we” and 
“our” to promote collective ownership and responsibility) need to “grasp” 
biotechnology to promote ‘prosperity’, ‘well being’, ‘industrial 
competitiveness’, ‘economic growth’, ‘economic and environmental 
sustainability’, a ‘higher standard of living’, ‘human development’, 
‘innovative farming, production, and manufacturing’. The research scientists 
I interviewed, though, were more likely to make a direct link between 
biotechnology and the general standard of living, a cure for a particular 
disease, crops in third world countries etc: they did not generally insert the 
two step flow between product development or industrial/economic 
competitiveness and standard of living.  
The utility (citizenry) value of supporting biotechnology research is often 
foregrounded in Australian Government policy documents.  
In New South Wales:  
Through the strategies outlined in Biofirst 2001 the benefits to the people of 
NSW will be maximised. (NSW Government Biofirst Strategy Statement, 2001, 
cwn. 127) 
In Queensland: 
 215 
Like you, I am obsessed with the immense potential biotechnology has to 
improve our quality of life and to create a future for our children. (Beattie, 1999)  
In Victoria: 
Biotechnology is regarded as one of the keys to Victoria's future prosperity with 
the potential to generate enormous economic, health and environmental 
benefits. (Department of Innovation, Industry and Regional Development, 
Victoria, 2002, cwn. 6). 
Apart from claiming broad utility benefits for all Australians, the 
Commonwealth Government’s 2001 strategy Backing Australia’s Ability 
sets down a particular “challenge” for all Australians: 
We invite all Australians to join in this exciting era. A great challenge now exists 
for the community at large, and in particular those in business and the research 
sector, to capitalise on the opportunities created. Together, we can continue to 
build a nation where innovation and excellence thrives. (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2001, cwn. 402) 
Public private partnerships are acknowledged but in an uncritical way. It 
seems that the Commonwealth Government is following on from the 
rhetorical strategies Beattie used in the 1999 statements on Queensland the 
Smart State and Queensland the Biotechnology Hub of Australia. The 
rationale is that the scientific expertise and intellectual capital in 
biotechnology already exists, the government will merely give 
biotechnology scientists the support they deserve for being ‘innovative’. In 
2001 the Australian Commonwealth Government had proceeded to a policy 
rationale of supporting the existing bases of biotechnology expertise in the 
country a la  
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Backing Australia’s Ability commits substantial additional money to the 
significant funding my Government already provides for science, research and 
innovation. This is evidence of our determination to back innovative Australians, 
build on known strengths, explore new opportunities and compete successfully 
with the best the world has to offer. It recognises that through the efforts of our 
scientists, researchers and entrepreneurial business leaders, all Australians will 
prosper. The Government believes that the strategy marks a significant step in 
harnessing the collective talent, energy and resources of all those dedicated to 
securing Australia’s economic future, both within and outside Government. It 
represents a commitment to pursue excellence in research, science and 
technology, to build an even more highly skilled workforce and increase 
opportunities for the commercialisation of new ideas—in essence it is about 
backing Australia’s ability (Commonwealth Government, 2001, cwn. 203).  
The authors of these policy documents do not identify exactly how the 
people of Australia, New South Wales, or Queensland will benefit through 
biotechnology. Pictures of everyday people are not really featured in the 
policy documents analysed. They are featured though in other contexts, 
specifically pharmaceutical company advertisements and health care 
advertisements and information.  
People in the virtuous cycle: The politics of 
representation 
To pull out some of the core aspects of biotechnology in terms of what the 
technologies are, who the agents are, what are the objects, processes, and 
outcomes of the technology, I have gathered a range of explanations of what 
biotechnology actually is from the corpus. The full list of explanations I 
have included in the tables below are listed in Appendix A. The following 
three analysis tables provide more clarity of the range of subjects, processes, 
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and objects being presented at three different levels of social interaction in 
relation to biotechnology research and commercialisation:  
 Government and politicians - public documents;  
 Non government publicly funded research organisations and 
institutions - public documents;  
 Individual scientists and practitioners’ - interview transcripts.  
The explanations of biotechnology are divided into five columns: 
Outcomes; Processes; Technologies; Agents; and Objects. Outcomes refer to 
what is produced or actualised through biotechnology (for example bread, 
cheese, beer). Processes refer to the action that is being carried out (for 
example using, manipulating, enhancing). Technologies refer to what is 
being used to produce the outcome (for example knowledge, genetic 
techniques). Agents are the persons or things that are presented as using the 
technologies or who conduct actions (Science, scientists, technology). 
Objects refer to the object of the technology, what is subject to action or 
transformation (for example flour, animals, embryos). 
The purpose of the tables is to make explicit the categories of persons, 
objects, processes, and things that are routinely defined as being central to 
the practice of biotechnology. While I do not assume that these explanations 
are in and of themselves sufficient to map out the complexity of the practice 
of biotechnology, both the formulated and semi or un formulated 
explanations offered by the various institutions and individual scientists are 
relevant as concentrated representations of what biotechnology is to 
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individual practitioners and/or what it is represented to others as being. The 
differences between the explanatory content and orientations at various 
levels is also a very cogent introduction to the diverse functioning, 
representation, and evaluation of biotechnology in different contexts.
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Table 3 Government 
departments’ and politicians’ 
explanations of biotechnology 
    
Outcomes 
(The end or product) 
 Industrial processes 
 Useful organisms and 
their products 
 Foods and medicines 
 The reduction of wastes 
 Renewable energy 
sources 
 Things for humans 
 A food product 
 Goods and services 
 Yoghurt 
 Beer, bread, and cheese 
 Medicines, foods and 
energy sources 
 Animals and plants with 
specific characteristics 
 Health, social, 
environmental or 
economic applications or 
outcomes 
 New products and new 
industrial processes 
Processes  
(the action or what is done) 
 Using  
(The use of) 
 Developing  
(The development of) 
 Producing  
(The production of) 
 Reducing  
(The reduction of) 
 Creating  
(The creation of) 
 Fermenting  
(to ferment) 
 Pursuing  
(Pursue the understanding and 
use of) 
 Understanding  
(Pursue the understanding of) 
 Breeding  
(Animal and plant) 
 Applying  
(The application of) 
 Making  
(To make) 
Technologies  
(what is used as means to…) 
 Biological discoveries 
 Yeast 
 Active micro-organisms 
 Living organisms 
 Bacteria 
 Fermentation processes 
 Organisms and biological 
processes 
 Techniques ranging from 
molecular and cellular 
biology, biochemistry and 
immunology through to 
biological applications of 
information technology 
(IT). 
 Knowledge about living 
organisms and their 
components 
Agents 
(Who acts, who uses the 
technologies) 
 A group of 
technologies 
Objects 
(What is acted upon or 
subjected to technological 
intervention) 
 Wastes 
 Dough 
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Table 4 Research Institutions’ 
explanations of biotechnology 
    
Outcomes 
(The end or product) 
 Products 
 Modified Products 
 Improved plants and 
animals 
 Micro-organisms for 
specific use 
 Bread 
 Cheese 
 Beer 
Processes  
(the action or what is done) 
 Applying 
(The application of) 
 Making  
(To make or modify) 
 Modifying 
(To make or modify) 
 Developing 
(To develop) 
 Changing  
(To make or change) 
 Baking 
 Making 
 Developing 
(the development of) 
 Producing 
(Production) 
 Using practically  
(Any practical or commercial 
use of living organisms) 
 Using 
 
Technologies  
(what is used as means to…) 
 Living organisms 
 Substances from living 
organisms 
 Biological systems 
 Living things 
 A biological process 
 Intact organisms eg 
yeasts and bacteria 
 Natural substances (eg. 
Enzymes) from 
organisms 
 A biological process 
 Yeast 
Agents 
(Who acts, who uses the 
technologies) 
 
 
Zero representation 
Objects 
(What is acted upon or 
subjected to technological 
intervention) 
 
Zero representation 
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Table 5 Interviewees’ 
explanations of biotechnology     
Outcomes 
(The end or product) 
 Products 
 A result 
 Products and processes 
 other organisms or 
mechanisms 
 chemicals, foods, etc 
 new organisms with 
different structures 
 Genetic change for 
example molecular 
markers 
 Human application or 
plant application or food 
 Health care applications 
– both veterinary and 
human 
 [improved] biological 
systems 
 Agriculture or medicine 
 Human endeavour 
Processes  
(the action or what is done) 
 Manufacturing ‘The 
manufacture of’ 
 Using ‘Using biological 
organisms’ 
 Producing ‘The 
production of’ 
 Creating ‘The creation 
of’ 
 Changing ‘Genetic 
change for’ 
 Utilising ‘Utilising 
biological information 
and biological systems’ 
 Improving ‘Improvement 
of’ 
 Manipulating 
‘Manipulating genes’ 
 Relating ‘Technology 
related to recombinant 
DNA’ 
 Enabling ‘Enabling 
technologies’ 
 Applying ‘The 
application of biological 
systems’ 
Technologies  
(what is used as means to 
achieve desired outcome) 
 Biological organisms 
 Biological means 
 Biologicals 
 DNA 
 Biological information 
and biological systems 
 Natural organisms or 
mechanisms 
 Genes 
 Gene technology 
 Biological techniques 
 Manipulation 
 Modern molecular tools 
 Molecular markers 
 Anything that is science 
based 
 Enabling technologies 
 Fermentation reactors 
 Tissue culture 
 Plant tissue cultures 
 Gene technology 
 Human endeavour 
Agents 
(Who acts, who uses the 
technologies) 
 
 
Zero representation 
Objects 
(What is acted upon or 
subjected to technological 
intervention) 
 Biological systems or 
organisms 
 Genes 
 Species  
 Kingdom barriers 
 Fields of agriculture or 
medicine 
 Any sort of field of 
human endeavour 
 Studies in plant 
physiology or 
applications in plant 
improvement 
 Biological sciences 
 A chemical/product 
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Object vs. agent: Of mice and men 
…eponymy undeniably pervades the language scientists use to talk 
about the history of their research organisms. Just as any chemist might 
refer to ‘Boyle’s air pump’ or any engineer might speak of ‘Edison’s 
light bulb’, for example, biologists typically speak of ‘Morgan’s flies’, 
‘Brenner’s worms’, and ‘Wistar rats’ as kind of shorthand for the 
process (actually involving many people) that brought these creatures 
into their laboratories. (Rader, 1999, p. 319) 
As the above tables indicate, persons and other living beings who are 
rendered vulnerable in relation to contemporary biotechnology have 
arguably fallen to the same fate as mice in science – at least in the official 
discourses. Within the history of science the ‘case study’ genre has 
traditionally ‘subordinated research materials [organisms] to the careers of 
the individuals who developed them and their institutional settings’ (Clarke, 
1987, p. 323). Likewise, the people or other living beings who are changed, 
mediated, or mined by the technologies, whether they be genetic screening, 
genetic ‘enhancement’, therapeutics, diagnostics, vaccines, skin transplant, 
whatever, are literally not in the picture in this corpus. As part of the 
orientational or evaluative function of language, authors implicitly or 
explicitly attribute [moral] agency to things, persons, processes. Agency is a 
significant variable in biotechnology discourses as has been highlighted 
throughout this chapter. There are several groups that have not been 
represented in the corpus or have been represented but without agency. 
Their value is derived through their instrumental use value to humans.  
Where the object of a technology is person or potential person with a 
particular genetic disease for example, that person, like the lab mice above, 
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is rendered invisible. Likewise, where the outcome of the technology is a 
person or potential person, as in assisted reproductive technology or 
cloning, that living person, as both object and outcome of the technology, is 
also rendered invisible. The objects of biotechnology are consistently not 
represented across the three contexts mapped in the above tables. The 
outcomes of the technology though are represented, but they are only 
presented in a positivistic sense: that is, in terms of beneficial 
transformation, enhancement, or efficiency. Unlike the mice and men 
example in the history of science, both the scientist and the objects and the 
human outcomes of the technology are portrayed as being secondary to the 
technology itself. 
As indicated in various sections of the thesis, these persons or other living 
beings are presented variously as ‘living organisms’; ‘research organisms’; 
‘production animals’; ‘genetic resources’; ‘natural resources’; and so on. 
There are only three mentions of abortion or termination of pregnancy 
related to genetic testing in the thesis corpus and only one of these indicates 
that this may be of ethical, social significance: i.e. that parents may feel 
pressured to terminate a pregnancy if a genetic disease or “abnormality” is 
detected in an unborn embryo/foetus/child. What is not being said is that 
prenatal genetic testing is not a ‘treatment’ or ‘cure’ for the unborn child or 
his or her parents. It is a method of identifying genetic traits in unborn 
children who may be terminated if they are found to have x, y, or z genes.  
Furthermore, the representation of living with disability or inherited disease 
as a way of being (cf. Campbell, 2002; Clapton, 2002), or even the 
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acknowledgement that persons currently live with disability, is zero except 
for the New Zealand Independent Biotechnology Advisory Council’s 
Information Booklet. This booklet is the only document in the entire corpus 
of publicly available texts that refers to the basic human rights of, and 
potential genetic discrimination against, persons as a result of genetic 
“abnormalities” or hereditary diseases. 
Biotechnology and non humans 
As the previous section has explored, while some agents in biotechnology 
are simply not represented at all, others are presented as if they are not 
agents but objects of the technology. This is particularly the case for non 
human living species. The thesis corpus consistently portrays animals and 
the natural environment are nothing other than economic resources to be 
exploited for human use, benefit, or wealth creation. This is once again an 
example of how biotechnology functions as a time medium by reproducing 
historically salient ways of seeing in new times. While it is not new, the 
recasting of all living things as being of potential human or, more 
specifically, commercial use value is an underpinning assumption not only 
of the “biotechnology age”. The sheer extent to which official discourses on 
biotechnology perpetuate an instrumental view of animals and the non 
human environment – despite considerable developments in animal rights 
and environmental sustainability discourse – is very significant.  
Throughout the corpus there was only one reference to the intrinsic value of 
animals and the natural environment in a Swedish policy document. Other 
references to the potential for animal suffering were located within the 
 225 
broader assumption that it is still acceptable to conduct genetic experiments 
on animals and that we should do so precisely because it brings some form 
of human “benefit”. The following quote from the Managing Director of a 
company that produces human and animal diagnostics provides an example 
of how human benefit presides over animal welfare: 
I will just give you an example, we have done the calculation last year 1.5 
million people were touched by our blood clot diagnostic product, even though 
the blood samples that were tested, the results affected their outcome. We 
have over two and a half million dogs and cats that were tested worldwide with 
our products to affect their outcome, be it that they got a better treatment, that 
they survived or whatever other decision was made for the benefit of the owner. 
So that is a feel good for the people here and that probably motivates the 
people here, the 70 people that work here full time that probably motivates 
them more than anything else… (Interview transcript, company Managing 
Director, cwn 7,993, italics added) 
The terms most frequently used to describe the benefits of genetically 
engineering ‘production animals’ include increased animal productivity; 
decreased animal wastage; increased disease resistance; and increased 
animal efficiency. This terminology was particularly evident in interview 
transcripts with research scientists in the CSIRO. Even the different 
categories of animals identified in the corpus send a message: that is, 
“production animals” versus “companion animals”. This discourse on 
animal productivity orients toward the “primary producer” context on 
biotechnology where more meat and less fat are important characteristics in 
an animal. Likewise an animal that can be genetically engineered or 
selectively bred to be more heat and stress resistant is a bonus for farmers 
who freight their “stock” on trucks or cargo ships. There are exceptions 
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though that should be noted. Some areas of biotechnology are designed 
specifically for bioremediation and environmental preservation rather than 
strictly human “use”. 
I posit that all of the implicit assumptions regarding animals and the non 
human environment in official discourses on biotechnology can have wider 
implications. This is not least due to the fact that biotechnology is being 
taught in schools and universities; is discussed on television and other mass 
media outlets almost daily; and is the focus of much of Australia’s – along 
with most other country’s – science and technology policy. With the advent 
and propagation of genetic technologies since the 1970s, and the ensuing 
“race” by multinational companies to secure the intellectual property and 
financial benefits arising out of the technology, we have moved into an 
expanded realm of commercial dominance. We have also introduced new or 
expanded bio-technologised notions of what is “natural”, innovative, and 
desirable in human life. 
We are now, arguably, witness to a time where the notion of what is 
“natural” itself is being redefined by the use of modern genetic technologies. 
Human ability to genetically engineer other species and themselves involves 
a fundamental ontological and epistemological challenge to standard ways 
of seeing and being within the now wider socio-political world of nature and 
society. This is not to say that discourses of nature have never been guided 
by socio-political phenomena. Of course our understandings of nature are 
regulated by discourse which is itself a social process of meaning making 
and sharing. But beyond that realm of our own “sense” of nature is where 
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the changes mediated through biotechnologies are occurring: That is, the 
fundamental structures of living things are being altered in a more precise 
and invasive way to accord with human desires. As such, these technologies 
have fundamental implications for a range of human relationships both with 
the human and non human world. In Escobar’s words: 
…we might be witnessing – in the wake of unprecedented intervention 
into nature at the molecular level – the final decline of the moderm 
ideology of naturalism, that is, the belief in the existence of pristine 
Nature outside of history and human context. (Escobar, 1999, p. 2) 
As the previous analysis chapters have highlighted, current policy 
discourses on biotechnology function to obfuscate and remove agency from 
humans who are rendered vulnerable in relation to new technologies and 
non human living beings by making them simultaneously materials, objects, 
and sites of capital production.  
Agency as it stands in the dominant technical and economic discourses of 
biotechnology today is a strictly human domain. Current discourses 
surrounding biotechnology research and commercialisation produce, 
reproduce, and rely upon already prevalent dualisms in modern western 
thought. This becomes even more interesting when we look at the discourse 
to see how these dualisms are invoked to allow/justify further colonisation 
of the natural world. In effect, these dualisms, like many other features of 
powerful economic and technocratic discourse, help us not to think critically 
or in a complex, appreciative way about human and non human others. 
What is significant about recombinant gene technology, as opposed to any 
other historical form of human manipulation and domination, is that 
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“nature” or more particularly what is “non-human” can now be more 
fundamentally altered, manipulated, engineered by humans toward the 
achievement of human wants, needs, or desires. These wants, needs, and 
desires driving biotechnology research, funding, and commercialisation 
opportunities are not being determined in an open or democratic process. 
The intersection of economic and political agendas obviously has a 
powerful voice in determining what/how these wants, needs, and desires are 
represented and actualised.  
Dualism and colonisation 
The table below combines the major dualisms of western thought 
(Plumwood, 1993) with the thematic results of the pilot analysis. The table 
shows that official biotechnology discourses rely upon and reproduce a 
number of dualisms constructed by Plumwood in order to make the claims it 
does about the value and logic of developments in bio/gene technology. As 
you will see, this is more complex than a mere human-nature split. 
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“Good” positive 
Subject 
Plus Agency 
“Bad” negative 
Object 
Minus Agency 
Biotechnology manifestation 
Anthropocentrism  Biocentrism  Technological imperative, means to ends  
Subject  Object  Use of living organisms, also humans objectifying themselves 
as object of study/production "we can take a look at ourselves 
too"  
“understanding of = control over” 
Rationality  Animality  Controlled reproduction, or ‘rational reproduction’ 
Culture  Nature  Defining culturally desirable attributes, eugenics  
Reason  Nature  Common manifestation: "Understanding of and control over 
living organisms and processes" (Independent Biotechnology 
Advisory Council, IBAC, 2000)  
Mind  Body  "…we’ll be able to take a closer look at ourselves too" 
(Biotechnology Australia, BA, 2000)  
Master  Slave  Engineering other species to be more efficient, productive etc 
for human benefit (CSIRO Tropical Agriculture Division); 
xenotransplantation, spare parts for humans 
Animal experimentation 
Reason  Matter (physicality)  "…we’ll be able to take a closer look at ourselves too" 
(BA)  
“engineering” 
Reason  Emotion  "Some people fear the creation of Frankenstein-like monsters! 
Much of this fear comes from a lack of understanding of the 
science". (BA)  
Mind, spirit  Nature  Control; precision; engineering; anthro-biocentrism 
Freedom  Necessity  Pressure on parents to consent to genetic screening and 
possible termination for ‘faulty’ embryos; embryo selection; 
eugenics  
Narrowing of down evaluative options in public discourse 
GM Foods – labelling 
Universal  Particular  Normality over "abnormality" for example striving to 
“eradicate” Down’s Syndrome 
Human  Non-human  Microbe world a "plague" on humanity (BA) 
Anthropocentrism and the technological imperative 
Civilised  Primitive  "Our new knowledge of gene technology will enable us to 
change exact characteristics without years of complicated, hit-
and-miss breeding programs" (BA).  
 
“catch evolution red-handed” (US National Academy of 
Science, 2001) 
Production  Reproduction  Genetic engineering; human "spare parts" taken from 
organisms with pig-human genes, xenotransplantation, 
embryo selection  
“catch evolution red-handed” (US National Academy of 
Science, 2001) 
Public  Private  DNA profile databases; intellectual property — private 
ownership of genetic material for plants, animals and humans  
Self  Other  Parents selecting embryos based on their own preferences, 
rights, or desires; cloning in one’s image = strict uniformity 
and narrowing of range of biological resources 
Table 6: Dualism and colonisation 
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Dualism is also used as a rhetorical strategy in defining and objectifying 
certain groups of people in the biotechnology “debate”. As the following 
analysis will show, stereotypes play a significant role in the politics of 
representation surrounding biotechnology research and commercialisation. 
Stereotypes are a feature of all genres of engagement surrounding 
biotechnology including the mass media, interpersonal, conferences, policy 
documents, interview transcripts, public education documents, and 
corporate strategy. Stereotypes are significant to dis-engagement because 
they are literally shortcuts to interpretation: they help us not to think, 
understand, or appreciate. Stereotypes misdirect us from a truer 
appreciation, or range of appreciations, of a person, process, or thing in our 
daily engagements with persons, living and non living ‘things’. Perhaps 
most significantly for ethical engagement, a stereotype requires generic 
evaluations and attributions that characterise the stereotype over time: 
Stereotypes are genres of identity.  
Dualistic stereotypes, like silence, language, and ethics, are a fundamentally 
social phenomenon (cf. Goffman, 1972). Stereotypes are closely linked to 
the normative expectations that surround social roles: What we do, how we 
do it, what we value, what we don’t value in our different social roles 
(Goffman, 1972). A common role stereotype is the private-public 
distinction. There are certain ways we behave in public and certain ways we 
behave in private. Common ideational categories in biotechnology 
discourses include ‘the scientist’; ‘the activist’; ‘the industrialist’; ‘the 
entrepreneur’; ‘the ethicist’; ‘the uniformed public’. In telling us what we 
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should be interested in, and responsible for, a stereotype or role also tells us 
what we should not be interested in or responsible for.  
Thus stereotypes, like university disciplines, function politically to maintain 
a division of labour between various areas of social inquiry. For example, 
between ethics and science, science and business, economics and society, 
accounting and science, politics and policy, etcetera. Someone who is 
concerned with economic growth does not, for instance, ostensibly have to 
concern him or herself with the intrinsic, as opposed to commercial, value 
of scientific research as a social science. When stereotypical demarcations 
are made between areas of social inquiry such as those listed above, one or 
other of the two “opposites” is portrayed as being superior. This happens 
within specific contexts. A context such as the stock market, for example, 
engenders different assumptions regarding the intrinsic value of scientific 
research than would a university research institute.  
The dominant modes of evaluation and the perceived function of the 
practices and contexts are significant to which of the supposed opposites is 
presented as being “rational”, “reasonable”, “desirable”, “virtuous”, or 
“correct”. There are “overlays” of superordinate dichotomies over other 
dichotomies that function not just as shortcuts to interpretation, but as 
shortcuts to evaluation and ethical response or non response.  
The superordinate dichotomies of evaluation of any given point in history 
define a social system (Lemke, 1995, p. 13). The persistent superordinate 
dichotomy is a classificatory good-bad distinction. The rhetorical function 
of creating dichotomies of good-bad is to prize one of the “opposites” over 
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the other: That is one option is attributed with intrinsic value and superiority 
while the other is presented as the evil undesirable opposite (Metzner, 
1988). The superordinate dichotomies of evaluation as articulated in policy 
discourse on western biotechnology include: for profit-not for profit; 
rational-emotional; industrial-non industrial; innovative-conventional;  
These potent demarcations get interesting in biotechnology when we have 
hybrid roles such as the research director of a university centre who has 
agreed to work toward commercialising research, economic productivity, 
and goals for state employment. This is the same person who is asked to sit 
in the NHMRC ethics committee, speak at public discussion forums, and 
make statements that address public concerns surrounding biotechnology. I 
have directly observed that, for some people involved in biotechnology 
practices, multiple roles, expectations, and responsibilities make it hard for 
them to express their thoughts honestly in a public setting. This is because 
a) their thoughts may conflict with the normative assumptions that surround 
their official position or role; b) their thoughts may conflict with the 
normative assumptions of the tradition, organisation, or social practice they 
are a part of.  
At each recontextualisation the defined benefits of biotechnology, and the 
agents who are benefited, are represented in different ways. This is very 
important not least because it shows that different contexts bring out 
different permutations of what seem to be the same “goods”, values, or 
evaluative orientations. The differences between for example what a 
research scientist will say, and what is presented in a policy text, reiterates 
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that different social practices can appear to be pursuing the same values, 
beliefs, etc but may be acting out different value sets and propositions.  
Further, policy statements are generically very different to a scientist’s 
narrative or an activist’s narrative: Governments try to present a case for the 
people, for all of the people. A functional way to do this is to appeal to 
generic standards such as “quality of life”, “economic efficiency”, or “jobs 
creation”. But, although there are many we’s and our’s included in the 
Commonwealth excerpt, neither the Australian public (investors included) 
nor the scientists themselves, are the ones who are realising this potential 
promise according to the scenario portrayed in this policy text. Rather, it is 
the personified but simultaneously transcendent “bio technology” who is 
‘promising’, ‘presenting’ and ‘bringing’ change and prosperity to “us”.  
The ‘anti-biotechnologists’ and ‘scientists’ 
The ‘anti biotechnology community’ 
‘The reason why we should be concerned about the minority that 
espouses anti-science sentiments is that many of these individuals are 
often better educated, more articulate and more committed to their 
particular views than the average citizen. A significant number of them 
are university educated (though of course they tend to hold degrees in 
the humanities). More importantly, they frequently occupy influential 
positions within the social, educational and political establishments 
where they are able to wield a degree of political power that is out of all 
proportion to their number. This contemporary dissatisfaction with 
science finds expression in two other phenomena characteristic of the 
late 20th Century. One is a dramatic resurgence of fundamentalist 
attitudes and beliefs, many of which are either self consciously anti-
science or actively seek to constrain its activities in radical ways; the 
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other is marked by the emergence of philosophies of despair among 
intellectual élites within the humanities’ (Dunbar, 1996, p. 5). 
As an example of the extremes to which the politics of representation may 
flow, Vandana Shiva is used as an example of ‘biotechnology opponents’ in 
the quotation below: 
The apparent willingness of biotechnology’s opponents to sacrifice people for 
their cause disturbs scientists who are trying to help the world’s poor. At the 
annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
last February, Ismail Serageldin, the director of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research, posed a challenge: "I ask opponents of 
biotechnology, do you want 2 to 3 million children a year to go blind and 1 
million to die of vitamin A deficiency, just because you object to the way golden 
rice was created?" Vandana Shiva is not alone in her disdain for 
biotechnology’s potential to help the poor… (Why we Should Learn to Stop 
Worrying and Love Genetically Modified Food, By Ronald Bailey, Reason 
Magazine, January 2, 2001, cwn. 579) 
The rhetorical strategies used in this passage are quite obvious and common 
in the popular media and some interpersonal exchanges at conferences and 
seminars I have attended. The primary rhetorical strategy is to position 
categories of actors in opposition to one another and attribute more and less 
favourable moral-ethical-political characteristics and motivations to those 
categories. Even the labels applied to categories serve a forensic rhetorical 
function. For example, “opponents” of biotechnology are referred to as 
“activists”, “environmental groups”, “critics”, “anti-biotechnologists” and, 
perhaps most interestingly, “the anti-biotechnology community” (cf. 
Prakash, 2000). All of these categories imply that the persons ostensibly 
positioned within them display unilateral, static, attitudes and orientations 
toward biotechnology. 
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Representations of Scientists  
Like the scientific ‘facts’ and ‘thinking’ explored previously, research 
scientists are not the subject of official discourses on biotechnology. In 
contrast to ‘the anti biotechnologists’ described in Prakash’s magazine 
article discussed previously, scientists are not described in the noun form of 
“the anti biotechnologists”: they are described as “scientists”. But, even 
though they are not presented as a thing (viz the anti biotechnologists), there 
is little to no representation of the “voices” of scientists – in particular basic 
research scientists – in policy, corporate, or educational texts (apart from, 
for example, when a scientist contributes to a “fact sheet” on a particular 
biotechnology technique or application). Media sources quote directly from 
scientific “experts” in a certain field about a specific development, 
breakthrough, but they are not the voices that make claims on the future of 
biotechnology in country X, city Y, or practice Z. What the textual analysis 
cannot demonstrate is that the primary representation of scientists happens 
through the pictures that accompany policy documents, and government and 
company websites. In fact, scientists and computers are the only “agents” 
featured pictorially at every stage of mediation toward commodity, 
including policy contexts, industry contexts, and research contexts. (See the 
previous chapter for a selection of pictures from different contexts to 
explicate these dynamics of representation). “Ordinary People” who 
“benefit” from biotechnology (i.e. other than scientists who are consistently 
represented in relation to research) are most often represented pictorially in 
contexts of consumption usually to do with medicine and health and 
pharmaceutical products.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the ethical significance of a number of mediations 
that are manifest in the thesis corpus. These mediations are accepted, and 
apparently acceptable, to the extent that they conform with and reproduce 
the limited contexts in which they are produced and upon which they impact 
directly. See for example the diagram taken from the Victorian Strategic 
Plan 2000 for biotechnology included at the end of the previous chapter. 
The arrows that lead out of the diagram portraying areas of research all 
represent “business applications”. I do not want to suggest that this is a 
surprising or “out of place” feature of a strategic plan – quite the contrary. I 
posit that this document is doing and saying what it “should” according to 
the genre of strategic plans. The broader indirect and less visible ethico-
social and socio-political mediations of these processes are, however, rarely 
recognised or critiqued, as the analysis in this chapter has shown.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
Overview 
This chapter revisits the primary theoretical and conceptual contributions of 
the biotechnology as media framework. Apart from its function as a 
technical medium of alienation for hitherto inalienable aspects of life such 
as DNA, and a time medium for reproducing historically salient discourses, 
I argue that biotechnology has the potential to effectively, and for the most 
part invisibly, mediate our more general understandings and experiences of 
ourselves, of other species, and the world we live in. I have argued that 
biotechnology as media processes – as they currently function at formal 
discursive levels at least – actively and often forcefully promote a vast 
narrowing of the range of evaluative resources on offer to the general 
community, and indeed to biotechnologists themselves. The important 
question asked in this chapter is, if we can identify these broad effects or 
mediations of biotechnology by using techniques such as CDA and the 
biotechnology as media framework, what can we do to interrupt them and 
generate movements that are more socially just, accepting, and generative of 
more democratic and socially responsive range ways of seeing, being, and 
acting? 
Biotechnology as media – a digest 
Throughout this thesis, I posit that seeing biotechnology as media allows us 
to more fully recognise the myriad forms and processes in which, and by 
which, the ways of seeing, being, and acting associated with the social 
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practice of biotechnology oscillate outward, beyond the permeable 
rhetorico-discursively produced boundaries of the practice itself. The 
biotechnology as media framework, in particular the combination of social 
practice and discourse, reopens discussions about the merging or 
‘hybridising’ (Lemke, 1995; Fairclough, 2002) of social institutions, 
discourses, practices, genre, function, and so on. In particular, the notion of 
social embeddedness renews focus on a key understanding in critical 
discourse analysis literature that each individual member of any given social 
practice or ‘discourse community’, is simultaneously a constituting and 
constituted member of multiple discourse communities and social contexts.  
An emerging theoretical observation gained from the biotechnology as 
media framework is that mediating processes do not have to work in a 
linear, one way fashion. In being socially embedded, any given social 
practice is both subject to, and initiator of, any number of mediating 
practices that move both “into” and “out from” the permeable “boundaries” 
of the social practice. Through policy texts in particular, it is evident that 
mediating processes into and out from the social practice of biotechnology, 
are operating in historically familiar ways.  
Using the combined resources of CDA and the media framework, I have 
identified a number of sites of mediation (alienation, translation, 
recontextualisation, and absorption) that are evident in discourses 
surrounding biotechnology research and commercialisation. I have 
summarised these sites of mediation in the following categories: 
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1. Ontological: transformation of human being and becoming 
through the direct intervention of genetic technologies and, 
indirectly, through the production and reproduction of esteemed 
versions of normality, abnormality, desirability, and so on. This 
includes, for example, notions of what constitutes a “healthy 
person”, a “defective person”, or “an embryo worth growing” 
amid knowledge gained via genetic technologies. Discourses of 
animal and productivity and instrumentality in biotechnology 
also obviously impact on humans’ perceptions of be-ing in non 
humans; 
2. Relational: transformation, expansion, or contraction in human 
be-ing in relation to, and as demarcated from, others. This 
includes relationships within the human species and with other 
species and “nature” more generally; 
3. Spatial: actual geographical movement of discursive and 
biological resources from one place and context to another, for 
example, from the body context to the clinic, the ocean to a 
pharmaceutical manufacturing plant, or the laboratory to the 
stock market; 
4. Temporal: This refers to the notion of biotechnology as time 
vector or literal median point between the past, present, and 
imagined futures. I argue that biotechnology reinvigorates a 
series of dualisms, assumptions, ways of seeing, acting, and 
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being featured in historical discourse, delivers them in various 
ways into a range of new contexts, practices, and relationships; 
5. Hybridising: This movement is most evident in the social 
practice of biotechnology where science is purposively mixed 
with, or totalised by, the dominant economic and commercial 
imperatives of industry. This movement is also featured where 
recombinant DNA technologies are used to design and produce 
hybrid life forms. These hybrid life forms are not, as they 
previously were, limited to movements between members of a 
particular species. Rather scientists and medical practitioners 
use recombinant DNA technologies to transfer genes and body 
parts from one species to another (see for example, 
xenotransplantation).  
6. Colonising: this movement refers to the way that the function, 
location, and reproductive capabilities of a living organism are 
colonised and reengineered so as to accord with dominant 
human (productive capitalist) desires, interests, and uses. The 
living organism is produced (rather than reproduced) to carry 
out a technological function that is intended to serve some 
human benefit. This colonising movement is also evident where 
animals and plants are used as living factories to produce a 
given hormone, enzyme, or compound for human use (referred 
to as “pharming”). Another way to describe this movement may 
be “human imperialism” over the non human world. In my mind 
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this movement has parallels with the way that a virus infects a 
cell and takes over its functioning within the body.  
As the previous chapters have highlighted, there is a great deal of thematic 
consistency in the ways that biotechnology is being represented and 
evaluated in official biotechnology discourses. The mediations involved in 
product development in biotechnology are specifically aimed at moving the 
“outcomes” of biotechnological research into social contexts of mass 
consumption.  
These mediations are in no way neutral. They are in fact, finely tuned to 
using an existing productive apparatus to produce tangible things out of 
biotechnology research: Industry is the medium for “delivering on 
biotechnology’s promise”. There are, however, only so many forms and 
attributes that the medium of capital production will accept. These forms are 
not by and large set by scientists or governments. As the policies indicate, 
governments, under the label of science and technology policy, are relying 
on private companies and industry bodies to responsibly translate and 
deliver strengths in scientific research into new bio-industries, jobs, profits, 
health products and technologies, and economic growth.  
Using biotechnology as media in direct and indirect ways, humans from a 
number of inter-textual and inter-temporal backgrounds, practices, 
professions, intentions, and persuasions have expanded the number and 
range of territories, sites, and contexts within which they themselves or 
other individuals and institutions in current or future times can produce and 
reproduce salient forms of power, evaluation, and meaning. One new site 
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pronounced in discourses surrounding biotechnology research and 
commercialisation for example is the “the human genome”. Developments 
in gene technology have evoked a redefinition of how “property” is being 
defined in both general and legal discourses. The essential elements of 
property and ownership themselves have been tested at a most fundamental 
level because recombinant DNA technology means that previously 
inalienable aspects of human life (for example DNA sequences, cell lines 
etc) can now be alienated from an individual, tribe or race to be patented 
and exchanged for profit under intellectual property rights protection (cf. 
Thompson, 1995). In some cases (see previous examples of “Genetic Park” 
in Cilento, Italy and Moore vs. Regents in Chapter 2) the individual, tribe or 
even isolated villages is allowed only as a “partner” in the process of 
alienation and the profits arising thereof because without the medium 
(biotechnology) and the operators of the medium (the technocratic scientific 
community and its funders) the content would be useless, abstract, 
inalienable. As Graham (2000) argues, these new definitions of genetic 
“sites” and “property” are equivalent to the land grabs and enclosures acts in 
More’s Utopia in the sense that they redefine and allocate public property as 
private. Graham draws comparison between the enclosures act for example, 
and current policy and legislation that seeks to appropriate things such as 
“bandwidth” and radio frequencies as private property.  
But, as mentioned previously, it is not only biotechnology research that is 
being “fenced in” and commercialised in this way. There are a range of 
social practices, disciplines, and persons that are subject to the same 
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discursive trends and imperatives for productivity, speed of product 
development, material commercial appeal, and fiscal reward. A simple 
example is the Yoga in daily life centre that I attend. While there is potential 
in traditional Yogic teachings and values to promote radically different ways 
of seeing, being, and acting than those promoted through contemporary 
western institutions, the Yoga in daily life centre does not fully promote this 
radical, alternative aspect. Rather, the Yoga in daily life centre, as the name 
suggests, has adapted traditional Yogic practices to attend to the pressures 
and constraints of everyday life in a productive society including, for 
example, muscle pain associated with computer use, minimal leisure time 
outside of working hours, and stress. While I do not want to ridicule this 
practice, or deplete from its value, I do want to point out that, in as far as the 
adaptive yoga practice promotes only minimal interference into the working 
day (i.e. three minutes or so) it inversely propagates the given daily life 
associated with productive society. My point is that the potentially 
transformative content of a practice can be diluted or absorbed by the 
imperatives of the dominant productive apparatus and its mediation 
according to the so-called “way it is”. In this way the heteroglossic potential 
of the practice can be totalised or colonised by the dominant ways of seeing, 
being, and acting within a social and political economic system.  
Heteroglossia and monologia revisited 
‘We used to think our fate was in the stars. Now we know, in large measure, 
our fate is in our genes’. (James Watson)  
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A central dialectic underpinning this thesis has been that, while economic, 
political, and scientific powers to mediate the social and biological world 
via powerful, linear (one way), and elite scientific, political, and commercial 
practices increase, the citizen’s power to identify, resist, and/or reverse that 
mediation decreases (heteroglossia and monologia). Obviously, science, 
biotechnology, and commercialisation do not transform only the social and 
biological world of a laboratory or market place. Rather, the combined 
practices of science and commercialisation – and all of their related 
practices such as public policy, health care, education, ethics, counselling, 
and so on – reach into multiple contexts via multiple interlaced and 
interlocking discourses and socio-political technologies. Indeed, 
biotechnology as a social practice itself has been subject to many of the 
powerful trajectories it reproduces and as such shares an historically salient 
and readily identifiable path of simultaneous expansion and contraction with 
many other social practices of its and other times.  
In effect, although it is often portrayed as being “new”, “revolutionary”, or 
“emerging” by critics and protagonists alike, our current preoccupation with 
genetics and “breeding” is not new but, rather, re-emphasised, rearticulated, 
and reinvigorated by recent developments in genetic technologies, the 
biggest one of which is the much touted “mapping of the human genome”. 
Animal husbandry and farming practices have, for example, routinely 
sought to “optimise” desired traits, and eradicate or reduce undesired traits, 
in animals, crops, and plants for a range of aesthetic, commercial, 
agricultural, and manufacturing purposes.  
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Throughout this thesis I have sought to emphasise that understandings, 
meanings, and in particular, socio-politico orientations enabled by modern 
technologies of genetics and biology move beyond the social practice of 
science, biotechnology, and directly related practices such as medicine to 
vastly different contexts, relationships, and social situations. The Australian 
national economy and technology and pharmaceuticals stock markets for 
example have and are being “biotechnologised” or, more specifically, 
“geneticised”. If we believe what we see and hear in the Media, so too are 
race relations; interpersonal relations; property rights; social class; science 
degrees; public funding of research, scientific and otherwise; business 
ventures in the “new economy”; venture capital and investment; social 
behaviour, tastes, and fashion sense; agriculture; aggression; spousal choice; 
smoking; alcohol consumption; obesity; cancer; and intelligence. 
In biotechnology, we are witness to a significantly expanded ability for 
some humans to alienate, appropriate, transform, and commodify not only 
human labour power, but the very bases of human and non human social 
and biological being. Developments in information, understanding, 
technique, and/or knowledge have facilitated an expansion in the range of 
technico-scientific apparatus with which humans may alter and control the 
natural environment, other species and themselves. In identifying and 
alienating certain, previously unidentified or inalienable aspects of life, 
biotechnology significantly expands the range of subjects, organisms, 
processes, and substances upon and within which scientists can act.  
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When a practice such as biotechnology is captured by dominant productive 
economic trends and discourses of the day, it becomes a powerful vehicle 
for transporting those discourses literally into thousands and even millions 
of social and biological contexts and beings (i.e. our social as well as our 
biological being). At the same time, the spaces for contesting such 
movements are being colonised or shut down entirely. In consonance with 
Marcuse (1964), Bourdieu (1998a, p. 19) argues that the kinds of 
movements from heteroglossia to monologia I have outlined in official 
biotechnology discourses significantly limit the availability of social and 
political spaces for contestation in modern society. Bourdieu posits that 
‘[t]he social space is indeed the first and last reality, since it still commands 
the representations that the social agents can have of it’ (1994/1998b, p. 12). 
He argues, further, that spaces of artistic abstraction and antagonism which 
were thought to “transcend” the everyday productive apparatus (some 
spheres of nature and art) are increasingly subjugated to, and totalised by, 
the ideational constraints of commercialisability, immediate profit, and 
exchange value (Bourdieu, 1998a, pp. 37-38). 
The autonomy of the worlds of cultural production with respect to the 
market, which had grown steadily through the battles and sacrifices of 
writers, artists and scientists, is increasingly threatened. The reign of 
‘commerce’ and the ‘commercial’ bears down more strongly every day 
on literature, particularly through the concentration of publishing, 
which is more and more subject to the constraints of immediate profit; 
on literary and artistic criticism, which has been handed over to the 
most opportunistic servants of the publishers – or of their accomplices, 
with favour traded for favour; and especially on the cinema…Not to 
mention the social sciences, which are condemned either to subordinate 
themselves to the directly self-interested sponsorship of corporate or 
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state bureaucracies or with under the censorship of power (relayed by 
the opportunists) or money. (Bourdieu, 1998a, pp. 37-38) 
The social space for alternative ways of seeing, being, and acting, and 
contestation of monologia, is literally its abstraction, in spaces removed and 
protected from the everyday, or in the case of biological options, in 
unknown states of potentiality and inalienability. However with the 
technologisation and mediation of these antagonistic contents, ‘…whatever 
preconditions for a reversal [of the dominant productive apparatus] may 
exist are being used to prevent it’ (Marcuse, 1964, p. 13). We have seen this 
in biotechnology through very limited public consultation forums and 
engagement strategies. It is also evident in the dynamics of silence and 
silencing that proliferate in university and government bureaucracies. 
Re-emphasising context 
Context is an important concept in the biotechnology as media framework 
for a number of reasons. First, different actors, beneficiaries, and 
stakeholders are ‘located’ and ‘represented’ in different contexts in 
discourses of biotechnology. The effect of this social locating is to identify 
who has a say in which areas, who is required to have and say, and who 
cannot have a say. One of the most obvious findings of the textual analysis 
was that members of the general community are only seen to have a role in 
contexts of passive consumption.  
Community and the public are portrayed in only five contexts in the thesis 
corpus: the workplace; the clinic; the hospital; the street; and the 
supermarket. Correspondingly, community members are identified variously 
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in contract to ‘biotechnology’ as consumers, patients, and employees. As the 
pictures included at the end of Chapter Six indicate, ‘the general public’ are 
portrayed pictorially most often on pharmaceutical company websites and in 
health research contexts (Such as the Queensland Institute of Medical 
Research’s Population Health page). Although scientists are included in all 
contexts pictorially, they are curiously not given a voice in the thesis corpus. 
The focus is rather on the commercialisation and commoditisation of their 
work. 
Second, context is very significant in biotechnology because the whole point 
of government intervention in the practice is to recontextualise, 
technologise, and commodify the objects and understandings of research 
into new commercial and product oriented contexts. Each movement of 
recontextualisation requires both decontextualisation from the practice, 
point, or context of origin, and entextualisation according to the dominant 
norms, values, and expectations of the receiving context. Each movement 
also, by a matter of course, reduces the degree of proximity between the 
original goals, goods, and guides of scientific research and its ultimate ends. 
I suggest that CDA is a valuable tool for identifying and assessing these 
movements. It would not be possible to identify these differences without 
conducting interdiscursive or intertextual analyses. 
Responses  
A critical question arising from the thesis, and contemporary approaches to 
applied ethics more generally (cf. Isaacs and Massey, 1994) is, if we can 
identify these broad effects or mediations of biotechnology by using 
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techniques such as CDA and the biotechnology as media framework, what 
can we do to interrupt them and generate movements that are more socially 
just, accepting, and generative of more democratic and socially responsive 
range ways of seeing, being, and acting? Mediations do not need to flow in 
only one direction. I have outlined a number of possibilities below. 
1. Towards an alternative metaphor  
Most people not only aren’t interested in changing the ordinary and 
routine, they can’t even imagine the need for doing so because of the 
invisibility of the habitual. In order to get them to think about it, you 
have to make it visible to them. (Postman and Weingartner, 1971) 
Throughout the thesis I have argued that a focus on new biotechnology 
technologies or techniques alone – as opposed to a fuller recognition of the 
elements of social practice – restricts citizens’ view of biotechnology to 
observable products or applications. Indeed, even anti-biotechnology 
activists’ focus on, or resignation to, the fact of institutionalised regulatory 
practices such as legislation, codified ethics, and public policy does not 
illuminate the extent to which social, scientific, technological innovation 
can influence and define human society via the myriad but largely 
unrecognised, nonmaterial, non-physical-technological by hugely political-
moral processes of mediation.  
In order to comprehend its socio-political, socio-historical impacts, I argue 
that we need to change the way we think about and evaluate biotechnology. 
I have suggested the metaphor of media and mediation as the central 
contribution of this thesis. But when we describe biotechnology to others, it 
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does not need to involve an entire doctoral thesis. An appropriate metaphor 
for biotechnology needs to be alive, it needs to “flow” in many ways and be 
sensitive to new additions to the story. In constructing an appropriate 
metaphor, we also need to recognise that even once certain ways of seeing, 
being, and acting have been ‘absorbed’ into everyday common sense and 
use, they are not beyond critique, question , or revision. 
During various conference presentations and conversations I have often 
described biotechnology as media using the metaphor of a lake of water. I 
have turned the metaphor of the lake into a story that encourages people to 
imagine the different ways that one event or development can move outward 
to, and affect, new contexts. If we say, for example, that knowledge and 
understanding of the human genome is a pebble (more or less weighty 
according to your own experience and imagination), and the practice of 
biotechnology research is a lake of water, the pebble being tossed into the 
lake could produce any number of expected and unexpected ripples and 
outcomes both within the lake and beyond it. When the pebble is tossed into 
the lake it causes ripples in the water that move outward from the point of 
origin. By the time these ripples get to the edges of the lake they have 
become waves that take sand from the edges of the lake and smooth the 
pebbles on the beaches. The force of the waves on the beach returns the 
ripples in a reverse motion toward the centre of the lake where the pebble 
has since sunk to the bottom and has been ingested by a large fish named 
Boris.  
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At the far end of the lake there is a group of school students collecting insect 
specimens for their science class. They enjoy the feeling of the ripples 
running over their feet at the edge of the water. Some girls at one end of the 
group decide they’ll start throwing in pebbles and sticks too. Their teacher, 
who seems to be somewhere else entirely, likes the aesthetic appeal of the 
way the ripples make the sun dance on the surface of the water.  
At the opposite end of the lake there is a stream that runs into a river that in 
turn runs into the ocean. At one section of the river a small farming 
community has gained permission from the local council to drain an agreed 
amount of water out of the river each day to irrigate their crops and provide 
drinking water for their animals. A high-pressure pump is now syphoning 
the ripples into an underwater pipe that eventually leads to Farmer Bob’s 
cows and crops. Along the river a bit further a small community has built a 
dam on the river to run a hydroelectric power station. Some of the ripples 
that came originally from the pebble, through the lake, and into the river, are 
now channelled into the hydroelectricity plant’s catchment area, others pass 
on through the dam wall. Before the community can use the power 
generated at the hydroelectricity power station it has to be processed, 
converted, and channelled into an appropriate voltage for household use. 
Ten years ago the local council decided to raise household rates to help pay 
for the hydroelectric dam to be built. The state government also chipped in 
some funds it had raised through a longstanding petrol levy. Each household 
now has to pay a $150 connection fee to finally start using the power. 
Household power privileges are cut off if they don’t pay their monthly bills 
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after that. The price of power is set by the CEO of power company but are 
within state government guidelines.  
At the point where the river is almost the ocean an oil freighter is in dock. 
Unbeknownst to the ship’s crew there is a leak in the main cargo hold. Oil is 
gradually leaking out of the large freighter into the water. Before the oil can 
be treated by the local bioremediation firm, some of the ripples from the 
pebble that made it through the lake into the river and past the hydroelectric 
dam now help to carry the oil slick out to sea. A fish who has decided she 
doesn’t like the level of water pollution so close to dock decides she will 
swim back toward the lake where she first learnt how to swim with her 
brother Boris. As she goes she carries with her images of the oil slick fresh 
in her mind and tiny particles of oil on her fins that she doesn’t even know 
are there. While it may be easy for an tall observer to watch the ripples 
progress outward from the pebble’s point of contact with the surface, it 
becomes increasingly more difficult to monitor or observe the progress of 
the pebble’s ripples as they move to and from the shore and beyond the lake 
into the stream, the river, and finally the unknown depths of the ocean 
2. Interrupting linear mediations and practices of silence and silencing 
The objective of government policy on biotechnology is to move 
biotechnological innovation and ‘life’ products in a linear flow from a state 
of inalienability to the commercial market and consumption. This is in part 
why contesting voices may feel utterly overwhelmed by the historical force 
and political weight of the assumptions not just of biotechnology but of the 
whole modernity project. Biotechnology as media processes are in reality 
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not linear. Recontextualisations, translations, alienations, absorptions occur 
in many directions between the groups, institutions, and individuals 
involved. Indeed the processes themselves are often simultaneous, for 
example recontextualisation via or through translation or alienation through 
translation and recontextualisation.  
In challenging practices of silence and silencing, we need to first 
acknowledge that silence is a collective practice. This in itself is more 
meaningful than it may at first appear: It is part of our common knowledge 
for example that something can be known or tacitly accepted without ever 
being overtly stated by anyone. We can for example “know” or “sense” that 
it is not “the done thing” to talk about X in a certain context or to discuss Y 
and Z with certain people. We come to learn, know, or sense these often 
unstated rules for communicative engagement from a range of sources. 
Identifying these technologies of silence and silencing goes at least some 
way toward showing us WHERE and HOW silence is produced and 
reproduced as a socio-political process, and thus where and how it can be 
transformed, not just THAT it exists. Moreover, it is important for all 
citizens, but particularly those who shape social engagements, to recognise 
that, even in situations where “discussion” and “debate” does occur, 
processes of silence and silencing can be at work: there are many things that 
are not said that should be. As the critical discourse analysis included in this 
thesis has identified, even when we have access to “information” about 
biotechnology, that information can still limit, distract, confuse, and lead us 
to silence, either advertently or inadvertently. Indeed it is often the most 
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obvious, powerful, and readily identifiable forms of discourse that mask 
and/or de-emphasise the harmful and dehumanising realities of silence, 
silencing, and the silenced. One way of countering practices of silence and 
silencing is to promote a more critical awareness of discourse and language. 
3. Critical discourse awareness 
Discourses do not just function ideologically as identity kits or to obtain 
‘goods’. They also function to legitimate, naturalize, or disguise the 
inequities they sustain. They function to get us thinking along particular 
lines, the lines of a common sense, which are not as likely to lead to 
subversive conclusions as using some other discourse might. (Lemke, 
1995, p. 13, italics added) 
Fairclough (1992) states that discursive practice is ‘constitutive in both 
conventional and creative ways: it contributes to reproducing society…as it 
is, yet also contributes to transforming society’. He makes an example of 
education practice: 
‘For example, the identities of teachers and pupils and the relationships 
between them which are at the heart of a system of education depend 
upon a consistency and durability of patterns of speech within and 
around those relationships for their reproduction. Yet they are open to 
transformations which may partly originate in discourse: in the speech 
of the classroom, the playground, the staffroom, educational debate, and 
so forth’ (p. 65). 
Most importantly, Fairclough’s example reinforces that the relationship 
between students and their teachers in this example is influenced by the way 
in which they are described. In a similar manner, critical awareness of the 
language of biotechnology research and commercialisation is urgently 
required in order to challenge the linearity of biotechnology mediation 
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processes toward absorption. Transformation in biotechnology and its 
related practices will require critical language awareness in order to render 
visible the assumptions and values that underlay, produce and reproduce the 
practice (Gee and Lankshear, 1995). Critical language awareness requires: 
‘teasing out the possible meanings of socially contested terms can give 
rise to sets of questions and issues for debate and dialogue among 
Discourses, as well as deeper understanding of the values and 
ideological loadings that are at stake’ (Gee and Lankshear, 1995, p. 12). 
Consonant with Gee and Lankshear’s notion of critical language awareness, 
Isaacs (1996, p. 39) and Gilbert (1987, p. 52) advocate the need for critical 
practice. Critical practice requires a condition of anti-hegemonic formal and 
informal practice ‘if it is to produce policies and political action’ (Gilbert, 
1987, p. 52). Essentially, anti-hegemonic practice requires that alternatives 
to the current conception of the purpose, means and culture of the dominant 
discourses are made available through the everyday lived experiences on 
offer. Critical discourse awareness, as opposed to critical language 
awareness, incorporates a more overt focus on the relationships between 
ways of using language, ways of seeing, being, valuing, and acting. 
4. Enhancing the engagement 
As members of an engaged community of scholars, researchers, and 
activists that seeks to practice and facilitate open and authentic discussion 
surrounding biotechnology developments, it is important that we name, 
discuss, critique, and seek to transform the technologies of silence at work 
in biotechnology related debates and other areas of social contestation. In 
many ways this is a personal challenge as much as it is a social or an 
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institutional one: we ourselves may need to overcome any number of 
personal and institutional limitations that would in many other 
circumstances, and for many quite legitimate reasons, function to silence or 
intimidate us. I do not want to pretend that this is an easy task. 
One possible solution is to create genres of engagement that support 
heteroglossia and contestation. As an indication of what may be possible, 
we can think briefly about the role of engagements that can be mediated 
through academic university contexts. During the thesis period, for example, 
I was involved in the organising committee of an international conference 
on biotechnology: ‘Towards Humane Technologies: Biotechnology, new 
media, and citizenship’. The aims of the conference were listed as follows: 
 To create a space for informed discussion and debate for all 
interested persons; 
 To illuminate the relationship between progress in biotechnology 
and broader technological, social, political, and economic 
trajectories; 
 To illuminate the social and historical embeddedness of 
biotechnology, so that we may more adequately understand, and 
respond to, current and future challenges; 
 To illuminate the nature of the new political economy with particular 
reference to biotechnology and new media, globalisation, 
sustainability, and global capital; 
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 To map out current ethical, regulatory, and legislative responses to 
advances in biotechnology research and commercialisation, and to 
evaluate the degree to which these responses match the ethical 
challenges at hand; 
 To develop an innovative and creative template for public discussion 
and learning founded on a multidisciplinary approach to doing 
applied ethics; 
 To encourage the development of an international network of 
scholars, professionals, and citizens who are committed to fostering 
broad, reflective, and informed awareness of biotechnology; 
 To promote a more authentic awareness and appreciation of 
vulnerable persons and marginalised discourses in the debate; 
 To facilitate a greater awareness of the human and non-human 
benefits and costs of modern biotechnology research and 
commercialisation. 
The conference featured a number of alternative engagement forums 
including: “Reality Check” testimonials: A series of live and recorded 
testimonials from professionals and interested parties whose voices are 
generally not foregrounded in public discussions. For example, people with 
disabilities; people conceived through reproductive technologies; scientists 
at the coal-face; policy makers; and so on.  
Following the conference, the conference organising committee produced a 
report that was used to circulate the outcomes of the conference to 
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government organisations (cf. Graham, Isaacs, and Sunderland, 2002). The 
authors emphasised a number of practical features that people organising 
engagements surrounding biotechnology need to be aware of. These include: 
The need to recognise, value, and include multiple knowledges and lived 
realities without falling into dichotomies between “expert” and “lay” or 
“rational” and “irrational” and “emotional”; The need to move the 
discussion into more community-friendly spaces: eg, not on working days 
and in working hours and no fee for any participant; The need to promote 
ongoing participation from government, academic, scientific, corporate, and 
other communities; and the need to provide a duty of care for those who 
wish to speak about their personal experiences, identities, constraints and so 
on, regardless of their institutional affiliation, status, or lack thereof;  
The report also suggested that the following passage, from Erich Fromm’s 
The Revolution of Hope: Toward a Humanized Technology, remains 
instructive and relevant in the context of biotechnology:  
1. The number of participating people must be restricted in such a way 
that the discussion remains direct and does not allow the rhetoric of 
the manipulating influence … to become effective. […]. 
2. Objective and relevant information which is the basis for everyone's 
having an approximately clear and accurate picture of the basic issues 
must be given to each group. ...We must ask (a) how the necessary 
information can be transmitted to the group for which it is relevant 
and (b) how our education can increase the [participant's] capacity for 
critical thought rather than to make of him [or her] a consumer of 
information. 
3. Another requirement for the functioning of all face-to-face groups is 
debate. Through the increasing mutual knowledge of the members, 
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the debate will lose an acrimonious and slogan-throwing character 
and will become a dialogue between human beings instead of a 
disputation. ... In every fruitful dialogue, each participant must help 
the other to clarify his [or her] thought rather than to force him to 
defend a formulation about which he [sic] may have his own doubts. 
Dialogue implies mutual respect and clarification. 
4. Eventually, information and debate would remain sterile and impotent 
if the group did not have the right to make decisions and if these 
decisions were not translated into the real process of that social sector 
to which they belong. …  
5. The people involved in debate, dialogue, and decision making need to 
be given time to consider, reflect, and reconsider their learnings and 
interactions. … It follows that the area of decision making should 
grow while people learn how to think, to debate, and to make 
judgements. … Eventually, the face-to-face groups would be entitled 
to vote on fundamental principles of action which would require a 
significant process of power shifting and sharing. (Fromm, 1968: 115-
116) 
Every process of interaction and debate has an educational influence and 
changes the people who participate in it (Fromm, p. 116). People who host 
these events have a duty of care to make every attempt to ensure that the 
people who participate move away from destructive interactions toward 
conditions of mutual respect – even in cases of disagreement and dispute. 
The lack of follow through with decision making directly, and the 
transformation of decision making processes, has been a major limitation of 
public "consultation" and Consensus Conference style interactions we have 
experienced in Australia. 
Conference organisers, managers of public awareness, and academics need 
to be aware of the broader climate of disinterestedness or prejudice against 
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certain forums for including multiple voices and narratives of lived reality. 
In particular, we face problems of passivity, silencing, and subjection to 
expert and hierarchical voices when trying to encourage widespread 
participation in debates and dialogue, particularly when attempting to hear 
from scientists working at the bench.  
Biotechnology is a particularly contentious area of debate and many public 
discussion forums end up being set up as US versus THEM. Getting a 
“balance” of the US and the THEM camps is then portrayed as a successful 
event – regardless of the quality of discussion and progress in 
understandings and trust between participants. Following the points above, 
participants can be encouraged to clarify understandings and perspectives 
with and for each other, rather than pursue offensive-defensive positions. 
Fromm’s point above that individual presenters and participants may 
themselves have some doubt about their position is particularly important in 
this respect. 
It is a reality that many people who have attempted to engage in public 
discussions surrounding biotechnology have been personally attacked and 
labelled publicly or in private forums using highly slanderous and 
derogatory terms. Because of this reality many people with valuable 
contributions and understandings feel disinclined to participate in further 
events. Conference organisers and participants alike should seek to remind 
others that bullying is unacceptable for any participant in any context, be 
they academic, scientist, community member, bureaucrat, politician, or 
activist.  
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5. Toward a view of ethics and language in social life 
Consistent with its focus on ethics as a dimension of social life, the 
approach to applied ethics adopted in the thesis draws less on philosophical 
approaches to ethics and more on social theories of language, power, 
interaction, mediation, and discourse. This approach to ethics seeks to locate 
ethics not in the realm of select, elite, authoritarian tracts, pacts, or defined 
spaces, but in the social round. Just like language itself, ethics is dynamic: at 
all times it is multicontextual, multifaceted, and multivoiced. Ethics is not 
simply philosophy, neither is it a field of science. Both philosophy and 
science are historically powerful representations and ways of approaching 
ethics that carry with them – like any approach or particular way of seeing – 
their own incumbent assumptions, freedoms, and limitations.  
Ethics is not separate from the social medium even when it is codified into a 
symbolic text such as ethical guidelines or laws or even stoplights at 
intersections. Even the most abstract text is an element in a chain of social 
events, understandings, interpretations, and relationships: It arises from 
specific social contexts and it has specific social effects.  
If we see ethics as being embedded in everyday relationships, codified 
guidelines for ethics is not “ethics” and ethics “committees” do not 
constitute “ethics”. Both of these genres of ethical engagement are only 
normative representations of ethics as it occurs in every, everyday social 
relationships and contexts. Drawing on Bakhtin’s theory of heteroglossia 
and its manifestation in the novel genre, we can draw parallels between 
ethics and language, or, more specifically Bakhtin’s critique of the notion 
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that there can be one national language for any given country or culture. 
Apart from the correlations we can draw between ethics and language as 
both being fundamentally shared social practices, and existing in social 
relationships, there are distinct functional relationships between language 
and ethics that have hardly been taken into account in the dominant 
“national language” style approaches to ethics. Although the fields of 
linguistics, language theory, philosophy of knowledge, discourse analysis, 
and some areas of narrative ethics readily acknowledge the role of language, 
discourse, and discourse materialities as shaping social appreciations of 
value, esteem, validity, identity, desirability, and more general ways of 
seeing, being, and acting, this is – curiously – not a feature of ethics 
discourse generally.  
I posit that, taking Bakhtin’s notion of heteroglossia as a base, we can re-
emphasise the heterogeneity and literal heteroglossic nature of ethics-in-life 
relative to multiple layerings of time, context, identity, lived reality, and so 
on. The primary aspect of this is to foreground language as a primary 
constituting element both of understandings of ethics, and of the more and 
less stated value orientations of members of society. We can literally see 
ethics as heteroglossia. The linkage point between a social view of ethics 
and heteroglossia is that each of the “socio-ideological languages” Bakhtin 
identifies in the above passage serve to produce and reproduce, in and 
themselves, distinct ethical orientations, ways of valuing, ways of being, 
seeing, and acting. This social metaphysical view of ethics is not merely 
essential in understanding the nature and complexity of social value and 
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ethical engagement but also in acknowledging and respecting the multiple 
sites and shapers of ethical engagements between persons. If we move the 
agenda to think not only of socio-ideological languages, but of their 
constitutive and recursive intersections with Beings and materialities we 
have yet again thickened and deepened our heteroglossic range of resources 
for comprehending and entering into ethical discussion and engagement. 
In their role in producing and reproducing centripetal power forces, social 
institutions and social practices are in themselves manifestations of ethics, 
value, and evaluation (Bahktin). But like language also, these institutions 
are not static or structural in and of themselves. These manifestations and 
the power they and their constituents accrue through totalisation of the 
centripetal and centrifugal forces have immense power to shape and reshape 
social habitation in reality and social relationships. How are these 
movements primarily achieved? Through language and discourse, the 
substances of shared social reality. Ethics, like language itself, finds it 
expression, production, and reproduction only through the social medium, 
the social round of shared experience, shared understanding, and shared 
access to meaningful social spaces.  
Ethics like biotechnology, policy making, law, medicine, business, and 
education, is a ‘social practice’ (Isaacs, 1998). We as social beings are 
inevitably tied up in practices of language and discourse via which we 
produce and reproduce shared understandings, relationships, meanings, 
identity, and so on. In approaching ethics as social practice, I have 
foregrounded the role of language and particular language practices such as 
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translation and recontextualisation as being inherently interpretive, political, 
and ethical practices. Social materialities such as social institutions, social 
practices, processes of governance and law which form the objective 
everyday realities of our lives and the boundaries within which we interact 
as ethical beings are all in and of themselves expressions of ethics that are 
recursively shaped and reshaped via language and discourse. 
As social beings we rely on language to be able to communicate with others, 
learn about, and understand them as well as ourselves. Language defines 
social realities just as it defines the value systems that shape the way we 
live. We are socialised as human beings via language and we gain access to 
various social practices, professions, and contexts by learning a common 
language and entering into a shared system of meaning. Our conceptions of 
our own identities, and the identities of others, are delineated and defined in 
people’s language, and that is why language provides an important, if not a 
vital focus for understanding ourselves as social beings. But to do so is no 
simple matter. Language practices cannot be understood outside of their 
historical and political contexts; neither can they be derived from these 
contexts by any simple equation. 
Social institutions, social practices, and language are all living, dynamic 
processes. They live in the spaces [relationships] between humans, not in 
individual humans alone. This means the ethical response is just that, a 
response. Not just an act or behaviour in accordance with a codified 
principle of such and such but a responsiveness and awareness and 
consciousness of the other, of his or her particular voice, and the historical 
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language and site he or she is speaking from. In life as it is lived ethics is a 
novel of voices, perspectives, experiences, and thoughts. Ethics is 
heteroglossic. But in ethics, as in social relationships at all levels, the voices 
of the heteroglossia are not equal. Each voice, each individual, each 
representation is regulated, privileged, and restrained by dynamics of power 
and the reproduction of power.  
Conclusion 
Throughout history developments in the biological sciences and health care 
such as the ones emerging in the “biotech century” have challenged widely 
accepted notions of the moral and ethical obligations of health professionals 
and the wider society (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994). But at a deeper 
level it is language and human relationships that make social systems 
different from mechanical or organic systems. Language is the basis of 
social-ethical engagements and of our understanding of others because of 
one basic fact: we cannot read someone else’s mind, we can only interpret 
what resources for meaning they and others make available – either 
wittingly or unwittingly – in the social medium.  
To the extent that techno-scientific and economically determined discourses 
on biotechnology are more powerful than others – and more 
effectively/invisibly produced and reproduced over time within increasing 
numbers of social genres – they filter out to become ‘officially’ synonymous 
with ‘the ethical form of life’. The thesis corpus clearly shows that 
biotechnology is an ‘official utopia’ of our time. The mediating functions of 
Alienation, Translation, Recontextualisation, and Absorption currently 
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function in largely monologic ways to perpetuate and shield this distinctly 
modern utopia from dissent or contestation.  
Currently, biotechnology developments are forcibly recontextualised into, 
and thus mediated by, contexts and practices that are themselves saturated 
with commercial imperatives and apparently asocial imperatives of 
economic determinism and rationalism. These mediations occur as a matter 
of public policy at state, national, and international levels.  
But, mediation is not a one way street. The current observable pathways of 
mediation associated with the so-called Virtuous Cycle of biotechnology 
need not necessarily define biotechnology as a practice in the years to come. 
The basis for social-political transformation has been located in the 
production and reproduction of social practices over time and, in turn, their 
influence on our shared ways of seeing, being, and acting in social life. 
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Appendix A Definitions of biotechnology 
Group 1. Government departments and politicians - formulated 
“official” definitions 
The following explanations of biotechnology come from Australian state 
and commonwealth government Departments. 
a) Biotechnology Australia Public Awareness division within the 
Commonwealth Department of Industry, Science, and 
Resources (DISR)  
Biotechnology is a broad term covering the use of biological 
discoveries for the development of industrial processes and the 
production of useful organisms and their products. Uses include the 
production of foods and medicines, the reduction of wastes and the 
creation of renewable energy sources. (Factsheet) 
b) Queensland Government Department of Primary Industries  
Biotechnology is simply using biological processes to make things 
for humans. Bread, for example, is made using biotechnology. The 
biological activity of the yeast helps dough rise, creating a food 
product with the help of active microorganisms. (Information for 
Educators page) 
c) Queensland Government Department of Innovation and 
Information Economy  
Put simply, biotechnology is the science of using living organisms 
to produce goods and services. Technically, the use of bacteria to 
produce yoghurt or the use of yeast to ferment beer is 
biotechnology. However, modern biotechnology is more commonly 
associated with genomics and gene technology. (Policy Statement: 
‘Queensland’s Ethical Approach to Biotechnology Development) 
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d) Parliamentary speech by Barbara Stone Member for 
Springwood QLD  
Biotechnology is the term used for biological discovery for the 
development of industrial processes and the production of useful 
organisms and their products. It is used in the production of 
medicines, foods and energy sources. It can be said that 
biotechnology in the form of fermentation processes has been used 
for decades to make cheese and beer. Biotechnology has also been 
associated with animals and plants in the creation of animals or 
plants with specific characteristics. (Hansard 18 October 2001) 
Group 2. Non government organisations – industry, activist, and 
scientific institutions and organisations – formulated definitions  
The following definitions of biotechnology are taken from a range of 
organisations and institutions websites. These organisations and institutions 
may be closely linked to government but are not government departments. 
a) US Office of Technology Assessment:  
‘The application of scientific techniques that use living organisms, 
or substances from those organisms, to make or modify products, 
improve plants and animals, or to develop micro-organisms for 
specific uses’.  
b) CSIRO Australia:  
‘The use of biological systems - living things - to make or change 
products. It has been used for centuries in traditional activities like 
baking bread and making cheese’.  
Group 3. Practitioners involved in biotechnology research and 
commercialisation – semi-formulated to informal definitions 
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The definitions of biotechnology listed below all come from people working 
within, or in direct relation to, the social practice of biotechnology in 
Queensland Australia. These definitions were recorded during interviews 
conducted between January and June 2000. While they are not intended to 
be representative of the complete range of understandings within the 
practice, these definitions provide an ‘impressionistic account’ (cf. Van 
Maanen, 1998, pp. 101-102) of the range of discursive resources on offer 
within the Queensland scientific research and business communities.  
a) “My understanding of it [the term biotechnology] would be 
different from the way it is used I suspect… I think the way it is 
actually used is any field of technology that’s applicable to 
biological systems or processes. In a stricter sense, 
biotechnology is actually using biological organisms to 
manufacture products - in which case we obviously wouldn’t 
fit”. (Company Managing Director) 
b) “Technology based on the use of biological means to achieve a 
result”. (Company Director) 
c) “Any type of technology that uses DNA as its basic substance, I 
don’t use it to refer to, for example, research in hormones and 
how to manipulate animals using hormones. For myself I see 
that term as restricted to DNA technology”. (Research 
Scientist) 
d) “Biotechnology is essentially, to me, the development of 
products and processes utilising biological information and 
biological systems”. (Research Director) 
e) “Using natural organisms or mechanisms to produce other 
organisms or mechanisms. Biotechnology has been around for 
centuries, used for bread making, whatever. Really, modern 
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biotechnology began with the discovery of DNA and 
recombinant technology.” (Company Director) 
f) “Any advanced technology that relates primarily to gene 
technology though its content may be broadened to include 
advanced biological technologies”. (Company CEO) 
g) “Biotechnology covers a lot of traditional forms of using 
biological techniques to produce chemicals, foods etc so it 
includes fermentation and similar sorts of traditional processes. 
But what I think we’re really talking about now is what you 
might call modern biotechnology or gene technology which 
involves actually manipulating genes to change the structure of 
organisms or to create new organisms with different structures. 
Within traditional biotechnology you can also talk about 
traditional breeding and cross breeding which has been going 
on for millennium. Now modern DNA technologies enable the 
transfer of DNA between species and even across kingdom 
barriers between plants and animals, microbiological organisms 
etc”. (Consumer representative ) 
h) “I understand it to mean manipulation of DNA by a range of 
means – not just genetic engineering, but including use of 
modern molecular tools to assist in genetic change and that 
includes things like molecular markers to assist in 
[indiscernible] breeding for example as well as traditional (well 
traditional now) conventional [indiscernible] things like genetic 
engineering.” (Research Director) 
i) “I think it’s changed a lot. It’s a bit of a catchall actually 
because these days it covers a lot of chemistry and physics but I 
suppose really it’s technology related to recombinant DNA”. 
(Research Institute Director) 
j) “Using biological processes or organisms for human 
application or plant application or food”. (Company Managing 
Director) 
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k) “From a public company perspective… meaning anything that 
is science-based that is used in health care applications – both 
veterinary and human. This is not necessarily the traditional 
definition of using biologicals although that is certainly and 
important part of [company name]” (Company CEO) 
l) “I believe it’s the use of, well I suppose, enabling technologies 
whether they be fermentation reactors or tissue culture or gene 
technology. It’s the use of a set of technologies for basically 
improvement of biological systems… Maybe it’s the 
application of biological systems in any of the fields of 
agriculture or medicine or, you know, any sort of field of 
human endeavour. Even in my mind it’s a fairly loose term and 
I never really started out thinking of myself as a 
biotechnologist. I started my career in plant physiology and I 
then widened that to use plant tissue cultures for some studies 
in plant physiology or applications in plant improvement. It’s 
only really been in the last 15 years that people have started 
calling it biotechnology” (Research Group Leader.) 
m) “I see it as broad a term as possible. I know a lot of people 
would assume biotechnology is genetic engineering but no I 
prefer to think of it as the use of modern technologies in a 
biological sense”. (Senior Researcher) 
n) “Creating value from biological sciences”. (Industry 
Consultant) 
o) “Anything to do with where we use technology as part of a 
biological process to achieve an end result”. (Company 
Marketing Manager) 
p) “Basically the use of biological means to achieve either the 
production of a chemical/product, or the degradation of a 
chemical/product be it naturally occurring or synthetic”. 
(Company Senior Scientist) 
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q) “Two things: biotechnology literally is the use of living 
organisms in some way to achieve a technological goal of one 
sort or another so things like genetic engineering are classic 
modern manifestations of it. Ancient manifestations are things 
like brewing and bread making and all that sort of stuff, cheese 
etc. I don’t think that we mean… I mean biotechnology now is 
a completely different word. Literally, in terms of its scientific 
discipline it still means the same thing: the use of living 
organisms for some purpose…When Bill Clinton, or John 
Howard or the Head of the International Biotechnology 
Industry Association or someone like that uses the term 
biotechnology they really mean the bio-industry or 
biologically-related industries if you like”. (Director Research 
Institute) 
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